LAHOUD'S LEGAL ADVISOR: SECOND CABINET (OR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000974

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2027
TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV LE SY
SUBJECT: LAHOUD'S LEGAL ADVISOR: SECOND CABINET (OR
LAHOUD'S NEXT EXTENSION) TO COME IN AUTUMN, NOT NOW

REF: BEIRUT 708

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) Lebanese President Emile Lahoud's amiable legal
advisor, Selim Jeressaiti, told the Ambassador on 6/29 that
-- based on Jeressaiti's advice -- Lahoud has begrudgingly
delayed the appointment of a second cabinet from July until
September. If no consensus presidential candidate emerges by
then, and if Siniora's cabinet has not yet been replaced,
then Lahoud will take one of two actions: he will either
appoint a second cabinet, or he will announce that he will
remain in Baabda Palace beyond his November 24 term
expiration. He will not turn over presidential powers to the
"illegitimate" Siniora cabinet. Jeressaiti's preferred
solution (consistent with his earlier comments, reftel) was
for PM Fouad Siniora to resign -- to be replaced by a
technocratic cabinet headed by Najib Mikati. Told by the
Ambassador that such an option was unlikely, Jeressaiti
switched to promoting a national unity cabinet. Asked why
the Syrians had instructed their allies to reject Arab League
proposals including a national unity cabinet only a week
earlier, Jeressaiti said that, then, Lahoud and Damascus
intended to move quickly on the second cabinet. Now, with
the second cabinet decision postponed, it is time to try
again on a national unity cabinet or work for a consensus
president. Jeressaiti also quizzed the Ambassador
extensively about the just-announced visa ban, suggesting
that the President's proclamation is having its intended
effect. End summary.

LAHOUD WANTED SECOND CABINET NOW;
LEGAL ARGUMENTS PERSUADED HIM TO WAIT
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2. (C) Judge Selim Jeressaiti met with the Ambassador on
6/29. Asked whether all the talk about President Emile
Lahoud's plan to appoint a second cabinet was bluff or
indicated a real danger, Jeressaiti (who serves as Lahoud's
legal advisor) said that, until a few days earlier, Lahoud
and Damascus indeed planned to appoint a second cabinet by
mid or late July. Lahoud is "frustrated" by the continued
illegitimacy of the Siniora cabinet, and Lahoud's "Syrian
friends" were prodding him to move swiftly in naming a new
cabinet that would enjoy sufficient popular and international
support so as to weaken PM Fouad Siniora.


3. (C) But Jeressaiti (who previously served on Lebanon's
constitutional court) claimed to have used constitutional
arguments to dissuade Lahoud, who reluctantly agreed and
explained to Damascus that he could not move now. Jeressaiti
noted that, constitutionally, Lahoud would have to call for
binding parliamentary consultations to replace the PM, and
March 14 MPs (still clinging to a razor-thin majority despite
assassinations) could easily renominate Siniora. But if
Lahoud waits until September 25, the date when Parliament
Speaker Nabih Berri has called for presidential elections,
then the parliament is an electoral body only. At that
point, MPs (in Jeressaiti's constitutional interpretation --
one we suspect other constitutional lawyers would dispute)
cannot do anything except work to elect a president. So
Lahoud, if he wants to avoid having his choice of PM tied by
the mandatory parliamentary consultations and having his
second cabinet linked to a parliamentary vote of confidence,
must wait until September to appoint a second cabinet.

BUT IF NO PRESIDENT AND SINIORA REMAINS,
THEN LAHOUD MIGHT JUST STAY IN BAABDA
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4. (C) Asked by the Ambassador whether a second cabinet in
September is the impending "Lahoud surprise" that has been
rumored in Beirut political circles, Jeressaiti said that
Lahoud, if he senses that he has insufficient support for a
second cabinet from Hizballah, Berri, and Michel Aoun (who
used a 7/1 New TV interview to express opposition to a second
cabinet),may announce instead that he is staying in Baabda
Palace indefinitely beyond the expiration of his term on
November 24. Lahoud will not turn over the powers of the
presidency to an "illegal" president who was elected without
a two-thirds parliamentary quorum. And, if presidential

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elections do not take place for lack of a quorum, he will not
allow the presidential executive powers to be transferred to
the "illegitimate" Siniora cabinet until the presidential
vacuum can be filled. The Ambassador asked how Jeressaiti
would legally and constitutionally justify Lahoud remaining
in Baabda beyond November 24. Yes, Jeressaiti conceded: it
would be unconstitutional. But a lesser sin, in Lahoud's
view, then transferring power to a cabinet that lost its
constitutionality when the Shia ministers submitted their
resignations on November 11.

TWO SOLUTIONS: EITHER A CONSENSUS PRESIDENT,
OR A CONSTITUTIONALLY LEGITIMATE CABINET
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5. (C) By convincing Lahoud to wait until September to act,
Jeressaiti argued that he had provided an opportunity to the
Lebanese and their international friends to fix the problem
ahead of time. There are two approaches, Jeressaiti said.
If a consensus presidential candidate emerges who will
elected in a parliament with a two-thirds quorum, then Lahoud
will feel that the security and unity of Lebanon has been
sufficiently safeguarded. He will transfer power to that
president and leave Baabda Palace peacefully and on time.
Or, if there are no presidential elections but a
constitutionally legitimate cabinet is in place, then Lahoud
will transfer his powers to that cabinet until such time as
presidential elections can be held. There is no
constitutional problem with either approach, Jeressaiti
argued; "take your pick."

