Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BEIRUT97
2007-01-18 16:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: JA'JA' BRINGS IDEAS DOWN FROM THE

Tags:  PREL PGOV LE 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHLB #0097/01 0181657
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181657Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7163
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0745
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000097 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: JA'JA' BRINGS IDEAS DOWN FROM THE
MOUNTAIN


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000097

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: JA'JA' BRINGS IDEAS DOWN FROM THE
MOUNTAIN


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Samir Geagea, newly installed in the hills north of
Beirut (vice the distant Cedars region),advocated to the
Ambassador early parliamentary elections, prior to the
presidential election, as a "master stroke" for March 14. He
acknowledged, however, that March 14 forces are divided over
what type of election law could be used. UNIFIL's worries
over possible attacks, as well as concern over arms smuggling
to Hizballah, should lead the international community to plan
to strikes on Syrian military sites, should UNIFIL be hit.
Unlike some recent whispered worries from other
pro-government figures, Geagea would not budge on the current
draft of legislation to enact the international tribunal,
comparing any softening of the tribunal's provisions to
"losing an arm." Finally, Michel Aoun's poor judgment
represents a destabilizing threat to Lebanon and he should
not be allowed to become president. End Summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador and EconOff visited Dr. Samir Geagea,
leader of the Lebanese Forces party, January 17 in a hotel in
the Bzummar area outside Beirut. Geagea is supervising the
construction of his new home nearby after leaving the
mountainous Cedars late last year. Geagea offered a
broad-reaching analysis of the current situation, while
admitting that neither he nor either of the opposing sides in
this debate has a "clear idea" of what will happen next.
Geagea had assessed all the possibilities currently under
discussion, both rumors and public proposals. More than once
he mentioned that certain ideas "should be aired" even if
they were bad ideas. Even ideas which he will not support,
such as the Aoun presidency, have been re-examined by him and
not dismissed lightly.

EARLY ELECTIONS COULD
BE "MASTER STROKE"
--------------


3. (C) Geagea asked us to pay attention to his key
proposals, even though he has not yet discussed them with the
rest of the March 14 bloc. Admitting that he was picking up
an issue first proposed by the March 8-Aoun opposition,

Geagea believes that early parliamentary elections could
bring an end to the current stand-off. By calling the March
8-Aoun bluff, he calls early legislative elections a possible
"master stroke." He acknowledged that early legislative
elections would require a speedy resolution to the question
of a new electoral law, something that he admitted could hurt
Lebanese Christians. Geagea nevertheless maintained that
elections could be held prior to the selection of a new
president, which Parliament must do in September of this
year. Geagea cautioned that the March 14 alliance should be
fully prepared to contest early elections, although the
opposition would no doubt reverse course and ultimately
oppose the idea. Campaigning would be costly -- he hinted
briefly that foreign funds might be required -- but the
outcome would be worthwhile. Geagea did not dismiss other
options, such as Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa's
19-10-1 cabinet proposal. But he admitted taht, after much
Geagea-esque contemplation, he had concluded that
parliamentary elections should come first. New presidential
elections thereafter would constitutionally lead to a new
cabinet anyway.

PROBLEMS WITH REDISTRICTING
--------------


4. (C) Geagea dismissed the possibility of additional
dangers to March 14 figures as a result of an early election,
saying that all the Ministers and MPs are already in danger
until the political conflict is resolved. He also appeared
willing to accept the possibility of a reduction in Christian
influence, and quickly outlined the possible outcomes based
on the implementation of various proposals from the past.
The 1960 electoral re-districting proposal -- that divides
Lebanon into 26 "qada" districts, with qada' lists decided by
majoritarian voting -- would allow voters from Christian
areas to elect a possible 44 of the 64 seats reserved for
Christians in the Parliament. The law proposed by the Fouad
Boutros Commission would be "more fair" with a possible 53
Christian seats coming from those areas. However, his
favorite option would be to use the 1960 districts (qada')
for the most part, but with races decided on proportional

BEIRUT 00000097 002 OF 004


representation. The main reason he has not discussed this
with March 14 is that it would be "catastrophic" for both
Hariri and Jumblatt, who would lose seats. Therefore the
acceptance of this proposal by March 14 would be a "real
breakthrough" and would seriously weaken the opposition.

