Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BELGRADE682
2007-05-17 13:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Belgrade
Cable title:  

SERBIA'S SPRING COALITION GOVERNMENT - PARTY PROSPECTS

Tags:  PGOV PREL SR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBW #0682/01 1371322
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171322Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0840
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000682 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/17
TAGS: PGOV PREL SR
SUBJECT: SERBIA'S SPRING COALITION GOVERNMENT - PARTY PROSPECTS


Classified by Ambassador Michael Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

SUMMARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000682

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/17
TAGS: PGOV PREL SR
SUBJECT: SERBIA'S SPRING COALITION GOVERNMENT - PARTY PROSPECTS


Classified by Ambassador Michael Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

SUMMARY


1. (c) The conditions under which the last-minute coalition deal
was struck between DS and DSS to form a new government has left a
sour taste in the mouths of many of the players and the body politic
more broadly. The election of SRS deputy leader Tomislav Nikolic to
head the parliament - however briefly - was a shock to the Serbian
political system. The fact that he was elected with the unanimous
support of Kostunica's DSS was particularly troubling, not only to
pro-reformists but even to many within DSS itself. The machinations
that surrounded this deal could have profound impacts on the futures
of all the key parties in the deal, as well as for those who remain
in opposition - notably LDP and SRS. End summary.

THE COALITION NEGOTIATIONS


2. (c) By all accounts, the brinksmanship that defined the
coalition talks showed the worst in Serbian politics. From the
outset, everyone expected the negotiations to be protracted - though
entering the third month, even most political pundits and media
commentators began to treat the talks as a political circus that made
Serbia look immature and politically atrophied to the rest of Europe.
Virtually everyone expected personal egos to complicate the talks,
and many openly blamed DS VP Dragan Sutanovac and DSS VP Dragan Jocic
for letting personal ambition (they both wanted control of the
Interior Ministry) to block the ability of both sides to get a deal
done sooner. In addition, Tadic's capitulation on allowing Kostunica
to keep the PM seat caused consternation among some in the DS, many
of whose senior members felt humiliated for ceding the post after
winning by far the most seats of any party in the democratic bloc.
This slowed the deal-making process further.


3. (c) Ultimately, though, the deal came down to who would control
the internal security institutions that have defined political
control in Serbia since Milosevic's day - the Interior ministry and
the Security Intelligence Agency (BIA). Defense was not a part of
that computation, at least for the DSS and the "hardline" DS camp.
Many believed Tadic would cave quickly on these two posts in his

desire to make a deal. However, with strong party support, he held
firm, insisting on a division of the posts as a condition for the
deal. This issue - who would get Interior and BIA - defined the
negotiations to the very end.


4. (c) That end came after Tadic, under pressure from within his
own party, rejected a DSS demand to cede Interior to DSS and split
control over BIA. DSS then launched a power play when they formally
supported the Radicals in a bid for the position of Speaker of the
parliament. This move shocked the entire political establishment,
fueled media scorn of the political elite, and struck fear into many
democratic voters. It also, apparently, took many DSS MP's by
surprise, with muttering against the decision and even open criticism
in the halls outside the parliamentary chamber (owing to strong
enforcement of party discipline, no DSS votes were cast against the
nomination).


5. (c) In the aftermath of the election, DS had its own bitter
internal debate, with Tadic loyalists who supported a deal whatever
the cost pitted against a group of oppositionists who called for new
elections - some more on the grounds of personal ambition (like
Sutanovac),others from a more principled position (like Djindjic's
widow and party VP, Ruzica). Meanwhile, G-17 Plus leader Mladjan
Dinkic postured with a principled stand, vowing never to join a
government that included a party (DSS) that voted in the Radicals.
Dinkic quickly found, though, that he didn't have the stomach for a
principled stand absent strong DS opposition to the move, so backed
down almost immediately and ultimately agreed to support whatever
government was formed.


6. (c) Paradoxically, most observers believe that this
brinksmanship and skullduggery will contribute to the stability of
the government. Every party involved in the deal sullied itself, and
so has a vested interest in putting as much time (and opportunities
for successes) as possible behind it before the next parliamentary
elections. Some of the parties involved - especially G-17 Plus - may
even assess this to be their last chance to participate in government
as individual parties, making their willingness to bring the
government down slim. At the same time, though, Kostunica showed
through his support of the Radicals that he just might be willing to
gamble his country's future against his staying in power - strong
medicine to a DS party that many feel is too weakly led to call these
sorts of bluffs.

IMPACTS: DS


7. (c) A palpable unease permeates Tadic's party. The coalition
talks led to a series of heated debates within the party, fracturing
along a line separating Tadic and those eager to cut a deal on one
side (cohabitationists),and party purists who fought throughout to
maximize DS gains from the elections as the leading vote-getter in
the coalition (maximalists). This rift exposed and in some cases

BELGRADE 00000682 002 OF 003


intensified rivalries between individuals and groups in DS. Many
analysts as well as senior DS insiders believe the in-fighting in the
party, coupled with Tadic's ultimate unwillingness to stand up to
Kostunica and call elections once the PM threw in with the Radicals,
has done the party enormous (but not irreparable) damage. Some will
be looking to score quick and repeated political wins to try to get
their constituents to forget about the lack of leadership exhibited
in the talks - while still sniping at each other behind the closed
doors of the party presidency. Others will look to enforce the
strength of their party faction in preparation for the ultimate
breach with the DSS.

