Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BELGRADE534
2007-04-20 16:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Belgrade
Cable title:  

LAVROV'S VISIT TO BELGRADE SHOWCASES HARDENING STANCE

Tags:  PBTS UNSC PREL KPAO RU SR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2212
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBW #0534/01 1101632
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201632Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0680
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0194
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1330
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000534 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR U/S BURNS AND EUR A/S FRIED
MOSCOW FOR AMBASSADOR BURNS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/17
TAGS: PBTS UNSC PREL KPAO RU SR
SUBJECT: LAVROV'S VISIT TO BELGRADE SHOWCASES HARDENING STANCE

REF: MOSCOW 1796

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000534

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR U/S BURNS AND EUR A/S FRIED
MOSCOW FOR AMBASSADOR BURNS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/17
TAGS: PBTS UNSC PREL KPAO RU SR
SUBJECT: LAVROV'S VISIT TO BELGRADE SHOWCASES HARDENING STANCE

REF: MOSCOW 1796


1. (u) Russian FM Lavrov's visit was widely covered in local press,
which focused on his meetings with Tadic and Kostunica. His
statements to press following the meetings reiterated Russia's
commitment to continued negotiations and respect for implementation
of UNSCR 1244 - the provisions of which he said had been completely
unfulfilled. He insisted that an imposed solution for Kosovo is
absolutely unacceptable, commenting that this was not the first time
the U.S. had had "its own view" on an issue. Lavrov said after his
meeting with Kostunica, and later in an interview with state
television, that Ahtisaari's plan has collapsed, as it did not take
into consideration the interests of one of the parties, adding that
Russia has prepared constructive initiatives in response to the plan
that could lead to a resumption on talks on Kosovo and the devising
of a solution acceptable to Belgrade and Pristina. He added that it
was "blackmail" to advance arguments in favor of accelerating a
Kosovo decision lest security be jeopardized and a new wave of
violence precipitated, noting pointedly that KFOR was well-equipped
to handle outbreaks of violence, and that if it did not, any
resulting violence would be solely KFOR's fault.


2. (u) Kostunica repeated the "blackmail" argument in public
remarks with Lavrov after their meeting, adding that the UNSC would
not abandon principles that it had been guided by in adopting 1244 in

1999. Kostunica claimed that the UNSC would respect its fundamental
document which guarantees the principles of state sovereignty and
territorial integrity and from which Serbia could not be exempted.
President Tadic said following his meeting with the Russian FM that
Serbia is prepared to take on its share of responsibility for
stability in the Balkans, and expects legally correct treatment on
the Kosovo issue in the UNSC. After meeting with Lavrov, he said
that the UNSC mission should also visit the Serb enclaves to enable
the mission to assess the implementation of res. 1244.



3. (C) Advisors to Tadic and Kostunica made themselves unavailable
for additional readouts from the meetings. Russian Ambassador to
Serbia Aleksander Alexeev, meanwhile, told the Ambassador Tadic and
Kostunica had portrayed identical positions in every regard during
their meetings with Lavrov. The Kostunica meeting, he said, focused
more heavily on planning for the upcoming Security Council visit to
Belgrade and Pristina, which Alexeev said would have to include a
healthy dose of visits to Serb enclaves to allow UNSC Permreps to get
a "full picture" of the situation on the ground. He said partition
was not raised, and Russia did not intend to explore it unless and
until the GoS formally proposed it. He also noted that the
delegation had been struck by the strength, in particular, of
Kostunica's conviction to stay the course of current Serbian policy.


4. (c) Alexeev assured the Ambassador that Lavrov did not promise a
veto to either Tadic or Kostunica. In fact, he said Lavrov made it
clear that Russia would take a "wait and see" attitude towards
developments in the UNSC, and would be willing to work with the
Council on a resolution that accorded to international legal
principles. In particular, Alexeev said Russia would be ready to
discuss specific status-neutral issues including decentralization,
protection of patrimonial sites, returns, freedom of movement, and
security. He said Russia wanted to work with the U.S. and EU
constructively on a resolution that would be palatable to both sides.
Alexeev said inclusion of language on Kosovo as a precedent was not
necessary, perhaps even unwelcome, since such language would be
counter to objective reality - separatist groups elsewhere in the
world would see Kosovo as a precedent for using threats of violence
to gain political ends no matter how the UNSC chose to characterize
it. Later, speaking in a strictly personal capacity, Alexeev floated
the concept of a resolution that enumerated restrictions to Kosovar
sovereignty, to include armed forces (e.g., no force deployable
outside Kosovo under a Kosovar flag),foreign policy, and a seat in
the UN.


5. (u) Serbian wire service Tanjug reported April 20 that after
Lavrov's declaration that Ahtisaari's plan has collapsed, the U.S.
announced a continuation of "serious consultations" with Russian top
level representatives. Quoting a "U.S. State Department source,"
Tanjug reported that while the US understands Russia's concern, it
regards Ahtisaari's plan as the only possible solution to the Kosovo
problem and talks are being held on this issue. In fact, Tanjug had
inaccurately linked previously issued Department guidance on Kosovo
and the Russian position into a U.S. reaction to Lavrov's statement
in another example of media inventiveness supporting the GOS party
line.


6. (c) Comment: Lavrov's remarks to press would seem to underscore
the hardening position outlined reftel. Both the Tadic and Kostunica
camps (which are now essentially inseparable on the Kosovo issue)
seemed very pleased by the outcome, if unwilling to talk to us about

BELGRADE 00000534 002 OF 002


it. What the press coverage soft-peddled, though, were Lavrov's
comments that Russia had not yet decided whether or not to use its
veto, and would only consider the issue once a formal draft UNSCR was
introduced. In fact, Lavrov went so far as to say in his RTS
interview that Russia had not rejected the "one-sided" Ahtisaari
plan, despite having declared the plan a failure in earlier press
remarks with Kostunica. Whether this vaguery represents a real
opening for compromise or is simply a mild rebuke to Kostunica for
trying to box the Russians in with inflammatory rhetoric is an open
question we prefer to leave to Embassy Moscow's expert
interpretation.

POLT