UNSC Visit to Belgrade

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000565

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR U/S BURNS, A/S FRIED, DAS DICARLO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/17
TAGS: UNSC PBTS PREL SR
SUBJECT: UNSC Visit to Belgrade


Classified by Ambassador Michael Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

Summary
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1. (c) The April 26 Security Council Mission (SCM) to Belgrade
produced little new substance on the Kosovo status issue, but was
spun by PM Kostunica as an endorsement of the re-start of
negotiations. The GoS passed to SCM members its "new proposal" for
an alternative solution to the status issue, which was nothing more
than a re-hash of unacceptable Serbian proposals dating back more
than a year. A few of the more unprepared SCM members, notably the
South African PermRep, made unhelpful statements about alternative
solutions and disparaging Ahtisaari, but the summary press statement
by the Belgian PermRep hit all the right marks, emphasizing that the
process would continue to be focused in New York. Ambassador
Khalilzad believes the likely impact on hearts and minds in the UNSC
from this trip will be negligible. End summary.

Kostunica Pushes "New Plan"
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2. (c) Kostunica provided little new in the way of substance in his
presentation to the SCM: he stressed the territorial integrity
issue, noted the need to respect the UN Charter, and commented on the
inadvisability of creating a second Albanian state in Europe. He did
admit to the SCM that negotiations had taken place over the past 14
months - something he has previously been unwilling to admit even in
private - but stressed that they ended in deadlock, and that as a
result, the Ahtisaari proposal could not be seen as a result of
compromise or agreement by either side. He emphasized both in the
meeting and later to the press that this SCM represented the
re-starting of negotiations on the Kosovo status issue. The GoS also
handed over to the delegation a three-page "status proposal,"
ostensibly a new Serbian plan but really nothing more than a
re-hashed presentation of previously rejected proposals - essentially
autonomy in a demilitarized Kosovo that would not control its own
foreign policy or defense and whose stability would be guaranteed by
the international community for the next twenty years (faxed to
desk).

Tadic Takes Hard Line
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3. (c) In comparison to Kostunica's workman-like performance, Tadic
played the heavy in what appeared to many in the SCM to be an
overly-orchestrated "bad cop-worse cop" routine. Tadic took a hard
line of never accepting any form of independence for Kosovo under any
name. He talked of Serbia's status as a founding member of the UN,
and noted the historical links making Kosovo an issue of identity for
Serbia. He did not, however, raise partition (nor did it come up
elsewhere). In his formal press remarks, the Belgian PermRep barely
touched on the Tadic meeting, focusing most of his attention on
Kostunica's presentations.

Lunch With NGO's
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4. (c) Lunch at the Belgian Ambassador's residence with civil
society leaders was a portrait in contrast to the official meetings.
Virtually all the attendees said that most Serbs recognize that
Kosovo will be independent, noting that the political leadership in
Serbia is making more of an issue of it than it merits, due to their
need to use Kosovo to hold onto political power. This obsession by
the leadership, they said, forces an upswing in popular attention
given to the issue, which in turn restricts the political maneuvering
room for the leaders - a self-fulfilling prophecy. Civil society
leaders said that a status resolution could be made palatable,
noting that is would succeed best if (a) worded carefully; (b)
accompanied by broad international support (i.e., US and EU unity);
and (c) if possible, not publicly driven by the U.S. or other players
seen as "anti-Serb."

Parliamentarians' Meeting
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5. (c) Representatives of virtually all the political parties that
will participate in the next parliament were represented at the
meeting (the notable exception being Riza Halimi, the only Albanian
MP in the Serbian parliament). Almost unanimously, the parties
rejected independence as an outcome, noting their need to uphold the
recently passed Serbian constitution, which claims Kosovo
unequivocally as an integral part of Serbia. The lone dissent came
from a representative of the democratic opposition, who said the
Kosovo independence issue is not a major concern, and that entrenched
Serbian leadership is inflating the crisis because it suits their
political and economic interests. He said those who are obsessing on
Kosovo do not want Serbia to change - sparking a spirited fight with
SRS leader Toma Nikolic, who professed that Serbia didn't need to be

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in the EU, doesn't want to join countries that have bombed Serbia,
and vowing that, no matter how long it took, Serbia would reclaim
Kosovo. Other MP's interceded, reaffirmed Serbia's desire to move
toward Europe, but noted that the international community should not
link movement toward Euro-Atlantic integration with acceptance of
Kosovo's independence. On the margins of the meeting,
representatives from both G-17 Plus and DS approached Ambassador
Khalilzad privately to assure him that they could live with an
independence outcome (even if they could not say so),and that robust
EU engagement and additional U.S. support for returns would help the
process go more smoothly.

Press
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6. (c) Press followed the events throughout the day, with wire
services picking up Kostunica's initial comments about the
re-starting of negotiations. Press also picked up on a question
posed by Ambassador Khalilzad, who asked Kostunica what Serbia, as a
country governed by the rule of law, would do in reaction to a UNSC
Resolution that created the conditions for Kosovo to declare
independence. Kostunica refused to answer the question, noting that
such a hypothetical outcome in the UNSC would be impossible. At the
end of the day, the Belgian PermRep held a short press conference
outlining the "interesting day" the SCM had had. His remarks hit all
the right notes - reminding the press that the visit would end with a
meeting with Ahtisaari, emphasizing that this was an informational
mission and that the locus of decision making would remain in New
York, and noting (including in response to several questions about
which Kosovo enclaves weren't on the agenda) that the intention of
the SCM was to provide a balanced view of the situation on the
ground. He also highlighted Kostunica's assurances that Serbia is
committed to a solution that is not violent and does not threaten
violence.

Comment
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7. (c) Kostunica clearly pushed this SCM visit to maximum local
effect to try to convince Serbs (and perhaps himself) that this visit
represents the re-starting of Kosovo status negotiations. It did not
help particularly that many of the non-permanent UNSC members seemed
to be very poorly prepared for the meetings and clearly had at best a
passing familiarity with the Ahtisaari plan, leading to some
uninformed questions that might fuel an impression among the Serbian
leadership that there is wiggle room for a new negotiating track.
Nevertheless, Ambassador Khalilzad told us he is confident that this
trip has done nothing to change hearts and minds in the UNSC. We
will report more reactions and the local UN office readout of the
visit in our 4/27 Kosovo roundup.


8. (u) Ambassador Khalilzad did not have the opportunity to clear
this message.

POLT