NO COMPROMISE PRESIDENT
--------------


5. (C) One thing that would break the Christians and March
14 would be a compromise in the presidency, Geagea said
adamantly. Why, he asked, should there be a compromise in
the presidency, rather than a compromise speaker or prime
minister? Geagea had given some thought to allowing Aoun to
become president, but said that there is no way to know which
way Aoun would go after reaching that overriding goal. He
said that Aoun obviously prefers chaos to losing the
presidency, and that he might push for violence without
clearly understanding the results. Saying that he had been
approached with the idea of allowing Aoun the presidency by
both Jumblatt and Hariri, he had made it clear that he would
not support it, and was assured that it would not be proposed
by either without further discussion with Geagea. In this
light he pointed out that paradoxically, Amal and Hizballah
are currently "allies in non-violence."

SYRIA COULD BE DETERRED
--------------


6. (C) Geagea does not believe that Hizballah's aim at this
time -- a position he made clear could change easily -- is
either violence or a resumption of hostilities with Israel.
However, he does believe that Syria is pushing for
wide-spread violence and the fall of the existing order. The
pro-Syrian parties within Lebanon -- Wi'am Wahab's group,
independents such as Omar Karami, and others -- are
supporting this agenda. Syria is currently doing all it can
to destabilize Lebanon from within, and the only thing that
will stop it would be massive retaliation, lead by a
multi-national force, striking at Syrian military targets, if
installations like UNIFIL are attacked. With no loss of
civilian life, this would not only cripple Syria, but would
send a clear signal that the United States does not intend to
depart the region, and would at the same time give Lebanon
time to resolve internal issues. Geagea, like others,
believes that Hizballah is targeting UNIFIL, and that it
would be "rational" to assume that any attack on UNIFIL would
originate from Syria. While it would be very difficult and
costly to fight Hizballah inside of Lebanon, an attack on
Syrian military targets would achieve the same result.

WHERE IS IRAN?
--------------


7. (C) As for Iran, Geagea believes that, while earlier they
were not in favor of widespread violence, Iran is now "not
far from accepting" the idea. If they threw their weight
behind the notion, coupled with the Syrians, it might be
difficult for Hizballah to resist, and currently Hizballah is
the only one who can push the country to sustained violent
conflict. Geagea dismissed the notion that assassinations of
public figures such as Jumblatt or he himself would have the
same effect, saying that they are not "easy assumptions" at
this time, since actions such as the arrests of SSNP members,
while not reaching to the core of the problem, have had a
discouraging effect. A recent rapprochement between Iran and
the Saudis will help, because the Iranians would now have
more to lose in the Islamic arena. But conversely, if Iran
is pushed into a corner by the international community this
could worsen the problem. Acting directly, or through
Hizballah as proxy, Iran would see an attack on UNIFIL as
achieving two benefits: an attack on the UN, and a direct hit
to Lebanon. The mere fact of a potential problem in the
south would continue to keep Lebanon tense.

THE TRIBUNAL STAYS AS IT IS
--------------


8. (C) On the subject of the international tribunal Geagea
was particularly adamant, saying that any weakening of the
position would be like "throwing away one of our arms."
Syria would become even more aggressive, and he could not
support the idea of any changes to the current government
position.

AND NOW FOR EVERYONE ELSE...

BEIRUT 00000097 003 OF 004


--------------


9. (C) Speaking of the opposition, Geagea expressed his
opinion that both Elie Skaff and the Tashnaq party (both part
of the Aoun parliamentary bloc) have now evolved to a
compromise view. Although he said that trying to bring
Skaff's 5-member bloc over to March 14 would be possible, he
speculated that it would require a lot of effort and would
not really change the balance of power. About Tashnaq,
however, Geagea acknowledged that it had been a big mistake
to refuse Tashnaq "at least two" seats in Beirut at the time
of the March 14 alliance. They are credible, and it is
"crucial" to take them on board. He asked the Ambassador to
work with them, and to encourage members of March 14 to do so
as well.