DISCUSSING A "CONSENSUS" PRESIDENT
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6. (C) The Ambassador asked how realistic it was to come up
with a true consensus president. Won't Syria's allies push
for a candidate who appeared to be a consensus figure but who
was in fact entirely reliant on, and subservient to,
Damascus? Jeressaiti countered with another question: if
there was a true consensus figure, would the United States
accept him? Wouldn't the United States push for a "militant"
March 14 figure? The Ambassador explained that the USG was
watching the process as much as the names. If a credible
presidential candidate emerges from a truly Lebanese process,
that is fine with us. But if it becomes clear that Syria's
allies are manipulating the constitution and using
intimidation to force acceptance of a so-called consensus
candidate, then the international community will have a
problem. How a president is selected is as important as who
the president is. For the Lebanese, rather than talk first
about names, perhaps it is best to talk about what the job
will be over the next six years, to see who are those most
qualified, the Ambassador suggested.


7. (C) Is there any way for you to talk to Syria about the
presidency, Jeressaiti asked. No, the Ambassador responded,
noting that none of the leading candidates opposed a positive
relationship with Syria based on mutual respect. Jeressaiti
mused about finding the candidate subject to the least
"vetoes." He noted, as an example, that Nassib Lahoud would
receive vetoes from Michel Aoun, Amine Gemayel, and Michel
Murr, all for local Metn political reasons. Emile Lahoud
would veto his cousin. The Syrians would veto Nassib, not
wanting "a Saudi" to occupy both the premiership and the
presidency. (Nassib's wife, a Sunni, has a sister who was
once married to King Abdullah.) Berri and Hizballah, wary of
Nassib's ties to Washington, would as well. The Ambassador
noted that Emile Lahoud and Syria do not cast votes in the
presidential elections. Asked who he thought might be a true
consensus candidate, Jeressaiti shook his head: "If I say
anyone, you will think he's Syria's candidate." He did list
people he thought would be poor choices, including former
Foreign Ministers Jean Obeid and Fares Bouez, both of whom,
he said, are favored by Berri.

SHIFTING FROM SINIORA'S RESIGNATION
TO A NATIONAL UNITY CABINET
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8. (C) Turning to the cabinet, Jeressaiti said (as he had
earlier, reftel) that he believed Siniora's resignation would
unlock the door to a solution. Najib Mikati did an excellent
job as PM for ten weeks during the 2005 transition period;
why not replace Siniora's discredited cabinet with a

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technocratic cabinet headed by Mikati? The period of time
before the presidential elections is about the same. The
Ambassador agreed Mikati did a good job as PM, but the times
are not analogous. Then, March 14 leaders knew that they had
a chance to compete in parliamentary elections. Now, they
have no assurances that presidential elections will indeed
take place. If there are no presidential elections, then
they will have given up their cabinet power with no easy way
to regain it. As long as two of the three most powerful
constitutional offices remain in the hands of Syria's allies,
March 14 will not volunteer to give up the premiership, the
Ambassador argued.


9. (C) So, Jeressaiti asked, what about a national unity
cabinet, split 19-11, 18-12, or 17-13? That is another way
to avoid "Lahoud's surprise" in September. The Ambassador
said that the USG was not opposed, but it was up to the
Lebanese themselves to come up with arrangements that
provided appropriate assurances. Just as we did not veto
Siniora's inclusion of Hizballah representatives in his
original cabinet despite our serious misgivings, we would not
now impose a particular cabinet composition on Lebanon. But,
the Ambassador noted, only a week earlier, Arab League
Secretary General Amr Moussa proposed a dialogue initiative

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that included on the agenda the idea of a national unity
cabinet. March 14 leaders accepted the idea, but Syria's
allies, after initially saying yes, rejected it. If the
March 8-Aoun leaders want a national unity cabinet, why did
they reject Moussa's proposal? Jeressaiti said that, at the
time, Syria and Lahoud hoped for the second cabinet to be
announced soon. Now, thanks to Jeressaiti's arguments, they
know it can't be done until September, if they want to avoid
parliamentary consultations. So it is time to try again for
a national unity cabinet.

COMMENT
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10. (C) We do not know whether Jeressaiti's thinking
mirrors that of Lahoud or not. If Lahoud chooses between
orders from Damascus and opposing constitutional arguments
from Jeressaiti, he'll follow the Syrian orders. (Usually,
we suspect, Jeressaiti is tasked post-fact to justify legally
whatever Lahoud is doing.) But, while a week ago all signs
indicated that a second cabinet was imminent, those fears now
seem to be receding. If it's true that Lahoud is postponing
his decision until September, we suspect it has less to do
with Jeressaiti's constitutional arguments and more to do
with the fact that Michel Aoun and even Nabih Berri seem
somewhat queasy about a second cabinet. We note that, as the
meeting came to a close, Jeressaiti quizzed the Ambassador
extensively about the new Presidential Proclamation banning
visas for Lebanese and Syrian officials. We suspect that the
visa ban is, as planned, dampening enthusiasm for the second
cabinet. And Jeressaiti's shocking suggestion that Lahoud is
contemplating remaining in Baabda beyond his November 24 term
expiration is probably rooted in realization that the second
cabinet is more difficult than Lahoud initially thought.


11. (C) One part of Jeressaiti's arguments was consistent
with everything else we've heard: that Lahoud will never
turn over presidential power to the current Siniora cabinet.
Therefore, given that we cannot yet say with certainty that
presidential elections will take place as scheduled, we
cannot therefore rule out altogether the second cabinet or
the possibility of Lahoud trying to stay in place. We will
continue to seek ways to deter such destructive developments.
FELTMAN