KOSOVO WEEKLY UPDATE: GOS EXPECTS RUSSIAN VETO BUT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000776

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DEPT FOR U/S BURNS, EUR A/S FRIED, EUR DAS DICARLO AND
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KBTS KPAO YI SR
SUBJECT: KOSOVO WEEKLY UPDATE: GOS EXPECTS RUSSIAN VETO BUT
PREPARES FOR DELAY

REF: A. (A) ROME 1187


B. (B) BELGRADE 310

C. (C) BELGRADE 750

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHAEL C. POLT FOR REASONS 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (U) With Serbia's government back online, President Tadic
and Prime Minister Kostunica are devoting their attention to
the UN Security Council's next steps regarding Kosovo. This
cable summarizes the week's notable events regarding Serbia
and Kosovo and (in paragraph 8) provides post's analysis of
GOS reactions to possible scenarios at the UNSC.

UNSC: The view from Belgrade
--------------


2. (SBU) Tadic and Kostunica remain united on Kosovo policy
with both leaders continuing to engage on the issue abroad
and at home. On 5/29, Belgrade media reported that Kostunica
would meet Russian President Putin in St. Petersburg during
the International Economic Forum next week. Russian
Ambassador to Serbia Alexeev told wire service FoNet on 5/30
that a meeting between the leaders is "definitely possible."
The Prime Minister is as confident as ever that a new UNSC
resolution allowing for Kosovo independence will fail,
telling the press on 6/1 that he expects further
international discussions on Kosovo status, as requested last
week by the Serbian parliament to the UN Secretary General.


3. (U) PM Advisor Jankovic, in a lengthy interview with
Serbian weekly NIN, protested against implications from the
international community that Serbia and Russia's
"intransigence" makes them "responsible" if there is violence
in Kosovo. Likening the situation to the 1938 Sudeten crisis
in principle, Jankovic said that "we are faced with an ethnic
community...that threatens to resort to violence unless given
territory...while an internationally recognized democratic
country is being forced to pay the price of irresponsibility,
cavalier attitude and cowardice of others." Jankovic claimed
to have had "official and unofficial" talks that suggest
"control was adequate and forces deployed to Kosovo are
capable of preventing violence." Jankovic also warned that
only a new UNSC resolution will keep EU countries united in
favor of Kosovo independence. If NATO countries recognize a
"self-proclaimed independent Kosovo," Jankovic said that
Serbia's attitude "could only mean one thing -- that the
military intervention of 1999 was not motivated by
humanitarian reasons, but by an intention to redraw the
borders of the Balkans." EU recognition in that case "would
inevitably result in a change of sentiments" of many Serbians
on the question of European integration.


4. (C) Meanwhile, President Tadic raised Serbia's objections
to Kosovo independence in a visit to Rome and planned the
same in a visit to Berlin. Serbian media reported that Tadic
met with Italian PM Prodi on 5/29 and reiterated that any
form of Kosovo independence is unacceptable to Serbia, and
that Serbia "wants a compromise solution...acceptable to both
sides." Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic also traveled to Rome
this week and had similar discussions with his counterpart.
Reftel A reported that Tadic and Jeremic both told the
Italians that the Russians have promised to veto any UNSC
that allows for Kosovo independence.


5. (U) In an interview with Belgrade daily Vecernje Novosti,
FM Jeremic made comments similar to PM advisor Jankovic's on
Serbia's policy towards other countries which recognize
Kosovo independence without a UNSC resolution. "Kosovo will
continue to be an inseparable part of Serbia," adding that
Serbia would "re-examine its relations (with countries
recognizing Kosovo) taking care not to bring the country into
isolation."


6. (U) The Radical Party (SRS) on 5/29 called for a "serious
parliamentary debate" on Kosovo to "discuss the threats made
by the EU, USA and other world powers that want to strip
Serbia of its province." SRS general secretary Vucic called
Tadic's support for joining NATO "damaging" for Serbia's
relations with Russia which Vucic "expects to impose a veto
at the UNSC." Russia, Vucic opined, "would not view
(Serbia's desire to join NATO) as a friendly gesture."


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USG statements and activity
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7. (U) Belgrade media reported the Ambassador's comments on
5/31 that he expects a solution to Kosovo status will be
reached before the end of his mandate this summer. Local
media also covered a Department spokesperson McCormack's
comments that Kosovo cannot be reintegrated into Serbia and
that both Kosovo and Serbia should have a European future.

Reactions to UNSC next steps
--------------


8. (S) The following is our assessment of the GOS and local
diplomatic representatives' reactions to three possible
outcomes at the UNSC.

- Scenario A: UNSC votes on resolution, Russia does not veto

Clearly optimal for the USG, this outcome would bring
finality to the GOS' years-long campaign to avoid and/or
delay any change to UNSCR 1244's protection of Kosovo as part
of Serbia. Tadic has told us privately (reftel B) that his
first job after Kosovo status is resolved will be to rebuild
Serbia's relations with the West. In this week's meeting
with the Ambassador (reftel C),PM Kostunica said that he
would "not oppose any UNSC resolution" and that the USG and
Serbia would be able to "settle issues" over Kosovo without
affecting the rest of the bilateral relationship.

- Scenario B: UNSC votes on resolution, Russia vetoes

Tadic and Kostunica expect this outcome and to them it would
represent the full triumph of Serbia's Kosovo policy over the
last year. The Radicals and other retrograde elements would
cast Russia as a savior and advocate for closer ties at all
levels. Despite the expected European unwillingness to act
on Kosovo's unilateral independence declaration, European
UNSC members, barring last minute reversals, would at least
be on the record in support of Kosovo independence and the
Ahtisaari plan, which would put us all in the same position
in dealings with Belgrade. Quint Ambassadors tell us,
however, that without a UNSC resolution, the EU taking over
responsibility for post-independence administration would be
virtually impossible. We would have to squeeze them hard,
using our continued KFOR participation as a lever.

- Scenario C: UNSC delays Kosovo status decision (either a
status-neutral resolution or no new resolution)

This also represents a major triumph for Serbia and Russia's
Kosovo policy, and the GOS is already preparing for this
eventuality with parliament's call for new talks and the
Kosovo Ministry's mandate to form a new GOS negotiating team.
Without clarity on next steps, Serbia's Kosovo policy would
continue as before with renewed vigor. Belgrade will seize
on any incident in Kosovo to keep building a case that
Pristina is unfit to govern, that Serbs cannot live safely in
Kosovo and that the international community has failed there.
U.S. and IC credibility would hit rock bottom in future
dealings with the GOS with no possible solution in sight.


9. (S) Comment: Serbian leaders are fully expecting either a
veto or a delay at the UNSC, with either outcome giving them
a massive victory and reason to entrench further against
Kosovo independence. In Serbia, this is for us the worst
possible outcome. We would be held accountable for events in
Kosovo either under an emasculated ICO or a remaining UNMIK
mandate that has no credibility and little power. We see
virtually no chance of managing a renewed negotiating effort
with the parties, the Contact Group, including the Russians,
and no resolution of an increasingly volatile situation in
sight.
POLT