Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BELGRADE683
2007-05-17 16:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Belgrade
Cable title:  

CERTIFICATION AND SERBIA'S "NEW" GOVERNMENT

Tags:  PGOV ICTY PREL EAID SR 
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VZCZCXYZ0009
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBW #0683/01 1371634
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 171634Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0843
C O N F I D E N T I A L BELGRADE 000683 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/17
TAGS: PGOV ICTY PREL EAID SR
SUBJECT: CERTIFICATION AND SERBIA'S "NEW" GOVERNMENT


C O N F I D E N T I A L BELGRADE 000683

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/17
TAGS: PGOV ICTY PREL EAID SR
SUBJECT: CERTIFICATION AND SERBIA'S "NEW" GOVERNMENT



1. (c) The new government in Serbia does not look appreciably
different from the previous one. Tadic's DS now has the potential to
play a large role in defense and foreign affairs that could have an
impact on moving forward the Euro-Atlantic agenda, but Kostunica
still holds many of the reins. Given Kostunica's ability to
routinely outplay Tadic on political tactics, we should not expect an
overabundance of change in the policy areas on which we engage with
Serbia.


2. (c) Nowhere is this more true than on ICTY cooperation. Tadic
has routinely given us his strongest assurances that completing ICTY
cooperation will be his highest priority. The coalition deal he has
now, though, creates the appearance of fragility - any coalition
partner can bring it down if the government tries to do something
against one party's perceived vital interests. Kostunica continues
to adhere to a policy of voluntary surrenders and try to wait for the
international community to lose interest, or to sublimate ICTY
cooperation to the "greater good" of bringing Serbia into Europe.
Tadic, on the other hand, openly calls for Mladic's arrest. For an
arrest to happen, Kostunica would presumably have to concur - both
because of the political sensitivity of the issue and because
Kostunica's party controls the Interior Ministry.


3. (c) Many in Europe are now looking for a way to restart SAA
talks as an encouragement to the new "Tadic dominated" government. We
have heard for months that if a government is formed that even hints
at new leadership in positions with responsibility for ICTY, the EU
is likely to approve restarting SAA talks. Such a government now
exists, with DS in control of Defense, a "technical" person
putatively to head BIA (the domestic intelligence service),and Tadic
personally in control of intelligence coordination through the new
National Security Council. Enlargement Commissioner Rehn has just
been here and signaled SAA restart intentions given a positive
signal/action from the Serbs. The EU bar will presumably be a low
one. We should scout out more specifically the Commission's

intentions and in as much as possible act in concert with the EU.
Unfortunately that means we don't have much time.


4. (c) At the same time, though, the outgoing government - which is
well represented in the new government, including the PM's slot,
Interior, and current authority over BIA - has done virtually nothing
on the ICTY agenda since April, 2005. Kostunica created an "Action
Plan" in July 2006 that is now totally discredited, and even by the
admission of the appointed overseers of the plan there has been no
meaningful action taken to locate and apprehend Mladic or other
PIFWCs since summer, 2006. Kostunica pointedly ignored the USG's 11
proposed actions on ICTY cooperation that we delivered in July 2006.


5. (c) In this atmosphere, and in the context of a looming Kosovo
status settlement that will require us to think creatively about ways
to spend assistance money to get Serbia past the "day after," the
deadline for certifying Serbia's compliance with the ICTY expires May

31. In our view, the best way to move forward is to simply let the
deadline pass without a decision. This will have the effect of
non-certification and freeze some assistance money, but will not
require the Secretary to make a public statement to that effect.
Following the expiration of the deadline, we could then approach
Tadic privately and tell him that we are prepared to certify rapidly
once the new government has given some credibility to its ICTY
commitments. We could even revive all or parts of our 11-point plan
as a benchmark for judging sufficient action.


6. (c) This approach admittedly has some pitfalls: it could at
least temporarily have us on a tougher track than the Europeans, and
would be seen by Tadic, at least initially, as lack of confidence in
"his" new government. We have a PD strategy in te drawer to
explain, if needed, the lack of certfication by the 5/31 deadline.
Not certifying bythe May deadline would also mean delaying some or
all of the additional FY07 assistance that might be in train in
Washington and that would be especially useful in the post-Kosovo
status environment - including especially additional IMET assistance.
Post has already submitted to the Department its proposed plan for
FY07 SEED programs that factors in a suspension of 10 percent (USD 6
million) in programs.


7. (c) Such an approach, though, would also show Tadic and
Kostunica that we remain committed to ICTY cooperation. An
announcement of our willingness to reconsider the decision and our
characterization of the postponement of a decision as being based on
the performance of the past government would soften the blow and
provide an opportunity for Tadic and the DS to take full credit for
forward movement if/when we certify. This option might also help us
with any possible opposition to unconditional certification on the
Hill.

CONCLUSION


8. (c) Our policy is to continue to demand ICTY cooperation, but
taking too hard a line on ICTY commitments early on would give the
appearance that we are breaking ranks with the EU on ICTY cooperation
and that we are cutting the legs out from the new DS-majority
government before it has a chance to stand up. In an atmosphere
where the EU is likely to re-start SAA talks as a result of
government formation, we suggest we strike a balance that supports DS
and Tadic without letting them off the hook for previous commitments.

POLT