Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BELGRADE288
2007-03-02 15:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Belgrade
Cable title:  

POWER STRUGGLE DEEPENS BETWEEN SERBIAN MUSLIMS

Tags:  KISL KPAO KIRF PGOV PREL SR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBW #0288/01 0611522
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 021522Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0383
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BELGRADE 000288 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2017
TAGS: KISL KPAO KIRF PGOV PREL SR
SUBJECT: POWER STRUGGLE DEEPENS BETWEEN SERBIAN MUSLIMS

REF: 06 BELGRADE 678

Classified By: POLOFF Ian Campbell, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L BELGRADE 000288

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2017
TAGS: KISL KPAO KIRF PGOV PREL SR
SUBJECT: POWER STRUGGLE DEEPENS BETWEEN SERBIAN MUSLIMS

REF: 06 BELGRADE 678

Classified By: POLOFF Ian Campbell, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Serbia's new Law on Religion has brought to
the fore long-simmering tensions within Serbia's Islamic
community (IC). Serbian Islamic leaders are deep into
negotiations over unification, but with separate ideas about
where the centralized administrative authority should be
based, and about whether they should come under the ultimate
spiritual authority of the Supreme Council (Riyaset) of
Sarajevo or have independent spiritual authority. We remain
engaged with both sides, counseling dialogue over
confrontation. End Summary


2. (U) A new Law on Religion, signed by President Tadic in
April 2006 (despite international objections),has become a
major irritant in a long-standing leadership struggle between
the Belgrade and Novi Pazar factions of the Serbian Islamic
community. Article 19 of the law states that "No religious
organisation may be entered into the Register whose name
contains a name or part of a name expressing the identity of
a Church, religious community or religious organisation which
is already entered in the Register or submitted an
application for entry first." As such, only one organization
may be called the "Islamic" community, which means that the
IC must pick one name and one leader in order to gain
recognition for and registry of their religion. The Belgrade
IC and the Sandzak IC have differing ideas on how to
structure the IC in Serbia, and to whom to look for
leadership.


3. (U) The Sandzak IC (which has the majority of Muslims in
Serbia),led by Mufti Muamer Zukorlic, would like to create
an IC that consists of four meshihats - Sandzak,
Belgrade/Central Serbia, Presevo Valley, and Vojvodina )
which would remain part of the Sarajevo Riyaset. The four
meshihats would be governed by a Supreme Assembly, based on
the proportion of believers in each, with a president who
would handle mainly administrative issues. Zukorlic insists
that the supreme leader be from the Islamic community of
Bosnia, and that all Muslims in Serbia be referred to as

"Bosniaks."

(4) (C) Zukorlic was appointed by, and owes allegiance to,
the head of Bosnia's IC, Reis-i-Ulema Mustafa ef. Ceric.
Zukorlic currently has a voting position in the Bosnian
Riyaset, which is headquartered in Sarajevo. He claims the
relationship is only spiritual, but as a voting member of the
board this is clearly not the case.


4. (U) The Belgrade IC's most recent proposal is to form a
Riyaset in Serbia that would be equal to and independent of
the other riyasets in the region. It would consist of four
meshihats, and would hold elections for the Reis of Serbia.
Belgrade seems willing to accept that the Reis may be held by
the Sandzak. Under this proposal, Belgrade Mufti Hamdija
Jusufspahic insists on having an independent Islamic
Community of Serbia with only an observer's position in both
the Sarajevo and Pristina Islamic Communities. He believes
the members of the Islamic Community should be referred to as
"Muslims" since not all of the believers are Bosniaks (some
are Roma, Albanians, Ashkali, and Serbs). Belgrade previously
proposed a similar arrangement, but wanted a coordinating
body to be in charge during the transitional period of 2-3
years, with the head of the coordinating body rotating among
the communities. This proposal was rejected by the Sandzak
community, with the basic problem being the requirement that
Sandzak lessen ties with the Bosnian Riyaset.


5. (C) The Belgrade IC currently controls all of the
municipalities in Serbia, except for the Sandzak ) where
most Serbian Muslims live. Sandzak leaders have been strongly
hinting that they will provide funding to those that support
them, in order to convince believers to sign their
initiative. They claim to have signatures from all
municipalities except Belgrade and Mali Zvornik. Both sides
are trying to get more deputies in the Assembly on their
side. Belgrade recently consulted with Reis Ceric in Sarajevo
regarding its plan, but did not receive any open support.
This is not surprising, as Reis Ceric often speaks publicly
about the Bosnian IC's spiritual unity with its Sandzak
"brothers."


6. (C) Zukorlic has been hard at work soliciting
international and local support for his position, including
from President Tadic and Rasim Ljajic. Zukorlic also met with
the German Ambassador to Belgrade to request support, as
Germany currently holds the EU presidency and is also home to
many Bosniaks. In a recent visit to Novi Pazar Jusufspahic
publicly met with Novi Pazar's controversial mayor, Sulejman
Ugljanin, who gave support for unification of the
communities, but did not give explicit support to either
side. The outgoing Minister of Religion, a DSS member, has
excellent relationships with Belgrade, but at this moment he
and most other politicians are carefully avoiding public
offers of support.


7. (SBU) In a meeting on January 29, Belgrade initiated the
establishment of the Serbian riyaset. The meeting was
actually a unilateral session of the Islamic Community of
Serbia (Belgrade) where representatives from 52
municipalities formally initiated establishment of the
Riyaset of the IC of Serbia. This meeting was a response to
the announced "unification session" initiated by the Sandzak
IC. On the other side, discussions were held in early
February in Sarajevo between the Bosnian IC and the Sandzak
leadership. Belgrade was not invited to this event.
Following these meetings, the Assembly of the IC of Serbia
(i.e., the Belgrade faction) on February 19 formally named
Jusufspahic "acting reis'ulema," effectively a unilateral
declaration of independence by the Serbian IC. Zukorlic
backers immediately denounced the appointment and declared it
illegal.


8. (C) The local security community has voiced concern to us
that in its struggle to find support, the Sandzak IC, through
its close ties to the Bosnian Riyaset, might bring its
practitioners in contact with extremist elements in Bosnia,
most of whom live outside Sarajevo. This danger should not
be overstated, as Reis Ceric and the Bosnian IC have
repeatedly condemned extremism and recently formed a
commission to investigate the phenomenon in Bosnia. However,
it is a remote possibility.


9. (C) COMMENT: We have excellent relations with both
sides, and have repeatedly met with both sides individually
and encouraged them to work out their disagreements through
dialogue and compromise. The Embassy's Iftar in October,
2006, afforded us an opportunity to demonstrate support for
moderation and cooperation with both Muftis together.
Despite our encouragement for compromise, both sides see the
contest as a zero-sum game and are unlikely to bridge their
differences in the near term. Meanwhile, the spiritual fight
is turning increasingly political, with Zukorlic receiving
support form Ljajic and Jusufspahic reaching out to Ugljanin
) whose "independent" supporters voted to appoint
Jusufspahic on February 19 as representatives of the Sandzak
Muslims.


10. (U) This cable has been coordinated with Embassy
Sarajevo.
POLT