LEBANON: FBI DIRECTOR EXPLORES COUNTERTERRORISM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000967

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KCRM LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: FBI DIRECTOR EXPLORES COUNTERTERRORISM
COOPERATION WITH GOL OFFICIALS


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) FBI Director Mueller on June 26 met with Deputy Prime
Minister and Defense Minister Elias Murr, Minister of
Interior Hassan Sabaa, Head of the Internal Security Forces
Ashraf Rifi, Minister of Justice Charles Rizk, and Chief
Prosecutor Jean Fahd to offer FBI assistance to Lebanon's
security services and judiciary. Mueller encouraged his GOL
contacts to allow international access to individuals
arrested in Lebanon so that other countries can track and
stop international terrorist activities. GOL officials
expressed differing opinions about whether the militants
fighting in Nahr al-Barid and those perpetrating attacks
around the country are Al-Qaida or fighters manipulated by
Iran, Syria, or Hizballah. They all agreed, however, that
more attacks are likely, and greater international assistance
would strengthen Lebanon's security services. End summary.

GOL WILLING TO SHARE EVIDENCE
AND EVENTUALLY DETAINEES
--------------


2. (S) FBI Director Mueller, Ambassador Feltman, and Legatt
on June 26 met with Deputy Prime Minister and Defense
Minister Elias Murr, Minister of Interior Hassan Sabaa, Head
of the Internal Security Forces Ashraf Rifi, Minister of
Justice Charles Rizk, and Chief Prosecutor Jean Fahd.
Mueller expressed his condolences for Lebanon's loss of life
in recent bombings, assassinations, and the ongoing battle in
Nahr al-Barid; he offered FBI assistance to Lebanon's
security services and judiciary in order to strengthen the
rule of law and prevent a security deterioration in Lebanon.


3. (S) Mueller encouraged his GOL contacts to share
internationally the fingerprints, explosives samples, and
evidence gathered in its counter-terrorism operations, and to
allow international access to individuals arrested in Lebanon
so that the United States and other countries can track and
stop their international activities. Murr told us that the
MOD is keeping samples of explosive devices as well as all
documents and computers found in Nahr al-Barid. Murr, Sabaa,
and Rifi were amenable to sharing evidence for analysis to
help cross-border efforts to catch regionally active
terrorists. International cooperation on investigations is
essential, Fahd agreed, since terrorists are operating
internationally.


4. (S) Allowing international access to detainees is more
difficult than sharing evidence, our GOL contacts explained.
Until Lebanon's investigations are complete, foreign
governments can only provide a list of questions for the
Lebanese to use in interrogations. Once the legal
investigation is complete, however, the prosecutor and the
Minister of Justice have the authority to receive and
adjudicate requests for extradition or deportation. Their
recommendation then requires the signature of both the Prime
Minister and President before the prisoner can be
transferred, Fahd told Mueller. The MOJ is paralyzed by the
political situation, and daily discovers new conflicts and
obstructionist procedures, Rizk noted, making informal
information-sharing agreements difficult. The Saudi Embassy
has already asked for access to Saudis arrested, Fahd told
us, because they suspect those arrested have information
about plots overseas.


5. (S) The LAF G-2 or Directorate of Intelligence is
currently holding at least 55 prisoners held in connection
with operations in Nahr al-Barid or other Fatah al-Islam
related arrests, our contacts told us, although many of those
held are supporters or facilitators rather than fighters.
Eighty percent of those arrested are Lebanese, Fahd told us,
in addition to a "cocktail" of Saudis, an Iraqi, a Moroccan,
an Algerian, a Tunisian, a Bangladeshi, a Chechnyan, and
others. The military court has authority over all security
and terrorism cases, although the government has the
authority to transfer any case involving state security to
the Higher Court of Justice; Fahd will retain control of the
Fatah al-Islam case until the GOL appoints a prosecutor and
transfers the case to the Higher Court.

