Serbian Government Warns EUR/SCE Deputy Director about

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 001674

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SENSITIVE

E.O.12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KBTS KPAO SR MW KV
SUBJECT: Serbian Government Warns EUR/SCE Deputy Director about
Consequences of Kosovo Independence

Summary
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1. (SBU) Officials of Serbia's ruling parties warned visiting
EUR/SCE Deputy Director Robert Silberstein on November 28 that U.S.
recognition of Kosovo independence would destabilize Serbia and the
region. Kostunica's key lieutenants went further, saying the GOS
was planning a tough response (NFI),but the United States, not
Serbia, would be responsible for any instability. We strongly
rejected these assertions. A senior member of President Tadic's
Democratic Party (DS) urged the United States to delay recognition
of Serbia until after Tadic's reelection in order to ensure a
democratic victory and preserve Serbia's path towards European
integration. A vice president of Prime Minister Kostunica's
Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) said that Serbia would not
"exchange" Kosovo for membership in the European Union, and would
instead choose closer partnership with Moscow. Meanwhile, both
Albanian and Serbian leaders from the Presevo Valley took advantage
of a DCM-hosted dinner to express concern that Belgrade was
neglecting the region. In a trip through the south, local politics
-- especially development and investment -- trumped the Kosovo
question that has absorbed the Belgrade's attention. Post will
continue to reinforce the message that it is a mistake for Belgrade
to believe its own rhetoric and we will continue dialogue with
constructive voices in Belgrade on consequence mitigation,
especially in the south. End Summary.

DS - Delay Kosovo Independence to Help "the Good Guys"
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2. (SBU) MFA Political Director Borislav Stefanovic told visiting
EUR/SCE Deputy Office Director Robert Silberstein on November 28
that he expected U.S. recognition of Kosovo to damage U.S.-Serbian
ties and to disrupt President Tadic's pro-Western national agenda.
Stefanovic, who is close to President Tadic, said that the
President's reelection was critical for the Democratic Party (DS)
goal of a strong relationship between the United States and Serbia.
In that regard, Stefanovic urged the United States, "the beacon of
freedom," to delay Kosovo recognition until after the second round
of presidential elections, which he expected would be on February 3,

2008. A delay in Kosovo's declaration would allow Tadic to avoid
defeat. Silberstein said that there was no appetite in Washington
for further delay and real disappointment in Tadic's leadership.
Stefanovic argued that Tadic was "the most pro-Western leader in the
region" and that Tadic's reelection would be "crucial and strategic"
to keep Serbia on a Euro-Atlantic path. Tadic's reelection as
commander-in-chief would also bring "peace and stability
guarantees." Early U.S. recognition, Stefanovic said, risked a
"doomsday scenario" of both an independent Kosovo and Radicals in
charge of Serbia; Stefanovic warned, "do not underestimate our
ability to screw up." Stefanovic noted that Serbia would respond
vigorously to a Kosovo coordinated declaration of independence (CDI)
and should not take Serbia's western direction for granted. For
example, he noted that the Government of Russia promised Serbia two
billion dollars of FDI over the next seven to eight years.

Looking for Assurances of U.S. Support
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3. (SBU) Silberstein said that Stefanovic and other leaders should
think carefully about reactions to a Kosovo CDI, and that Washington
would look to Tadic and the DS to lead Serbia past Kosovo and
towards Europe, rather than espouse a policy of rejectionism and
opposition. Stefanovic said that Washington's expectations failed
to consider the political context and did not acknowledge Serbia's
efforts to maintain regional peace. He complained about Washington
pressure for Tadic to encourage the public to accept the loss of
Kosovo -- something no Serbia leader could do. The late Prime
Minister Djindjic "was assassinated for less," Stefanovic said.
Stefanovic said that Washington never praised Tadic for taking
"difficult" steps such as apologizing for the Srebrenica massacre.
Nonetheless, Stefanovic promised that damage to Serbia's relations
with the West was a "redline the DS would not cross."

