LEBANON: BRAMMERTZ PREVIEWS NEXT REPORT ON HARIRI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000945

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: BRAMMERTZ PREVIEWS NEXT REPORT ON HARIRI
ASSASSINATION


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman Reasons: Section 1.4 (b)
and (d)

SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST
--------------


1. (C) In a June 20 meeting with the Ambassador, UNIIIC
Commissioner Serge Brammertz said he was in the process of
finalizing his next report to the UN Security Council (which
he expects to present on July 19). While the report will not
include the names of those believed responsible for the 2005
assassination of former PM Rafiq Hariri, it will provide
"indications" as to the perpetrators. Furthermore, Brammertz
stated, the report will conclude that political motives are
the only remaining explanation. Brammertz acknowledged
obliquely his belief that former Surete General chief Jamil
as-Sayyed, one of the four generals currently in prison for
the Hariri attacks, was involved in the attack. Brammertz
also reported on UNIIIC's investigation into the June 13
assassination of MP Walid Eido. Regardless of political
events in Lebanon, Brammertz believes the Special Tribunal
will go forward. ACTION REQUEST: Brammertz will be in
Washington July 13 and 14 and is interested in meeting USG
officials; see para 14. End summary.

INVESTIGATION PROCEEDING "BUSINESS AS USUAL"
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by DCM and Pol/Econ
Chief, met with Brammertz and Special Assistant Mathieu
Lefevre on June 20 to discuss Brammertz' report to the UN
Security Council on the assassination of former MP Rafiq
Hariri, the June 13, 2007 assassination of March 14 MP Walid
Eido, and progress in the establishment of the Special
Tribunal. It was an unusually forthcoming Brammertz who
welcomed us (perhaps, as he put it, because the establishment
of the Special Tribunal means there is "light at the end of
the tunnel").


3. (C) Some security limitations had caused witnesses to
cancel and prevented some out-of-country meetings, but
otherwise UNIIIC's investigation was proceeding "business as
usual," Brammertz said. His staff was in the process of
consolidating tens of thousands of pages of internal reports
into one summary report to present to the UN Security Council
on July 19. In short, the investigation is mostly over and
the results are being consolidated, he concluded; if the
tribunal was created tomorrow, he would simply hand over the
summary (along with UNIIIC's extensive data bank) and provide
updates over the next six months.


4. (C) Brammertz said UNIIIC now has a clear idea of how the
car involved in the Hariri bombing entered the country.
Furthermore, with the help of DNA specialists and Interpol,
it was finalizing its analysis of fingerprint data,
cross-checking hundreds of prints. Soil, water, and air
samples found on the scene and within recovered DNA from the
presumed bomber suggested that the suicide bomber arrived in
Lebanon two months prior to the assassination. Though the
exact country of origin was not known, Brammertz said, "some
countries have a much higher probability than others," based
on the samples. Brammertz also noted that the use of the
phone cards documented in earlier reports remains an
interesting line of inquiry.


5. (C) Ambassador asked about Syrian cooperation; Brammertz
characterized it as "business as usual." UNIIIC is still
translating thousands of pages from Syrian military archives
and, while he didn't expect much in terms of incriminating
evidence, Brammertz said the information would be useful in
understanding "who reported to whom when about what" and the
structure of Syria's presence in Lebanon pre- and post- its
2005 withdrawal. UNIIIC also has phone records, Brammertz
added, which will make it difficult for those under
questioning to deny relationships and contacts. He expected
to conduct more interviews before the July report. Brammertz
expressed his disappointment, however, that many "friendly"
countries weren't being as forthcoming with information as
they could, especially classified information.

POLITICAL MOTIVES ONLY POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR HARIRI
ASSASSINATION
-------------- --------------

BEIRUT 00000945 002 OF 003




6. (C) Brammertz confirmed UNIIIC had concluded its
investigation of Bank al-Medina's role in the Hariri
investigation, including interviews in Brazil with a key
witness involved in illegal money transfers during Syria's
occupation of Lebanon, Rana Koleilet. Though this line of
inquiry was useful in understanding the dynamics of Lebanon's
financial institutions and how they are used to give and
receive monetary gifts, Brammertz said there was nothing of
direct relevance to Hariri or any of the other
assassinations. "The financial door is closed," he said,
leaving only the political door. Brammertz stated
confidently that the only remaining hypothesis is the Hariri
and other attacks occurred in a specific political context:
the extension of President Lahoud's mandate, combined with
UNSCR 1559 and Hariri's support for the resolution and his
efforts to secure the support of other countries led to a
"climate for assassination."


7. (C) Brammertz was careful to clarify that the report will
not point fingers at individuals, but will "indicate" the
people UNIIIC is looking at. Brammertz stressed it was
important not to names for two reasons: 1) the closer we get
to the establishment of the tribunal, the more careful UNIIIC
has to be not to violate suspects' right to a fair trial to
avoid accusations that UNIIIC convicted them before the
trial; and 2) the threshold for a Commissioner is lower than
for a prosecutor, who has to demonstrate no reasonable doubt.