IMPACTS: DSS


8. (c) Many believe DSS was hurt the most from this drama, despite
scoring the most short-term gains by keeping hold of the PM job and
the key interior ministry job and at least shared control over BIA.
The forced vote to support the Radicals had two significant impacts:
first, it exposed divisions within DSS - deep divisions that the
party has been adroitly managing to date. DSS MP's were seen crying
in the halls before the vote to put Nikolic in power, and there was
an angry buzz throughout the chamber over the move. Second, the vote
again exposed the limits of Kostunica's democratic commitment when it
comes to playing hardball with his political opponents. The PM has
always assured us he would never make common cause with the Radicals.
Yet he did so, gambling the country's relations with all its
neighbors and its path toward Europe against his ability to
strong-arm Tadic into letting him keep control of the institutions
that have the largest measure of control over Serbian internal
affairs.


9. (c) In the eyes of many here - including some in his own party -
Kostunica has exposed himself as a supporter of hardline nationalism
over pragmatism and Euro-Atlanticism, and this reaffirmation may be
the pebble that starts an avalanche of DSS defections. The more
moderate DSS supporters could start looking to the conservative wing
of DS, from which they came originally, as more representative of
their ideology, while the hardliners and former JUL members who make
up the balance of DSS may start to see little reason to support a
party that polls at, say, nine percent, when they can join instead a
party with a similar platform (SRS) that polls 29 percent. Thus many
are saying DSS now has a fairly short political half-life, which will
make it eager to keep this government going. The key to the length
of this half-life ifs Kostunica himself, who is the glue holding the
party together.

IMPACTS: G-17 Plus


10. (c) As a political party, G-17 has been a one-man show for
Mladjan Dinkic ever since he ousted former deputy PM Miroljub Labus.
Other party officials - mostly technocrats - either follow his lead
submissively or do not have the political savvy to oppose him. In
the coalition talks, Dinkic was unable to outmaneuver either
Kostunica or Tadic, as was evidenced by his routine flip-flopping
between the two larger parties at the start of the talks, his
willingness to be dominated by Kostunica later on, and his immediate
walk-back from strong statements of political principle when Nikolic
was elected speaker. Dinkic remains concerned with two things -
keeping his hands on economic levers in the government, and keeping
his party in government. Dinkic has perhaps the most to fear from
new elections, whenever they happen. His party has no uniquely
identifiable platform - his pro-European views and economic planks
are essentially shared by the DS. Without the Finance ministry, DS
sources tell us Dinkic has already offered to merge G-17 into DS, but
that Tadic has postponed this for now. Dinkic may feel G-17 would be
unable to cross the threshold for participation in any future
election - and he is likely right - making this government his last
huzzah as a party leader. In the meantime, as Economy minister he
will play on key privatizations in the energy and telecoms sectors
(the ministries for these two sectors are DSS and DS appointees,
respectively).

IMPACTS: SRS


11. (c) The million-dollar question in Belgrade now is what side
deal Kostunica may well have cut with Nikolic in order to a) engineer
Nikolic's appointment to the Speaker of parliament post, and b)
subsequently get him to agree to step down without any sort of fight,
and without any of the trademark obstructionism and crass behavior
that has defined the SRS parliamentary modus operandi. Most of the
general public is simply so relieved that SRS has stepped down that
they have not thought to pose the question. The political classes,
though, are rock-solid certain that a Faustian bargain has been
struck. In their view, the most likely scenario is some combination
of the following: DSS support for an SRS presidential candidate when
elections are held by the end of the year (or, at a minimum, DSS
withholding support for a "democratic bloc" candidate and/or running
their own candidate to dilute the democratic vote); similar DSS
indirect or direct support for an SRS candidate for mayor of
Belgrade, again by the end of the year; and/or DSS support for a
longtime SRS desire to rewrite the law on local elections in a way
that more heavily favors SRS candidates and, inter alia, makes mayors

BELGRADE 00000682 003 OF 003


appointed by local assemblies instead of being directly elected, as
is the case now (in many municipalities, assemblies are headed by
SRS-led coalitions, while many mayors are democratic bloc). Whatever
the deal, though, SRS wins out of this circus, having been
legitimized as a national political party within Serbia - this could
translate to better polling numbers in any future election (likely at
the expense of DSS and, to a lesser extent, SPS).

LDP


12. (c) Besides SRS, the party no one heard about may have fared
the best from this debacle. LDP's leadership is calm and confident.
They note that all the parties that formed the government hurt
themselves in the eyes of their constituents in the process. In
particular, they assert that Tadic's DS folded when the time came to
stand up and be counted - by not calling elections as soon as
Kostunica threw in with the Radicals, LDP believes DS has made itself
complicit in tolerating Radical supporters. LDP is supremely
confident that they will fare better in any future election than they
did in the last, likely at the expense of crestfallen DS and G-17
voters. LDP's leadership believes the government will do enough
damage to itself while in office that all LDP, as the only democratic
opposition party, will have to do is welcome the democratic voters
that are alienated. While their confidence should not be overstated
- they barely squeaked into this parliament with just over the
requisite 5 percent - they will be extremely well-placed to snipe at
a government they see as the last continuation of the Milosevic
legacy - a DSS in league with the Radicals, and a DS in league with
DSS and more concerned about sinecures than leadership.

POLT