Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BELGRADE207
2007-02-13 14:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Belgrade
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR WISNER'S FEB 6 VISIT TO BELGRADE

Tags:  PGOV PREL PBTS PHUM KPAO YI MW SR 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BELGRADE 000207 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, NSC FOR B. BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS PHUM KPAO YI MW SR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR WISNER'S FEB 6 VISIT TO BELGRADE


Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt for reasons 1.4(b) & (D)

This cable is being repeated due to network problems.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BELGRADE 000207

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, NSC FOR B. BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS PHUM KPAO YI MW SR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR WISNER'S FEB 6 VISIT TO BELGRADE


Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt for reasons 1.4(b) & (D)

This cable is being repeated due to network problems.


1. (C) Summary: In his 2/6 meetings in Belgrade, Ambassador
Wisner affirmed full USG support for Ahtisaari and his
proposal and urged Serbian leaders to commit fully to the
UNOSEK negotiations as the Kosovo status process moves into
its final stage. President Tadic offered assurances that he
would engage "personally" while PM Kostunica was more
ambiguous. G17 Plus leader Dinkic appears ready to (only)
follow the lead to engage in talks. All leaders said that
Serbia would not be able to participate in Kosovo
negotiations until parliament convened and granted a mandate
to a new team, something they all said would be impossible by
Ahtisaari's suggested negotiations beginning the week of
2/13. Wisner also firmly rebuffed hints at partition from
Dinkic and even some progressive Serbs at lunch, reaffirming
complete USG support for Contact Group principles against the
partition, saying it would "extinguish Serbian life" in
Kosovo. End Summary.

President Tadic
--------------


2. (C) President Tadic was calm, self-assured and
well-prepared, closely following a written script. Though
the meeting was entirely about Kosovo, the President framed
his remarks in the context of his commitment to moving Serbia
forward to closer integration with NATO and the EU --
something he called a "strategic imperative" for his country.
He thanked the USG for our help on the PfP decision, which
he called an "extremely important boost" helping to achieve
the best ever result for the DS in parliamentary elections.
He said he was committed to forming a government that would
include all democratic parties, even if some parties had
vowed not to work together. As soon as a government was
formed he would move Serbia closer to NATO. The DS would be
the dominant player in a new government with the right

priorities: peace, a reform orientation, full cooperation
with ICTY, and quick Euro-Atlantic integration.


3. (C) On Kosovo negotiations on the Ahtisaari plan, Tadic
said that as President he would insist that Serbia be
"totally engaged" with a negotiating team that had "renewed
legitimacy." He then proceeded to lay out the next steps for
moving forward: rerun of elections in six polling stations
by the end of the week, quick completion of other technical
and legal requirements for constituting a new parliament
(which he suggested could be done as early as February 12),a
decision by parliament to either confirm or reappoint the
negotiating team, and finally debate in the parliament of the
Ahtisaari proposal that would define the platform for Serbia
in Vienna.


4. (C) Tadic said that the current caretaker government did
not have a mandate to engage in negotiations and that the
current negotiating team was "legally dissolved." He said he
believed that the parties had all expressed to him their full
support for engaging in Vienna and he did not believe they
would put up any roadblocks in convening parliament or in the
ensuing debate on the proposal. He thought the Radicals
would not seek to join the team but he acknowledged that
other parties, including Milosevic,s Socialist party, had
requested to be represented. The Radicals, he surmised, only
wanted a chance to make a statement in parliament. In
response to Wisner,s question about whether he would be
personally engaged, Tadic did not hesitate: "Serbia will
participate and I will participate; I need your country,s
support on this." That said, in reaffirming his public
stance that the independence of Kosovo was unacceptable to
him, Tadic did not offer a way to square his equally
unequivocal commitment to the Euro-Atlantic relationship with
Kosovo solution rejection.


5. (C) Wisner acknowledged the historical importance of the
moment and the complicated decision that he faced. He
affirmed the common views in Washington that strong US-Serbia
relations are a high priority and that Tadic has the talent
and determination to secure the best for Serbia's future. He
told Tadic that he had fully understood his plan for moving
forward on Kosovo talks and supported it. Wisner then
reviewed the Ahtisaari proposal, describing its different
parts, noting our strong support and collaboration, and
highlighting its value and importance in "settling the Kosovo

BELGRADE 00000207 002 OF 004


problem" and opening the door to the right kind of
relationship between Serbia and the USG.


