SERBIA PREPARES FOR PEACEFUL RETALIATION TO KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 001632

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL 12/06/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KV SR
SUBJECT: SERBIA PREPARES FOR PEACEFUL RETALIATION TO KOSOVO
INDEPENDENCE

Classified By: Ambassador Cameron Munter, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

Summary
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1. (C) In the event of a declaration of independence, the Government
of Serbia will retaliate against Kosovo and against countries that
recognize an independent Kosovo. But Serbia will not wage war. The
Prime Minister's cabinet has prepared contingency plans, for now
under wraps, detailing the government's response, ministry by
ministry. Retaliation against the United States and Europe will
almost certainly fall short of a break in relations. Retaliation
against Kosovo will almost certainly include closing borders to
commerce and travel and encumbering official communication between
Belgrade and Pristina. Belgrade could disrupt transmission of power
and water to Kosovo, and we must continue to discourage them from
exercising this capability. Keeping Serbs safely in Kosovo remains
an official priority. Attempts to change borders in southern Serbia
or foment secession there would trigger a stronger GOS reaction. The
rhetoric, which will grow shriller in the weeks ahead, represents
Belgrade's efforts to convince the domestic audience it is holding
the line on Kosovo. It is not a call to arms. End Summary.

Declaring the Declaration Illegal
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2. (C) The Government of Serbia will retaliate in the event of a
unilateral or coordinated declaration of independence (CDI),invoking
legal arguments to justify its actions. Serbian officials have
preemptively stated that a unilateral declaration of independence
(UDI) in Kosovo will be illegitimate and that any foreign country to
recognize Kosovo would violate Serbia's sovereignty. In the event of
a declaration of independence, the Serbian parliament is expected to
annul the declaration and pronounce it an illegal act on Serbian
territory. Government officials have told us that the Serbia will
also formally demand that the UN Secretary General and UNMIK
repudiate the declaration as a violation of UN Security Council
Resolution 1244.

The Diplomatic Response to Recognition
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3. (C) The Prime Minister's Cabinet has submitted ministry action
plans for responses to Kosovo independence. On December 4, Foreign
Minister Vuk Jeremic Foreign Minister Jeremic spoke to the media
about the MFA's plan. Jeremic described a scale of diplomatic
responses, with rupture of diplomatic relations representing the
harshest response, reserved, we believe, for unilateral recognition
of a UDI. MFA Political Director Stefanovic, in a private meeting
with poloff on December 5 said that the plan was descriptive, not
prescriptive. Stefanovic suggested that said that Serbia would
withdraw, if temporarily, ambassadors from countries which recognize
Kosovo. If the United States unilaterally recognized Kosovo,
following a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI),Serbia
might sever relations with the United States. If the USG acted in
concert with Europe, he said, this would not happen.

Trade Restrictions
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4. (SBU) Government officials have stated that Serbia will employ
all means legally available, short of military action, in retaliation
against a break-away Kosovo. An advisor to FM Jeremic told poloff,
on November 27, that Serbia would close the border to Kosovo trade
and travel in the event of a declaration of independence. Stefanovic
said Serbia would not recognize import/export certificates,
passports, or any other documents from a Kosovo state. To
observations that Serbian business and Serbs in Kosovo would suffer
most severely from such acts, Stefanovic and others acknowledge that
the actual interruption of the flow of goods to Kosovo would be
brief. While Serbia would maintain trade restrictions, informal
"transfers," black marketeering, and commerce via Macedonia would
supply Kosovo.

Interfering with Infrastructure
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5. (C) It is conceivable that, following a CDI, the GOS might claim
an absence of legal authority in Kosovo, declare infrastructure
agreements with UNMIK void, and at least temporarily disrupt the flow
of water and power to Kosovo. We have strongly discouraged such
acts, pointing out that they could be interpreted as attacks against
innocents. Where basic humanitarian arguments have had little
traction, we have also pointed out that such acts would undermine
President Tadic's stated objective of preventing an exodus of Serbs
from Kosovo. While Serbia might be able to insolate northern
Mitrovice from such punishing acts, we noted, reaching Serb enclaves
and Serbs in the Kosovo countryside would be problematic.

Preparing the Public to Lose Kosovo Not an Option
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6. (C) Serbia's leaders oppose Kosovo independence, privately and
publicly, regardless the inevitability of that outcome, and will
continue to beat the drum for territorial integrity. With
presidential elections anticipated in early 2008, officials from both
President Tadic (DS) and Prime Minister Kostunica's (DSS) parties
have told us that they need to prevent the loss of Kosovo from
leading to loss of Serbian democracy and a Radical win at the polls.
Political analysts do not expect Tadic to pull off a first-round
victory, but currently have him running slightly ahead of Radical
Party leader Nikolic in the second round.



7. (U) The Government of Serbia has launched several media campaigns
to show Serbians that it is battling to keep Kosovo. In November, a
GOS-funded organization erected billboards throughout Belgrade
featuring Serbian celebrities urging Serbians to remember the
"suffering" of Kosovo Serbs. In December, the Kosovo Ministry put up
a billboards depicting historic Western leaders (including Churchill
and U.S. Presidents Washington, Kennedy, and Lincoln) and citing
their challenges to their fellow citizens to stand up for their
principals and beliefs. The message that Kosovo is and must stay
part of Serbia, blazoned on billboards across the city and in
televised public service messages, reflects the people's will, but
perhaps not their expectation. We believe most Serbs know what is
coming, even if they don't like it.

Losing Kosovo: Blaming the West
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8. (C) Serbian leaders will denounce all countries that recognize
Kosovo's independence, but will lay most of the blame on the United
States. On November 28, the Prime Minister's Advisor Sestovic told
poloff that Serbs consider Kosovo independence the conclusion of
"NATO's war on Serbia," for which they particularly blame the United
States. He said he expected Serbian politicians and media explain
the loss of Kosovo as a "great injustice" perpetrated by the U.S.-led
international community. We expect that much of the public will
accept the premise of this anti-American rhetoric and demonstrate,
albeit peacefully, against the United States and international
community.

Maintaining Peace
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9. (C) Serbia's leaders, including the President, Prime Minister,
and Minister of Defense, have assured the Ambassador they will not
send Serbia's military into Kosovo and will not wage war. They
underscore, however, Serbia's right and responsibility to defend
against violence within its borders, and we expect they will
particularly monitor activities in Serbia's Albanian communities of
the Presevo Valley. In a December 6 meeting with the Ambassador and
visiting EUCOM General Gallagher, President Tadic said that avoiding
violence in Kosovo and the exodus of "100,000 Serbs" will require
close contact and daily communication between the United States and
Serbia's security and defense institutions. He reiterated his
appreciation of U.S. assistance in apprehending criminal Kosovo gangs
organizing armed militias in Macedonia.

Comment: Red Lines
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10. (C) Serbia will not be Kosovo's good neighbor for the
foreseeable future unites Serbia's population and politicians and
Serbia's leaders must and will protest this outcome to years of
negotiations with political and economic means at their disposal.
The ministries' action plans undoubtedly identify numerous trip wires
that will trigger measured government responses. Elements of the
government may cause and condone mischief -- both in the interval
leading to a declaration of Kosovo independence and beyond. The
Government will not wreak havoc or incite sustained violence.


11. (C) Our task is to develop our own clear red lines, and to
present them, in concert with our allies, to the Serbs once the
December UN process has concluded.

MUNTER