The Sandzak: Ugljanin's Fiefdom

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001627

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SR KV BK
SUBJECT: The Sandzak: Ugljanin's Fiefdom

REF: BELGRADE 1394

SUMMARY


1. (SBU) Sandzak is one of the last vestiges of Milosevic-era rule
in Serbia where a local politician holds on to his power base
through manipulation, coercion, and intimidation. However, this
Muslim-populated area appears primed for a political opening, as
Novi Pazar Mayor Ugljanin's tactics are beginning to show their
wear, and local political, religious, and civic leaders are
beginning to find their unified voice. Mirroring this political
shift is the pending resolution of an intra-religious feud between
feuding muftis, which could further weaken Ugljanin's influence. If
the leaders can act in a unified manner, Sandzak has the potential
to shake from its authoritarian past and could serve as a bridge
providing economic growth and stability in southwest Serbia, and the
border regions with Montenegro, Bosnia, and Kosovo. But there is
little indication that Ugljanin will relinquish his power either
quietly or honestly. End Summary.

Mayor Ugljanin: Sandzak's Solution or Sandzak's Milosevic
-------------- --------------


2. (SBU) Mayor Sulejman Ugljanin told DCM, on her December 3-4
visit to Novi Pazar, that Sandzak was confronted by difficult
problems requiring international assistance. He claimed that he was
not the cause of those problems, but instead, part of the solution.
Ugljanin blamed the United States for the recent split in the local
Islamic community (reftel),and accused the United States of
supporting "that murderer" Mufti Muamer Zukorlic. He blamed
Zukorlic for the lack of rule of law in Novi Pazar and accused him
of supporting criminal and fundamentalist elements. Ugljanin
repeated the accusation floating around in Belgrade's Islamic
circles that Zukorlic was running a shooting range in the basement
of his private Islamic university. When questioned about the
lackluster performance of the local police under his control during
the November 16 mosque shootings, Ugljanin responded disingenuously
that he was committed to improving the rule of law, the judiciary,
and working with the United States. He asked for U.S. and OSCE
assistance in these efforts. Following the meeting, Ugljanin called
in his local press and reported he had had a productive talk with
the DCM highlighting "the need for reform of the police force,
judiciary and public prosecutor's office." DCM stressed the need
for calm and rule of law.

Opposition Parties and NGOs Seeking Common Cause
-------------- ---


3. Local opposition leaders and NGOs in the Sandzak described their
strong concern over about Ugljanin's repressive rule over Novi Pazar
tactics but emphasized they wanted to cooperate in an effort to
bring about political change in the Sandzak. Aida Corovic of local
NGO Urban In told the DCM that Uglanjin, whom she called "Sandzak's
Milosevic," maintained power through voter intimidation and
restricting control of the local media. Ugljanin, she and other NGO
representatives said, employed local "thugs," separate from the
police, to bully local citizens into submission and apathy. In a
separate meeting, a local judge who is part of a Serbia-wide
movement to establish an independent judiciary supported these
statements, noting that he had received death threats and directly
fingered Ugljanin and his "shock troops" as the culprits. In
response to DCM's question, the judge said Ugljanin's mechanism for
sustaining his unpopular control was by liberal use of these shock
troops. They would tell people how to vote, which mosque to go to
and when to show up for Ugljanin rallies. The judge said the shock
troops led the demonstration in front of the Zukorlic-controlled
mosque, shoving their way through those waiting to go to prayer and
trying to start fights. The judge described these shock troops as
"buzz-cut body builder mercenaries with extensive rap sheets."


4. Representatives of the opposition Sandzak Democratic Party (SDP,
led by Labor and Social Policy Minister Rasim Ljajic) said they were
considering new local alliances in order to defeat Ugljanin at the
polls at upcoming municipal elections, most likely to be held in the
spring of 2008. SDP Spokesperson Mirosad Jusufovic said, SDP, which
is already partnered with the Democratic Party (DS),was already
talking to the local Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) branch about
combining for a single candidates' list, since the LDP could help
attract Serb voters in this predominantly Muslim region. Hajram
Djekic, Director of the local LDP office, left open the possibility
of a coalition and said the LDP was focusing its campaign efforts on
winning the support of the youth, who were heavily disenfranchised
in this region of high unemployment and few opportunities.
Representatives of both the LDP and SDP complained of the difficulty
of getting their messages out on the street due to Ugljanin's
control over local media. NGO representatives had also complained
bitterly about lack of independent media. Jusufovic of SDP said
well trained poll observers would be extremely important in the
upcoming municipal elections and asked for U.S. assistance in
training local election monitors.