DSS: Kosovo trumps EU
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4. (SBU) Officials from Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS)
said that keeping Kosovo was more important to Serbia than joining
the European Union. Kosovo Ministry State Secretary Dusan
Prorokovic, a self-described "Euro-skeptic," said that Kosovo
independence would be bad for the region and would "impair the
regional security framework," but would not necessarily hurt Serbia.
He claimed that Russia and "other Eastern countries" would provide
enough investment to compensate for possible disruptions in
relations with the West. Prorokovic raised Bosnia, saying that
Republika Srpska "would naturally become a national issue," if
Kosovo declared independence. Insinuating that the Radical Party

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would benefit at the polls, if the democrats failed to address this
issue, he said that political leaders could either respond to the
will of the electorate or lose power to those who did. In a
separate meeting, DSS vice president and parliamentary caucus chair
Milos Aligrudic said that delay or suspension of Serbia's entry into
the EU "was not the end of the world...but losing Kosovo was." If
the United States recognized Kosovo, he warned, Serbia would become
"anti-American".


5. (SBU) Echoing Stefanovic's theme of U.S. responsibility,
Prorokovic said that U.S. "pro-Albanian policies...forced Belgrade's
hand." Aligrudic said that U.S. "insistence" on Kosovo independence
discouraged any real negotiations and warned that a Kosovo
declaration could also void the Kumanovo military agreement, but
that "with this [Serbian] government" there would be no military
option.

Southern Serbia: Keep Belgrade Involved
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6. (U) For Presevo Valley Serbs and Albanians, local development
issues trumped the Kosovo debate. At a DCM-hosted dinner with GOS,
British, and OSCE representatives, November 28, Stojanca Arsic, the
Serb former mayor of Bujanovac and Armend Aliu, an Albanian who runs
a development NGO, expressed worry that Belgrade was neglecting
their region. Arsic and Aliu drove six-hours (together) from
Bujanovac to attend the dinner and were direct with their concerns
to the senior officials of the GOS Coordinating Body for Southern
Serbia (CB) present at the event. Aliu said that if Kosovo became
independent, Belgrade should do more, not less, to stabilize the
south through investment rather than more militarization. CB
economic head Nenad Popovic assured Arsic and Aliu that Belgrade
"would take care of Southern Serbia," and Economic Ministry State
Secretary Verica Kalanovic promised cooperative efforts between

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Belgrade and local governments. The DCM and Silberstein said the
United States was working hard to achieve the "softest landing" for
Serbia after Kosovo, which included pressure to keep Belgrade and
the local leaders -- both represented at the table -- committed to
each other. Serbia, however, had to seize the opportunities for
progress inherent in resolving Kosovo's final status. In this
context, it was in everyone's interest that Belgrade invests in the
south and locals should engage with Belgrade.


7. (U) During Silberstein's trip through Southern Serbia, November
29, pragmatic Vranje mayor Miroljub Stojcic echoed Arsic and Aliu's
concern that Belgrade was more worried about responding to Kosovo
than about the impact of those responses on the ground. Stojcic
said that he hadnot been consulted on Belgrade's Kosovo contingenc
plans for Kosovo CDI and admitted that his regio would suffer from
closure of the Kosovo border r other efforts to punish Kosovo.
Albanian leades in Bujanovac and Presevo said that the local
Abanians contributed to stability in the south and hat Belgrade
had yet to deliver on promises -- spcifically regarding minority
rights (to use the lbanian language, symbols, etc),key developmentprojects, and demilitarization in the region.

Cmment
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8. (SBU) The DS was more suppliant, the DSS more arrogant and
tough. Their underlying message was the same, however. Both sought
to link U.S. support for Kosovo independence to rgional
destabilization, disruption of pro-Western movement in Serbia, and
Serbia's move toward Russia. Our message to both was clear: We
want Serbia to seize the opportunities for rapid integration into
Euro-Atlantic institutions that would emerge after Kosovo status is
resolved. At the same time, our red lines are well known and Serbia
will have to shoulder the responsibility for its actions should it
take provocative steps in the aftermath of a CDI.


9. (U) The United States plays a critical role in Southern Serbia.
We will continue to emphasize to both Belgrade and Southern Serbia
leaders that Presevo Valley Albanians must commit to peaceful
integration in Serbia, and Belgrade must deliver on investment and
political integration promises. This will be more important than
ever during the next months, where political decisions from Belgrade
could affect everyday life in Southern Serbia. End Comment.


10. (U) EUR/SCE Deputy Director Robert Silberstein has cleared this
message.

MUNTER