SERBIA: PRESIDENT TADIC AND PRIME MINISTER KOSTUNICA ON THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001552

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR P, EUR, EUR/SCE
PASS TO NSC (BRAUN/AINSLEY)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM KV BH SR
SUBJECT: SERBIA: PRESIDENT TADIC AND PRIME MINISTER KOSTUNICA ON THE
ROAD AHEAD

REF: BELGRADE 1411

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CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR CAMERON MUNTER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador met Serbian Prime Minister Kostunica
November 7 and President Tadic November 9. Kostunica was guarded but
cordial, Tadic open and realistic. Tadic agreed to continue public
statements condemning violence in days to come; Kostunica demurred,
saying such statements would just draw attention to possible
incidents. Both agreed to temper their statements on Bosnia, though
both expressed solidarity with RS PM Dodik and criticized the actions
taken by Hirep Lajcak. Kostunica repeated his conviction that any
unilateral action in Kosovo would ignite a regional conflict.
Kostunica confirmed that dates for Serbian presidential elections
would be announced only after December 10, when legislation governing
elections and presidential functions had passed; Tadic said he
believed elections would take place in January, and expressed growing
confidence in his ability to win. Most important, Kostunica is
clearly prepared to resist the loss of Kosovo to the end, while Tadic
has made an important step: while he isn't happy with the outcome of
an independent Kosovo, he is prepared for it and explicitly willing
to work with us to manage the transition, hoping that he can protect
his strategic goal of promoting Serbian integration into the west.
END SUMMARY.

THE ODD COUPLE
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2. (C) Serbian Prime Minister Kostunica met the Ambassador
one-on-one November 7. He was guarded but cordial, clearly seeking
to portray himself as a reasonable man. He discussed at length the
Hong Kong model put forth at the latest Vienna meeting of the
Belgrade and Pristina leadership under the auspices of the troika,
arguing that he could not compromise on the issue of Serbian
sovereignty over Kosovo. He said it was an attempt to be specific
and illustrative using ideas the Serbs had suggested previously.
Ambassador asked Kostunica how Pristina had received the model, and
Kostunica said: badly. Ambassador noted that, ultimately, Pristina
would be his audience. Kostunica said the Serbs would redouble their
efforts at the next meeting on November 20.


3. (C) Serbian President Tadic, meeting with the Ambassador two days
later, was much more direct. He blamed Pristina for rejecting the
Hong Kong model and the Russian suggestion of a confederal
relationship (though he nodded when Ambassador noted that Kostunica
too had rejected this option in Vienna). Tadic said the Serbs would
continue to suggest fresh ideas to the end, but noted that he had two
goals: not to abandon Serbia's legitimate goals in Kosovo, and to
ensure that, whatever happened, there was peace.


4. (C) Ambassador requested that both Kostunica and Tadic make
frequent public statements that, whatever the outcome in Kosovo,
violence would not be tolerated. Tadic readily agreed to this
request. Kostunica did not, claiming that such statements would draw
unneeded attention to the prospect of violence. Ambassador urged
Kostunica to reconsider, as his silence would likely be understood as
toleration, even encouragement, of extremist actions.

GETTING REAL
--------------


5. (C) Where Kostunica was unwilling to engage in discussions of the
"day after," Tadic enthusiastically engaged in a discussion of what
he called "planning for the worst." While Tadic claimed he was
worried that a UDI could lead to regional violence and declared he
would do what he could to prevent it, he reiterated his commitment
above all to a peaceful solution. Tadic recalled the events of March
2004, and expressed some doubt about KFOR's ability to respond
appropriately. Ambassador reassured Tadic that KFOR too had learned
from 2004, and that his own military was in close touch with KFOR's
leadership to ensure swift action if necessary to keep the peace. He
stressed the importance of restraint on the part of both Kosovars and
Serbs and the danger should either or both sides respond with force.
The Ambassador expressed gratitude for the Tadic's remarks on the
role of the army and the importance of cross-border military contacts
to share information and to maintain order in the hot spots, and
emphasized the need to go beyond traditional contingency planning.
Tadic said that he would not order a military action without talking
to the Ambassador. Ambassador responded that any Serbian military
action in Kosovo was unacceptable, period. Tadic appeared to accept
this red line but said nothing. (Comment: Tadic, Defense Minister
Sutanovac, and CHOD Ponos have repeated many times that the Serbian
Army will not fight in Kosovo. We believe Tadic's statement may be
the result of pressure from Kostunica and his allies to put a
military option back on the table.)