6. (C) Tadic raised some troubling reports he had received
about Albanian extremists in Kosovo and the threat they posed
to stability and to moving forward in the negotiations.
Wisner said that the international community had carefully
considered all the contingencies and explained how that
thinking had translated into the proposal, i.e. the four
month UNMIK transition period, the roles for NATO and the
ESPD element on the police side, and the international
civilian office. Some of these reports were politically
inspired scare talk and not fully reflective of the reality
on the ground: he asked Tadic to carefully evaluate the
information he was receiving to distinguish which was which.
Wisner said the USG expected that Tadic would use all of the
services/authority at his disposal to separate rumor from
reality and to do everything to maintain calm and prevent
problems. Wisner urged Tadic to keep an "open line" between
his CHOD and COMKFOR, which Tadic assured was also his
priority.


Prime Minister Kostunica
--------------


7. (C) The Prime Minister was far more ambiguous about how
long the delay might be and completely dodged repeated
questions about how Serbia would engage in Vienna. While
there was no specific request for a postponement of the 2/13
date for the next Vienna round, there was a clear suggestion
that a short postponement was needed. Kostunica began the
discussion noting new developments in Serbia "Constitution
and elections" followed by an uncharitable and inaccurate
characterization of the Ahtisaari proposal. He said that
Ahtisaari had overstepped his mandate by taking away a part
of Serbia,s territory and ignoring a international law; he
complained about the way in which Ahtisaari had structured
the negotiations and the few opportunities that Belgrade had
been given to discuss the status issue. The Prime Minister
again referred to the Badinter report, noting that Ahtisaari
had ignored it entirely with the proposal's unambiguous
support for independence. That the plan does not mention
independence "means nothing" and said it would be "a
tautology" to have included such a reference. Kostunica
proclaimed that the entire Ahtisaari proposal had nothing to
do with the Vienna negotiations and it does not resemble "an
outcome" of those talks.


8. (C) Wisner responded to each point challenging the Prime
Minister,s arguments and refuting his characterization of a
complicated process that Ahtisaari had managed with care,
transparency and integrity. He said Ahtisaari,s proposal
"stems directly" from the negotiations on all matters on all
negotiated issues between the sides. Wisner clarified that
arrangements between international bodies such as the UN, EU,
and NATO were up to the concerned bodies. If there were
details that had been decided without full consideration of
Serbia,s position, it was not for want of trying but a
result of Serbia,s uneven engagement.


9. (C) Kostunica reviewed the discussions from Tadic,s
meeting yesterday with all political parties. He said it was
clear that the competencies of the negotiating team had
expired and that his caretaker government was only authorized
to deal with technical issues. It was essential that the
Serb parliament consider the Ahtisaari proposal, confirm
and/or appoint a new negotiating team and debate the proposal
and establish a platform for negotiating in Vienna. The
follow up negotiations could only be managed in the context
of Serbia,s constitutional and political requirements, not
under the threat of a time line. Serbia had moved forward in
a number of important ways: with a new constitution, with
parliamentary elections, and was now in the midst of a
process that would not take so long, months at the most.


10. (C) Wisner pressed him on his thoughts on how Serbia
might engage in Vienna beyond the constitutional and
technical difficulties. Kostunica complained about the
proposal, distinguishing between the annexes, which dealt
with practical issues and the first part of the proposal
which suggested independence. He complained about the
arbitrary way in which the two parts had been combined and
presented, so quickly after elections. In fact, Kostunica
called it "strange" that Ahtisaari had decided to postpone

BELGRADE 00000207 003 OF 004


presenting his proposal until after Serbian elections "with
no consultations with us," going so far as to say, "if a
country is about to be deprived of 15% of its territory, it
should be known before elections." Ahtisaari must be
"patient" and wait for a new parliamentary mandate, the Prime
Minister continued, "otherwise it looks like blackmail."


11. (C) Wisner pressed again for his vision of the road ahead
and how we could get back to the business of building
Serbia,s future. Kostunica was vague and rambling. He
said that the Contact Group and Security Council would have
to decide (presumably about a delay) and that ultimately it
would have to decide between independence and autonomy.
Kostunica said things were not so clear. Kosovo, the Prime
Minister insisted, was not only a question of territorial
integrity but national integrity and state dignity. Serbia
had to be treated fairly and with justice.


12. (C) Wisner reviewed the next steps that Ahtisaari had
outlined for the parties leading up to his recommendation to
the Security Council in New York and consideration of a
resolution; he encouraged Serbia to engage on specific
issues. Wisner told him that there are no strict deadlines
but our &sense of the calendar8 was that things could move
to New York as early as March. The Kosovo status process is
going into the final round and Serbia should move to act
responsibly and engage. Kostunica closed by noting that the
serious obstacle was in convening parliament over the next
several days. This might require at the most ten days.