GOL OFFICIALS BLAME AL-QAIDA,
IRANIAN AND SYRIAN PROXIES

BEIRUT 00000967 002 OF 003


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6. (S) GOL officials had differing theories about who is
behind the violence in Nahr al-Barid, the attack on UNIFIL,
and recent assassinations. Murr told us he believes that the
militants in Nahr al-Barid include Al-Qaida fighters from
Afghanistan and Iraq mobilized unknowingly by the Syrian
security services. The majority of those arrested say they
were came to create an Islamic state in north Lebanon, or to
attack UNIFIL, Murr told us, while only the top tier were
aware of a direct link with Syria. Murr went on to describe
Al-Qaida fighters as proxies financed by Iran to hit US
interests and EU member state troops in UNIFIL via a Sunni
cutout, enabling Hizballah to retain its image as a Lebanese
resistance organization. Murr went on to explicitly link
Hizballah to the UNIFIL bombing, arguing that no attack could
take place in the Hizballah-dominated south without the
group's observation if not execution, and that Hizballah had
been threatened by Spanish troops' aggressive patrols, which
actively searched for Hziballah's arms caches. Finally, Murr
observed that similar techniques were used in the Eido and
Tueni assassinations, the UNIFIL attack, and his own
attempted assassination.


7. (S) Sabaa and Rifi more generally condemned Iran, Syria,
their Lebanese allies, and Al-Qaida for various security
disruptions, and vowed that the March 14 coalition will fight
Lebanon's political and terrorist enemies "to the end." They
cited circumstantial evidence and public statements to blame
"the Lebanese allies of Iran and Syria" for the attack on
UNIFIL, and noted that Hizballah has the most to lose from
UNIFIL's presence in the south, giving it the motivation to
attack.

MORE ATTACKS LIKELY;
MORE ASSISTANCE NEEDED
--------------


8. (S) With five or six cells arrested recently, there are
many more cells outside Nahr al-Barid and more and larger
terrorist attacks are likely, the security officials agreed.
Where terrorists once viewed Lebanon as a place for transit
and training, Lebanon is now a key target for attacks. The
camps are like the safe haven cities, Murr worried; the
terrorists are likely to respond massively to the loss of a
safe haven. GOL officials sought Mueller's advice on how
best to prevent terrorist attacks.


9. (S) American training and support have already benefited
Lebanon's security services, officials told us, but more help
is needed. The ISF with international assistance has become
more professional and cable, Rifi told us; its success in
investigating the mid-March Ain Alaq bus bombings led to the
current action against Fatah al-Islam. With increased
professionalism, public perceptions of the ISF as a
Sunni-dominated security service are slowly changing.
Hizballah has stated publicly that the ISF serves all
confessions, and neighborhoods where the ISF is posted are
starting to realize that their presence is helpful.


10. (S) Fahd viewed the security services as hindered by a
lack of resources as well as the political situation, and
expressed an interest in greater assistance. While rules and
procedures exist for investigations, in reality inadequate
investigation resources and training prevent the Lebanese
from following international best practices.


11. (S) Finally, our GOL contacts admitted that Lebanon is
struggling to come up with a politically acceptable system to
monitor the entrance of Gulf Arabs into the country without
deterring Arab tourism, investment, and political support.
Sabaa and Murr told us that while many of the terrorists
presumably entered Lebanon via the Syrian land or sea border,
some of the Saudis arrested entered Lebanon via the airport
where they, like most Arabs, were not required to obtain
visas. (Note: Prime Minister Hariri in 2002 instituted a
policy of allowing Gulf Arabs into Lebanon without visas;
Hariri believed the security risk of allowing Arabs in
unchecked was small compared to the economic benefits of
increased tourism and investment. End Note.)


12. (S) Since they used false documents, even a visa system
would not necessarily have flagged them as dangerous
travelers, Sabaa noted. Murr explained that the cabinet in
late June agreed to review the policy and discuss creating a
specialized visa bureau in each country to help potential

BEIRUT 00000967 003 OF 003


tourists and investors, but right now there is not a
consensus to overturn the policy, and instead the cabinet
will next discuss ways to exclude undesirable entrants
without a visa system. Sabaa also indicated that the GOL is
working back channels with the Gulf countries to ensure they
are prepared for a change in the policy.
FELTMAN