10. (C) Geagea reported that he is not talking to Aoun or
his followers -- he says that Aoun has no advisors, only
followers -- very much lately. This is because Aoun's
situation has become critical and Geagea does not wish to
resuscitate Aoun's declining political fortunes. Geagea
believes that Aoun will find someone to run in the Metn
by-election against former President Amine Gemayel, although
it is difficult to see how Gemayel could lose. Aoun really
believes that his candidate will win, which is further proof
that his poor judgment carries a high risk for the country.
As for Speaker Berri, he is "shy" and won't meet, even
declining a ceremonial visit by Geagea on the recent Muslim
Eid holiday. Berri said he was not receiving visitors.

INCLUDING HIZBALLAH
--------------


11. (C) On a final note, Geagea commented broadly on
Hizballah. He estimated the current state of support for
Hizballah among the Shia population as "not bad," with about
50 percent of Shia fully in support. At the same time, he
says that Shia are "living a dream" and do not see the world
"as we do." Nasrallah wants to control the direction of the
"central state," or at least the strategic vision. Although
he now denies it, Nasrallah did say that he did not plan for
the July war. In Geagea's opinion Nasrallah accepted USCSR
1701 only because he was squeezed by the war, and was
unpleasantly surprised when the GOL unexpectedly adhered to
the resolution. Although he recognized the quantity of
weapons coming in over the Syrian border, he believed that
Prime Minister Siniora cannot risk a closure of the border by
the Syrians, which would mean economic death for the
Lebanese. He suggested that such a catastrophe could only be
avoided by measures such as an aerial bridge or some other
way to avoid Syrian control over Lebanese exports. In this
context, he repeated his call for a definitive strike against
Syrian military targets.

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) Geagea, who cultivates an image as a hermetic deep
thinker, does not make comments lightly. His unorthodox
reference to early legislative elections was not a throwaway
line. He has calculated that the March 8-Aoun opposition's
call for early legislative elections is a bluff -- and that,
if legislative elections were moved forward (from the 2009
scheduled dates),the March 14 alliance would actually
confirm its majority status. That calculation may indeed be
correct in theory. But we do not see anyway to pursue
Geagea's idea without splitting the March 14 alliance over
the type of election law to be used. The 2000 election law
that brought the March 14 alliance to power has been
thoroughly discredited (ironically, by those like Suleiman
Franjieh and Omar Karami who originally voted for it).


13. (C) But using qada districting proportionally, as
Geagea proposes, would disadvantage Saad Hariri and Walid
Jumblatt, Geagea's allies. The Christians who win seats in
Beirut on Hariri's ticket or in the Chouf on Jumblatt's
ticket in the winner-take-all system now in place could, in a
proportional system, accumulate sufficient Christian votes to
be elected from Christian parties like Geagea's Lebanese
Forces (LF) or even Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement. This
should not matter if LF candidates win -- LF is allied with
Jumblatt and Hariri, for example, and thus the seats would
remain part of the March 14 alliance. But, in the Lebanese
context, this matters very, very much: Hariri is unlikely to
cede seats to the Christians easily. (We recall vividly how
hard it was to convince Hariri to place someone considered a

BEIRUT 00000097 004 OF 004


credible Maronite -- Solange Gemayel, widow of Bashir -- on
his Beirut ticket.) On the bright side, differences of views
over an election law can also sow divisions within the March
8-Aoun bloc: while Aoun will insist on "Christians electing
Christians" in small districts, and Hizballah probably will
fare well under any system, Nabih Berri (a victim of sharply
declining popularity) will want the largest districts
possible in order to accumulate enough votes to retain a
bloc. All of this suggests to us that, while we should
indeed push for early debate of a new legislative electoral
law and system to replace the badly flawed one now in place,
early legislative elections are not a realistic way out of
the current political crisis.
FELTMAN