G17 Plus President Mladjan Dinkic
--------------


13. (C) The outgoing Finance Minister and leader of the
kingmaker G17 Plus, Mladjan Dinkic showed himself to be very
new to the nuts and bolts of the Kosovo negotiations. Other
than a few cursory and disjointed concerns about the
Ahtisaari plan, Dinkic preferred to stick to the general
agreement of the parties born out of their 2/5 meeting with
Tadic. He also predicted that the GOS would not be ready for
talks on 2/13.


14. (C) Dinkic said that he and "his pro-EU party" were
disappointed by the Ahtisaari plan but that Serbia should
work to negotiate and amend it rather than "fight the
document." In general, he thinks the Ahtisaari proposal
"worsens Serbia's position" because there are "not enough
guarantees" for Kosovo Serbs. He raised issue with financial
ties between Serb municipalities and the GOS, church
protections and debt issues. Specifically, Dinkic was
concerned with "Kosovo government approval" for financial
transfers between Kosovo Serb municipalities and the GOS.
However, he said he "understands the logic" that an
independent Kosovo should have a say over financial ties
outside its borders.


15. (C) Wisner thanked Dinkic for his engagement and urged
him to "take his concerns to Vienna and negotiate."
Reaffirming USG support of the UNOSEK plan, Wisner responded
to Dinkic's specific points qualifying that his views could
clarify the logic of the provisions but that the details
would have to be raised in Vienna. On financial transfers,
Wisner explained that the plan assured to Serb municipalities
unhindered financial ties and simply required both sides --
the receiving municipality and the granting GOS entity -- to
inform Pristina, stressing the importance of this kind of
transparency for a host of reasons including facilitating
assistance. On church protection, Wisner agreed it was of
supreme importance and urged Dinkic to speak with deputy
Special Envoy Rohan. On debt, Wisner told Dinkic the plan
would be "fair and sustainable" to both parties. In sum,
Wisner called the Ahtisaari plan the "best package in Europe"
for a minority community and the basis for a multi-ethnic
state.


16. (C) Dinkic ended by hinting at partition, describing the
two possible outcomes as either imposed with current borders
or "a compromise" protecting Serbia's strategic interests.
Wisner was unambiguous in his response and averred the
Contact Group would not budge from its principles on the
matter. "The best way to avoid Pandora's Box is not to open
it," Wisner said.

Lunch with Opinion Leaders
--------------

BELGRADE 00000207 004 OF 004




17. (SBU) A split amongst even progressive Serbs on partition
was apparent at a lunch hosted by the Ambassador for Wisner.
Former Djindjic advisor (and possible DS candidate for
Foreign Minister) Ivan Vejvoda was joined by former Deputy PM
Miroljub Labus and incoming LDP MP Vesna Pesic in probing the
partition question. Vejvoda noted a "buzz" on the issue.
Labus asked if it is not time to "accept reality" in Kosovo
and accept that "Belgrade does not control Pristina and
Pristina does not control the north." Pesic opined it would
be worthwhile to "relax border rigidity" to avoid
destabilization and raised the prospect of delaying a UN seat
for Kosovo. Businessman Slobodan Vucicevic, who runs
factories in all the former Yugoslav republics and does
business in Kosovo, said that the "fragile democratic
majority" might not survive independence and there would be
"clarity through partition." Conversely, former Foreign
Minister Goran Svilanovic thought the plan was "not a bad
deal" for Kosovo Serbs but that a UN seat could be withheld
until public opinion was "prepared." Correspondent for Danas
Jelena Bjelica said that as a Serb living in Pristina, she
was firmly against partition since it would jeopardize peace
and abandon the enclaves. She noted that many Kosovo Serbs
are taking steps to integrate -- several Serbian parties are
now registered in Pristina through the OSCE.


18. (SBU) Wisner firmly laid down a marker on partition,
saying it would "extinguish Serbian life" in Kosovo. He
called the Ahtisaari plan the "best chance for stability and
for the Kosovo Serb population." Wisner was direct in his
response to the idea of holding a UN seat in abeyance,
repudiating the strategy as one "aimed to deprive and punish"
the Kosovars rather than one based on a sincere aim to
stabilize.


19. (C) Comment: Mission accomplished so far. The Serbs are
engaging, even if not to find a way to accept Kosovo
independence. Kostunica,s non-engagement strategy
backfired. Tadic got lucky and looks presidential and
statesmanlike for now. In fairness to him, he also played
his cards pretty well in this instance. Public opinion so
far can hardly be described in the cataclysmic terms
predicted by Kostunica and other more strident nationalists.
The lesson so far is we are on the right track to move ahead
to closure quickly while capitalizing on the relatively muted
response to the Ahtisaari plan. End Comment.


20. (U) Ambassador Wisner cleared this message after
departing post.
POLT