SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR WISNER'S VISIT TO BELGRADE

UNCLAS BELGRADE 001113

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR FRANK WISNER

E.O. 12958:N/A
TAGS: PBTS PGOV PREL SR KV
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR WISNER'S VISIT TO BELGRADE

REF: A. BELGRADE 1100, B. PRISTINA 593


1. (SBU) Ambassador Wisner,

Serbia's leaders, led by Prime Minister Kostunica, have prepared for
the new round of Kosovo talks and the first visit of the negotiating
troika by affirming their unity on Kosovo policy and by submitting
their "rules" for the format and substance of the talks. In short,
the GOS rejects independence and demands that the talks be without
deadline, deal primarily with status and that any only the UNSC can
make a final decision.

Belgrade now
--------------


2. (SBU) President Tadic and Prime Minister Kostunica agreed to form
Serbia's current government in May after nearly four months of
coalition talks. Mladjan Dinkic's G17 Plus is also part of the
coalition. The deal left Kostunica as Prime Minister despite a much
weaker electoral showing than Tadic's DS, along with his DSS party
in control of the Interior Ministry, intelligence service (BIA) and
a new Kosovo Ministry headed by his close advisor Slobodan
Samardzic. Tadic's DS party received a majority of ministry seats
including Defense, Foreign Affairs, Finance, and others. The
coalition has made its Kosovo policy one of its "five principles"
(along with European integration, ICTY cooperation, socio-economic
development, and combating corruption/organized crime).


3. (SBU) The new coalition has acted quickly on both ICTY and
Kosovo. Two ICTY indictees were arrested abroad (Djordjevic in
Montenegro and Tolomir in Bosnia) within the first weeks (and just
before a visit by ICTY prosecutor Del Ponte). Tadic and the DS-run
ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs have tried to capitalize
on the arrests as concrete proof that Serbia is both cooperating and
ready to move closer to Europe.


4. (SBU) On Kosovo, Kostunica still runs the show. The new Kosovo
Ministry was his idea, and his way of maintaining "coordinating"
authority over Kosovo policy despite ceding key ministries such as
Defense and Foreign Affairs to the DS. Kosovo Minister Samardzic is
extremely close to Kostunica on Kosovo (and other issues) and was
the PM's envoy to the UNOSEK talks.


5. (SBU) Kostunica has declared victory over Kosovo publicly, citing
both the withdrawal of a new UNSC resolution based on the Ahtisaari
plan as well as Serbia's July 24 parliamentary approval of his
Kosovo policy as the national position. He has also set the tone
for Serbia's diplomatic campaign on Kosovo, which was largely fueled
by anti-American rhetoric. Kostunica has also tried to isolate the
USG from EU members on Kosovo policy. When the UNSC was considering
a new resolution, Kostunica said (on Vitovdan, the commemoration of
the Serb's iconic defeat by the Turks on Kosovo Polje in 1389) that
there was "a battle for Kosovo between Serbia and U.S...between
power and justice." His efforts and tactics have been unopposed --
both Tadic and Foreign Minister (DS and close Tadic ally) Vuk
Jeremic have not differed from Kostunica at all in public comments
on Kosovo, calling its independence and the Ahtisaari plan as
"unacceptable," and remaining silent throughout Kostunica's fiery,
anti-U.S. rhetoric.

Serbia's "rules"
--------------


6. (SBU) On August 3, the GOS submitted to Chiefs of Mission of
Contact Group missions in Belgrade their "rules" for the new round
of negotiations (ref a). The GOS requests direct talks, without
time limits and without the Ahtisaari plan as a basis, in which
Kosovo's status is the "primary issue" for discussion. The GOS also
notes that "only the UNSC can enact relevant decisions" by the
Troika.


Your meetings
--------------


7. (SBU) These rules summarize Kostunica, Tadic and Jeremic's common
position on Kosovo, these talks and their outcome. They will not
view your visit to Belgrade as shuttle diplomacy, but rather an
opportunity to formally present Serbia's position to the Troika,
Contact Group and international community. In addition to the
overarching themes that will be raised in the Troika context, we
recommend you also clearly reiterate the message you passed to Tadic
and Kostunica in your February 2007 visit warning against Belgrade
undermining stability in Kosovo directly or via surrogates in the
Kosovo Serb community. As summarized in ref b, there are
increasingly worrying signs that the GOS is at best tacitly
tolerating, and at worst actively encouraging unhelpful elements in
Kosovo.

SIMMONS