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5. SDP had begun the meeting saying local television already was
carrying Ugljanin's photo op with the DCM and expressing their
concerns that Ugljanin was manipulating DCM's visit to somehow show
that the United States supported him. This was transparently
hypocritical, they said, because Ugljanin repeatedly appeared on
television blaming the United States for all of Novi Pazar's
problems, including instigating the mufti feud. SDP then arranged a
joint press statement with Hajrudin Hajrovic, President of SDP's
Novi Pazar chapter, and DCM emphasizing SDP's long-term cooperation
with the United States and our joint desire for democratic and
economic reform and stability for the Sandzak.

Mufti Dispute Dissipating
--------------


6. (SBU) During DCM's conversations with the two claimants to
Serbia's Supreme Mufti status, it became clear that the Ugljanin
(and DSS) engineered putsch was losing steam. Though Zukorlic began
his meeting saying he was "angry" with the DCM for meeting
Ugljanin-annointed Adem Zilkic, he was visibly more confident and in
control than he was during the November 13 meeting in Belgrade
immediately before the shootings. Appearing statesmanlike in his
ornate office compound and surrounded by local supporting imams,
Zukorlic noted positively the increased attention by the diplomatic
community in the Sandzak over the past several months. He told DCM
he was encouraged that he had successfully organized several
thousand people in the streets of Novi Pazar on December 1 in
support of the upcoming Hadj to Mecca. Ugljanan and Zilkic had
attempted to promote a counter-event, but were only able to muster
50 supporters. In response to Zukorlic's "anger," DCM reiterated
that diplomats were not politicians and meetings with various
interlocutors could not and should not be interpreted as shows of
support. Zukorlic repeated the SDP's apprehension that the local
community was not sophisticated enough to understand diplomatic
nuances and would view any meeting with a U.S. diplomat as an
indication of U.S. support.


7. (SBU) In a separate meeting, a clearly unhinged Zilkic,
appearing alone in a simple storefront office, told the DCM that the
he still hoped to resolve the religious dispute between him and
Zukorlic peacefully, and hoped he could get Ugljanin and Lajic to
meet in order to help resolve the situation. Sounding desperate and
defeated, he once again pitched the need for a Belgrade-based Reis
for Serbia, saying that without its own Reis the Muslim community in
Serbia would be further fractured and split. Zilkic said he was
concerned that with the probable pending loss of Kosovo, Serbia's
Muslims would further lose their influence in Serbian political and
social life. As DCM was attempting to leave, Zilkic practically
prostrated himself asking if DCM thought what he had done was wrong
and begging for the United States to "help."

Comment
--------------


8. (SBU) Ugljanin is a fascinating by-product of Milosevic's brutal
rein. Originally a founding member of former Bosnian President
Alija Izetbegovic's Democratic Action Party (SDA),Ugljanin actively
began arming Sandzak to secede from Serbia in the early 1990's.
When his co-conspirators were arrested in 1993, Ugljanin managed to
escape to Turkey. Though he visited Sarajevo every year during the
war (DCM first me him in Sarajevo in 1994),flying in via Turkey, he
remained wanted until he arrived in Belgrade in 1996, on a regularly
scheduled Jugoslav Airlines Flight and was escorted by police escort
back to Novi Pazar. Though still the subject of considerable
speculation, it is clear that Milosevic allowed him to return and
would not have done so without Ugljanin's support. Ugljanin's SDP
party subsequently dropped its ties to the Bosnian branch and went
into coalition with Prime Minister Kostunica's Democratic Party of
Serbia (DSS) following Milosevic's ouster. Ugljanin is now closely
associated with Kostunica and Kostunica's policies. Kostunica is
widely believed to have engineered the Mufti feud through his cat's
paw in the Sandzak, Ugljanin, in order both to keep Serbia in a
constant state of chaos and also to position himself and Ugljanin as
major beneficiaries of restitution of Islamic lands to the Islamic
community when the restitution law is implemented in 2008.


9. (SBU) Ugljanin increasingly has used more brutal tactics to stay
in power, including stealing the last local elections in 2006, when
his shock troops were widely deployed to intimidate voters and stuff
ballot boxes. Though his influence over the local political
culture, media and judiciary still permeates the Sandzak, and he
still has a sizable populist base, there appears to be a new
emboldened current of opposition. With the recent reaffirmation of
Zukorlic's religious authority and a developing commitment among
previously fractured NGO's and political parties to work
cooperatively towards upcoming municipal elections, Ugljanin's grasp
on political control is vulnerable. Given his history, he is
unlikely to relinquish this control easily or honestly and will
certainly employ his supporters and his muscle on the street to
counteract any electoral challenge. Post will continue to provide
assistance to Sandzak's democratic parties and will be increasingly
present in the Sandzak both to show Ugljanin we are watching and to

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further bolster democratic forces. End Comment.

MUNTER