SERBIAN PRIME MINISTER KOSTUNICA AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 001411

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL SR
SUBJECT: SERBIAN PRIME MINISTER KOSTUNICA AND
PRESIDENT TADIC - CO-DEPENDENCY


CLASSIFIED BY DCM JENNIFER L BRUSH FOR REASONS 1.4
(B/D)

Summary and Comment
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1. (C) Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica and
President Boris Tadic dislike each other. This has
the fortunate benefit of keeping the Democratic Party
of Serbia (DSS) and Democratic Party (DS) coalition
together. Both men's political bases are equally
based on exploiting differences between the two men
and their parties, as they are based on their unified
opposition to an independent Kosovo. During the
months leading up to and through the end of the Troika
Talks USG interests are reinforced by the Kostunica-
Tadic rift. As long as the two can only agree on one
thing - Kosovo -- their coalition will endure, and the
government is likely to survive the aftermath of a
possible Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI).
As long as holding the government together becomes the
most important goal for both following a UDI, it is in
neither's interest to provoke or encourage violence.
The biggest danger lies in the government's losing
control of Kostunica's anti-U.S./NATO rhetoric and
having a random act of violence spin events beyond
either's ability to manage. End Summary and Comment.

Focus on Interpersonal Relations
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2. (C) Much has been made in the press and in
observations by Troika officials of the palpable
dislike between Prime Minister Kostunica and President
Tadic. Particularly in the hyper-stimulated Serbian
press this dislike is spun for domestic consumption
and to reinforce both parties' political bases. The
political spin typically consists of Tadic being
softer on America and NATO than Kostunica. This spin
plays out up until the subject of Kosovo and Troika
talks, when both men find a common voice. Up and down
the political spectrum, interlocutors have been
telling embassy officials there is no light between
the two on Kosovo.


3. (C) Some among us might wish that Tadic would
accept an inevitable UDI and to publicly support the
move, pre-December 10. Tadic will not do this, as
that would be the one act that could destroy the
coalition, which would be political suicide for Tadic.


4. (C) The more likely scenario is for the two to
take their differences -- and single unifying element
(opposition to an independent Kosovo) to the end of
the Troika negotiation. Neither wants to, or can be,
associated with losing Kosovo. It is more important
to both that the other be blamed than any particular
outcome be achieved.

Focus on Staying in Government
--------------


5. (C) Both men's primary interest is to stay in
government, for which they equally depend on each
other. Neither Tadic's DS nor Kostunica's DSS believe
it is strong enough alone to take on the radicals.
They can only hold off the radicals, however, if DSS's
perceived nationalism continues to be the primary
difference between DSS and DS. In 2007 in Serbia, a
pure EU-oriented, Trans-Atlantic-directed platform
will not win. The population remains isolated and
bruised from the Milosevic years and the NATO
bombings, though they equally fail to see the
connection between the two. Many man-on-the-street
Serbs still profess wonder that "our friends and
allies America" would bomb them in modern times. A
truly western-leaning political party, such as DS,
cannot win on a pro-western platform in this
environment, though its intelligentsia brain trust
says all the right things.


6. (C) Likewise Kostunica still seems himself, and is
perceived by most of Serbia, as the man who overthrew
Milosevic; making an alliance with the Radical Party
distasteful and unlikely. But his small spectrum of
not-as-crazy-as-Radicals-nationalists, equally is
insufficient to create a majority. This dynamic makes
a DS/DSS Coalition essential to keeping the two
parties in power.

Post-UDI
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7. (C) During discussions with the diplomatic corps
and with Belgrade's think tanks, the view is
increasingly emerging that the coalition will survive
a UDI. This impression is based mainly on the
population's war fatigue, and latent - though rarely
expressed - view that Kosovo's Independence already is
inevitable. There is little appetite for either
sending Serbian boys to defend Kosovo or for
sustaining any backlash from the United States/NATO.
The scars from the 1999 bombing are still gaping in
Serbia and elsewhere, perhaps intentionally left that
way to remind the people of the awful consequences of
supporting Milosevic.


8. (C) Though Kostunica is likely to continue to
spout anti-U.S. and NATO rhetoric to reinforce his
nationalist credentials, Tadic is equally unlikely to
challenge him. Rather the result of this dynamic may
be to frame themselves as defenders of Serbia's
territorial integrity, while also laying the ground
for a non-violent transition. For example, the
government already has clearly ruled out a role for
the Serbian National Army in "defending Kosovo."

The Risks
--------------


9. (C) The Kostunica/Tadic dynamic bears considerable
risk. As populations in Northern Mitrovica and
Southern Serbia begin to brace themselves for a UDI,
the potential for random violence increases. Whether
or not the coalition is ready to control this violence
remains a question. Elements of the DS have
approached the USG to inquire about possible early
warning measures with UNMIK in order to reduce this
risk. For example, Chief of Defense Ponos has asked
DOD officials to help organize a meeting with UNMIK
Commander BG Earhardt in Belgrade. While in
Washington in early October, at a roundtable with the
National Defense University, Assistant Defense
Minister Spasojevic recommended the United States
request a strong statement from NATO that KFOR will
protect the Serbs, and a strong statement to Albanians
to avoid any violence. In a later meeting with DASD
Fata, Spasojevic asked the latter to visit Belgrade
prior to December and to keep BG Earhardt in place
through the next few months.

Comment
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10. (C) The irony for long-time observers of Serbian
politicsis how atomized Serbian politicians can be
whilehiding behind their slogan of "Only Unity Saves
te Serbs." Serbs seem to do best when uniting
aginst a common enemy rather than uniting togetherfor a common good, e.g., EU or NATO membership. Srbs
have been able to unite against world-class nemies --
the Turks, Nazis and Stalinist Russia. During his
time, Milosevic was able to create unty against the
ludicrous triple threat specter o a Vatican/Islamic
Jihad/Fourth Reich alliance. Now Serbs are united
against a clearly awkward treat -- those who would
"steal" Kosovo. The artiiciality of the threat, in
the short-term, will elp Kostunica and Tadic unite to
save Kosovo, whle, we hope, they equally prepare for
a Kosovo-fee Serbia. End Comment.

MUNTER