LEBANON: ARE MODERATE SHIA THE ANSWER TO MARCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000977

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: ARE MODERATE SHIA THE ANSWER TO MARCH
14'S POLITICAL WOES?

REF: BEIRUT 896

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Recent discussions with two political figures from
opposite sides of the confessional spectrum revealed a common
thread in terms of broadening March 14's political alliances
-- the need to secure the support of moderate Shia. While
one advocated an alliance with Amal as a means for March 14
to secure a candidate of its choice in the upcoming
presidential elections, the other viewed broader outreach to
Shia not affiliated with either Amal or Hizballah as
necessary to ensure March 14's longer-term political
viability. Interestingly, neither figure exhibited much
trust in his group's traditional political allies. End
summary.

CHRISTIANS: AOUN OUT, BERRI IN?
--------------


2. (C) Elie Khoury, Political Advisor to Lebanese Forces
(LF) leader Samir Geagea, told Pol/Econ Chief June 28 that
LF, as a Christian party, would prefer an alliance with
General Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) in March
14's efforts to form a national unity government. However,
the LF doesn't trust Aoun, who frequently changes course
according to the prevailing political winds in his
never-ending quest for the presidency. Khoury viewed Aoun's
constant maneuvering as short-sighted and, by putting
personal ambition before the needs of the country, in part to
blame for the Cedar Revolution's loss of momentum. Case in
point: Khoury, referring to Aoun's recent statements that a
second government would be better than the status quo, said
Aoun does not really want a second government, but is evoking
it as a scare tactic to provoke March 14 into making more
concessions on a national unity government. (Note. Just ten
days earlier Aoun had agreed with the Ambassador's assertion
that a second government would be "catastrophic" -- reftel.
End note.)


3. (C) Khoury said LF was therefore considering an
alternative strategy whereby it would try to peel Parliament
Speaker Nabil Berri's Amal party away from Hizballah to
secure enough votes for March 14 to elect a president of its
choice. Under Khoury's scenario, March 14 would have 70
seats in parliament (assuming it wins the August 5
by-elections to replace assassinated MPs Pierre Gemayel and
Walid Eido, which Khoury was confident it would if the
elections go forward as planned). Adding the Amal bloc's 15
votes, March 14/Amal would have a total of 85 votes, just one
vote short of the 86 needed to elect a president in the first
round of voting, where a two-thirds quorum is required.
Khoury believes March 14 can easily get at least one of the
less-committed Aounist parliamentarians to jump ship and vote
with the majority.


4. (C) Of course, Khoury acknowledged, this strategy hinged
on agreement with Amal on the presidency; Nassib Lahoud and
Boutros Harb were the most likely candidates, in his view.
Khoury was not concerned that the opposition would boycott
the presidential vote, citing Berri's repeated claims that he
will convene parliament on September 15. Khoury interpreted
this to mean Amal will be present and will vote, adding that
usually when Berri says he will do something specific like
this, he does.

SHIA: BERRI, HIZBALLAH OUT, THIRD-WAY SHIA KEY TO ELECTORAL
SUCCESS
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Independent Shia and former Amal MP Mohamad Baydoun,
offered a longer-term prescription for March 14's political
troubles. Criticizing Future Movement leader Saad Hariri and
PM Fouad Siniora for their naive trust in Berri, Baydoun said
the GOL continues to view Amal and Hizballah as partners when
it should be treating them as rivals. He argued March 14
should be pursuing a broader policy to woo those Shia who
don't support Amal or Hizballah, i.e., those who aren't
represented politically by these groups and haven't

BEIRUT 00000977 002 OF 002


benefitted from their financial assistance following last
summer's war.


5. (C) Baydoun feared that, unless March 14 starts today, it
faces a very real possibility that Hizballah will take over
parliament in the 2009 elections. Moreover, there is an
urgency now for immediate outreach to southern Shia who are
angry with how the government paid indemnities after last
summer's war between Hizballah and Israel. If Hariri were
smart, Baydoun said, he'd reach out to these people and make
sure they see the government's financial assistance to the
south and the Biqa'. These groups could be easily mobilized
in favor of the current government. Expanding the Lebanese
Armed Forces to integrate many young Shia would also dampen
Hizballah's attraction to moderate Shia youth, Baydoun added.



6. (C) In terms of March 14's immediate challenge of electing
a president of its choice, Baydoun warned about a Hizballah
plan to physically prevent parliament from meeting.
According to Baydoun's reading of the constitution, parties
can legally boycott parliament during the first month (Sept.
25 - Oct. 25) of the two-month period running up to the
expiration of President Lahoud's mandate. However, since
they have a constitutional duty to elect a president within
the two-month period, they must be present and vote during
the second month. Although March 14 does not have enough
votes to elect a president the first round of voting (when a
two-thirds majority is required),it would win the second
vote requiring only a simple majority. Hence Hizballah's
plan to block MPs access to the voting sessions.


7. (C) Entirely on his own initiative (and speaking the day
before the President's June 29 visa ban proclamation against
individuals threatening Lebanon's sovereignty and democracy),
Baydoun urged the US to take action targeting the financial
assets of those working against the current government. A
ban against individuals is not enough, he argued; we need to
hit them where it hurts -- in their pocketbooks.


8. (C) Comment. Using Baydoun's reasoning, March 14
(assuming no more of its MPs are assassinated) has no way it
can lose the presidency under the constitution. However,
each new day in Lebanon seems to bring a new interpretation
of the constitution to light. Even if Baydoun's reading is
correct, we don't share his faith that opposition MPs
wouldn't boycott the elections regardless, despite Khoury's
(somewhat optimistic, in our view) assertion that Berri will
stick to his word. The opposition is determined to see a
candidate of its (Syrian overlords') liking in Baabda Palace;
failing that, it will pursue whatever means necessary to
prevent the elections from going forward. End comment.
FELTMAN