IMPRISONED GENERALS SUSPECTED OF INVOLVEMENT
--------------


8. (C) The Ambassador inquired about the fate of four
Lebanese generals currently in prison for their believed
involvement in the Hariri assassination. Brammertz replied
it was up to the Lebanese judiciary to decide, since UNIIIC
has no authority to issue an arrest warrant, and the GOL
wants them to appear before the Special Tribunal.
Unfortunately, the two witnesses who implicated the generals
have no credibility, he admitted. However, Brammertz
reasoned that releasing then now would lead some to argue the
tribunal is no longer needed, since there are no longer any
suspects in custody.


9. (C) Brammertz said he was "not convinced all four have
nothing to do with" the Hariri assassination. Although the
basis for their imprisonment may not have been correct, it
doesn't exclude the possibility that "one or more" may have
been aware of the assassination plot because of their
positions. The Ambassador pressed, arguing that Jamil
as-Sayyed has to be involved. Brammertz seemed to agree,
replying, "Of course, he's a person of interest. Probably we
both believe similar things, but what can we prove?"

INVESTIGATING EIDO ASSASSINATION
--------------


10. (C) Brammertz, who had visited the site two days earlier,
confirmed that UNIIIC had started working on the June 13
assassination of March 14 MP Walid Eido. It was clearly, he
said, a targeted attack using the same motus operendi as the
December 12, 2005 attack on Gebran Tueni. The attack
occurred in a narrow alley, which made it more difficult to
clear the crime scene; there was also the fear of a second
bomb targeting the response teams. An international
forensics team arrived at the site a day and a half after the
attack (though a local expert who works part-time for UNIIIC
went to the scene immediately after the explosion),taking
control on June 15. This was an improvement, Brammertz said,
but still too slow; the lag time opened the door not only to
possible violations of the crime scene but, more likely, to
the incompetence of local response teams, he argued, citing
the November 21, 2005 attack on Minister of Industry Pierre
Gemayel, where poor forensic work led to no DNA samples to
follow up on. He advocated the creation of a permanent
forensics team based in Beirut that could be on the scene
immediately following an attack.


11. (C) Brammertz stressed the political importance of
UNIIIC's demonstrating that it was working on new cases as
well as old ones, to discourage future attacks. Although 80
percent of UNIIIC's resources are directed at the Hariri

BEIRUT 00000945 003 OF 003


assassination (UNIIIC's investigation team consists of 37
people, working on a total of 17 bombings, eight of which
were targeted attacks),it must also be able to address the
current violence as well. Brammertz confirmed UNIIIC is
working on the February 13, 2007 twin bus attacks. However,
it not involved in other recent bombings and Brammertz did
not know whether Fatah al-Islam was behind the recent
attacks, though he did not a similarity to the post-Hariri
bombings, especially in the Christian areas. The purpose was
to "create a general climate of fear," he said.


LOOKING AHEAD TO SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
--------------


12. (C) On the Special Tribunal, Brammertz said the next
steps were to decide the venue and organize the transition
from his team to the (not yet appointed) tribunal prosecutor,
who should be selected in the next three to four months.
Noting he had suggested several names to UN Legal Advisor
Nicolas Michel, Brammertz said we need to push for names
because the UN itself wouldn't do it. Brammertz confirmed he
had agreed to stay until December, and said he hoped the
prosecutor would be able to spend two months in Lebanon prior
to his departure to give the two an opportunity to overlap.
The prosecutor-elect would then be able to take up the
tribunal in January. Responding to the Ambassador's question
as to what, if any, implications a change of government in
Lebanon would have on the tribunal, Brammertz said there is
no reason the judges and the prosecutors can't be named now.
Either there is a tribunal or there isn't ("either you're
pregnant or you're not," was how Brammertz put it),but it
was in the hands of the UN now to get it up and running.


13. (C) Separately, PM Siniora's chief aide Mohamed Chatah
told DCM on June 23 that the Lebanese have identified the 12
nominees whose names the GOL will submit to the UN, from
which the UN will select four for the Tribunal. The twelve
are now being approached about their willingness to
participate, a process Chatah estimated would take one to two
weeks. He also said that UN Secretariat officials are
debating if it is best to wait until very late in the process
before the Tribunal commences before making the selection of
the four, so that they do not become assasination targets.

BRAMMERTZ IN WASHINGTON JULY 13 AND 14
--------------

14. (SBU) Brammertz will be in Washington July 13 and 14,
about a week before he goes to New York, and asked us to
guage interest in scheduling follow up meetings with USG
officials who follow UNIIIC. ACTION REQUEST: Request a
response we can pass to Brammertz.



FELTMAN