BOSNIA: CRITICISM OF LAJCAK
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6. (C) Tadic emphatically affirmed his interest in upholding
international law and stabilizing the situation in Republika Srpska
(RS). In Brussels and to high-level U.S. officials, he claimed, he
had stated "one hundred times" his opposition to partition of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Tadic observed that he could advance a
legal/historical argument that RS and Serbia were, in fact, one
nation, but said that he would not insist on this line because of the
political consequences and sensitivities. He repeated Serbia's
commitment to stability in the region and the country's support for
Dayton. The president commented that the timing of Hirep Lajcak's
initiatives, coinciding with Serbia's impending loss of Kosovo, was
dangerous and problematic for Serbia. Remarking on Lajcak's service
as Ambassador to Serbia and his "unhelpful involvement" in the break
up of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro, Tadic doubted the OHR had
understood how his actions would play in Serbia.


7. (C) Kostunica too had expressed his criticism of Lajcak's
reforms, and provided a long account of why Dayton was in essence a
mechanism chiefly created to support the rights of the constituent
countries. Lajcak, he said, had attacked the very basis of Dayton.
Ambassador countered that Dayton was also the agreement that
specifically gave Lajcak his powers, and that it was up to Lajcak, in
this capacity, to see that Bosnia was well governed and the needs of
its peoples met. In any event, Ambassador urged Kostunica to avoid
making the situation worse in Bosnia, and allowing the Bosnians
themselves to resolve the situation. Kostunica said he believed the
situation had indeed calmed in recent days (he claimed not to be
informed about latest developments) and said he would watch closely
"and quietly." Kostunica said he believed the United States needed a
comprehensive policy on the Balkans rather than seeing it in pieces.
Ambassador countered that it was precisely in the interest of
regional stability that we believed Kosovo's status must be resolved,
and Dayton protected.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
--------------


8. (C) Kostunica confirmed that that the ruling coalition had agreed
not to choose a date for Serbia's presidential elections until after
December 10, when law governing the role of the presidency and the
procedure of elections would be passed. Kostunica also confirmed
that he had not given his party's support to Tadic. The agreement,
Kostunica said, called for elections not to take place if Serbia's
territorial integrity was threatened; asked by the Ambassador to
define "threatened," Kostunica answered "UDI" - that is, it would
take a Kosovar independence declaration, rather than the possibility
of such a declaration, to postpone elections.


9. (C) Tadic said he believed democratic leaders would pay the price
of Kosovo's independence at the polls. Having agreed with coalition
partners to delay announcement of presidential elections until after
December 10, Tadic said that he expected the first round of elections
would take place in mid January. The expected schedule, he said,
linked his success with the Kosovo endgame. "I am in the hands of
the Albanians," he said. "If they shoot in Presevo Valley, I am in
trouble." Tadic seemed more confident of polling data showing him
firmly in front in the run-up to a possible showdown with the
expected Radical candidate Nikolic, and expected that these elections
would take place in January.

MANAGING TOUGH TIMES
--------------


10. (C) Tadic said that U.S. recognition of a unilateral declaration
of Kosovo independence would create serious problems in bilateral
relations. Preparing for the worst-case scenario, Tadic said, it
would be important to maintain candid, immediate communications with
the Ambassador. Despite serious difficulties he anticipated, Tadic
said he hoped that, in the tough times, Serbia and the United States
would find a way to work together. He explicitly repeated his
commitment to a Euro-Atlantic future with Serbian membership in both
the EU and NATO.


11. (C) Kostunica, on the other hand, is playing his cards very
close to the vest. He reiterated to the Ambassador his commitment to
a European future for Serbia, despite press reports that he has grown
increasingly close to the Russians. He, and especially some of his
lieutenants, have maintained a tough public approach to Kosovo
(Minister for Kosovo Samardzic has pointedly rejected all prospective
solutions to Kosovo in the troika talks that do not explicitly
support Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo).

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) Tadic recognizes his responsibility to maintain public order
and we believe that he will refrain from intemperate public
predictions of violence, urging calm, instead. He seems to have
concluded that he needs to work through tough times rather than

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resist them. His approach was supported by Foreign Minister Jeremic
in a November 9 meeting with the Ambassador: they see what's coming,
and they're telling us they want to manage the post UDI process.


13. (C) But Kostunica is the Prime Minister, and as such has greater
power to cause difficulty in Kosovo. He is reserved for now, but we
believe he may still be willing to cause trouble after a UDI in an
effort to prove that his dire warnings about Kosovar independence are
indeed accurate.


14. (C) We continue to have a problem, both with Tadic and with
Kostunica, over Bosnia. Tadic believes that we misunderstand Bosnia;
Kostunica will, in our opinion, exploit any opportunities he can to
portray himself as the champion of aggrieved Serbs, be they in RS or
Serbia proper. Not only we, but also the British and French have
told Kostunica to moderate his public statements on Bosnia. We've
also urged Tadic to stay out of the press on Bosnian issues. For the
last few days, both have been quiet. But we must watch Bosnia - and
the Serbian leadership's approach to Bosnia - very carefully in the
days to come. End Comment.

MUNTER