Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BELGRADE158
2007-02-02 16:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Belgrade
Cable title:  

PRIME MINISTER CHARTS COLLISION COURSE WITH NATO

Tags:  PBTS MARR NATO PREL SR YI 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHBW #0158/01 0331646
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021646Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0187
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000158 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017
TAGS: PBTS MARR NATO PREL SR YI
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER CHARTS COLLISION COURSE WITH NATO
AND EUROPE

Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000158

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017
TAGS: PBTS MARR NATO PREL SR YI
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER CHARTS COLLISION COURSE WITH NATO
AND EUROPE

Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (c) Summary: The DSS Kosovo platform released January
31 as the basis for coalition talks is further evidence that
Kostunica is not likely to take a constructive path in the
Kosovo status process. It also signals his willingness, just
two months after the PfP invitation, to block or delay
Serbia's budding relationship with NATO and its larger
defense reform. The platform, which will raise the stakes
for Tadic in cobbling together a working coalition
government, raises questions about whether Tadic is strong
enough and committed enough to keeping his vision of a Serbia
moving towards NATO and EU membership on track. The
Ambassador has urged Tadic to stand up for his vision and
delivered a strong message to Kostunica on the potential
impact of his stance on U.S.-Serbia relations. End summary.


2. (c) On January 31, the DSS made public its platform
regarding its approach to the Kosovo status issue, and
specifically highlighted the platform as the basis for any
coalition talks with DS on forming a government. The
platform is a reiteration of some of the least helpful
positions of the Kostunica government over the past twelve
months. It includes three principles: first, that the
Serbian government will always regard Kosovo as an integral
and inseparable part of the territory of Serbia; second, that
the Serbian government would reject any recognition of
Kosovo's independence by any state or international
organization as "illegal, illegitimate and void," and would
regard any such decision as having serious consequences on
relations with that country or organization; and third, that
acknowledgment of Kosovo's independence by any NATO member
state would constitute a major threat to relations between
Serbia and NATO, since the Serbian government would treat
recognition as evidence that NATO had bombed Serbia in 1999
in order to seize the territory of Kosovo.


3. (c) Many of the elements of this platform have surfaced

previously as official government statements or statements by
Kostunica. Kostunica previously publicly threatened serious
consequences to bilateral relations with any country that
recognizes Kosovo independence, and Kostunica privately (and
other officials publicly) have directly or obliquely stated
that recognition of Kosovo's independence would be tantamount
to an admission by NATO members that the 1999 bombing was
"the first phase of NATO's invasion of Serbia" and a
pre-meditated attempt to seize Kosovo by force.


4. (c) This platform significantly raises the stakes in
negotiations for the formation of a coalition government.
DSS has said publicly that acceptance of this platform is a
prerequisite for DSS's participation in the next government.
This will make it extremely difficult for Tadic and the DS to
forge a more flexible and responsible Kosovo policy, at least
in the next phases of the Ahtisaari process, as an
intransigent DSS is a necessary partner for a "democratic"
coalition. Unless Tadic is willing to counter Kostunica's
brinkmanship, the president's maneuvering space on Kosovo
policy will be limited. To date, Tadic has shown no
indication that he is willing to lead or take risks on this
issue.


5. (c) This latest policy pronouncement from Kostunica
exposes the PM's instinctive aversion to NATO and his
suspicion of deeper defense cooperation with the West. The
specific threat to relations with NATO as an institution in
the DSS Kosovo platform - coming on the heels of Serbia's
acceptance of an offer to join PfP - shows how low a priority
relations with the alliance are for him. This approach is
nothing new for the PM. It was Kostunica who put the brakes
on a planned deployment of Serbian military personnel on a
training mission to Afghanistan under the aegis of a
Norwegian ISAF deployment and it is Kostunica's government
(notably Stojkovic's Justice ministry) that continues to
slow-roll implementation of the NATO GLOC agreement that the
NATO SYG signed with FONMIN Draskovic in Belgrade in 2005.
It was Kostunica who barely acknowledged the PfP invitation
and chose somehow to interpret it as support for his position
on Kosovo. It is easy to see Kostunica's fingerprints
throughout Serbia's draft PfP Presentation Document, which
highlights Kostunica's legal position on Kosovo and
territorial integrity liberally and notes Serbia's intention
to use the PfP consultative mechanism if its territorial
integrity is threatened; and it was Kostunica himself who
told the Ambassador in a private meeting in December - in
strong and emotive terms - that he disapproved of the earlier
visit of U.S. F-16 fighters to Batajnica airfield, noting it
was "a mistake" and "too early" for the Serbian people to
move on from the NATO intervention.


6. (c) Kostunica's willingness to make Serbia-NATO
relations the first and most prominent victim of Kosovo

BELGRADE 00000158 002 OF 002


independence, then, is not surprising. Tadic claimed credit
for NATO's surprise announcement last December to invite
Serbia to join PfP. He has repeatedly and forcefully claimed
that Serbia's integration in NATO is his number one priority.
He has actively courted parts of our defense establishment
in Washington, Naples and Europe. He finally, after months
of wavering, confirmed the appointment of a new reform minded
Chief of the General Staff. He now faces a challenge. He
will have to stand up to Kostunica's deliberate provocation
on something he said is at the top of his priorities or fall
back on his oft repeated statement that Kostunica and his DSS
must be kept in the government lest he go to the radicals.
It will take strong leadership from the president to avert
such an outcome - leadership that has not been in evidence
yet.


7. (c) Kostunica's reaction also makes it all the more
important that Serbia's PfP presentation Document reiterate
the assurances on Kosovo and ICTY that Tadic enumerated in
his letter to the President on the eve of the PfP invitation.
POLT