WAITING FOR HIZBALLAH: SAUDI AMBASSADOR CLAIMS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000094

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER LE SY
SUBJECT: WAITING FOR HIZBALLAH: SAUDI AMBASSADOR CLAIMS
BERRI, HARIRI ON BOARD FOR ELEMENTS OF A POLITICAL DEAL

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: In a 1/18 meeting with the Ambassador,
Saudi Ambassador Abdulaziz Khoja said that he has received
approvals from Parliament Speaker Berri and MP Saad Hariri
for the broad outlines of a political deal to resolve
Lebanon's political crisis. Hizballah has not yet responded
to his ideas, which he will pitch to Prime Minister Fouad
Siniora when he returns from his Arab tour sometime this
evening. Khoja's proposal links approval of the tribunal to
expansion of the cabinet (along the 19-10-1 split floated by
Amr Moussa in December),and he keeps presidential and
legislative elections on their current schedules. Khoja
acknowledged that even the agreement in principle from Hariri
and Berri could break down over the details, especially
regarding how the "neutral" minister would be chosen and
function. (Khoja himself mused about former Foreign Minister
Jean Obeid playing the "neutral" role, given that Obeid's
presidential ambitions would prevent him from siding with
either side.) Khoja agreed that his proposal would have
little appeal to Michel Aoun. End summary.


2. (S) Pulling a page from his suit pocket, Khoja shared
with the Ambassador the elements he has over the past few
days been peddling in an attempt to solve Lebanon's political
crisis. He acknowledged that he started with the ideas in
circulation from Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa's
December trips and revised them in hopes of finding the
breakthrough that eluded Moussa. If his ideas have traction,
Moussa could return to clinch the deal. Khoja's ideas follow:

-- Special Tribunal for Lebanon: A team composed of March
14 and March 8-Aoun judges would study the tribunal documents
together and discuss possible amendments. The team would
operate under strict time limits, having only "three or four
days to make their recommendations."

-- Simultaneously with the work of the tribunal study team,
a second team of March 8-Aoun and March 14 leaders would
discuss how to expand the cabinet to 30 members (from its
original 24),along the split proposed by Amr Moussa: 19
ministers from the March 14 majority and allies, 10 ministers
from the March 8-Aoun opposition, and one "neutral" minister.
The team would make recommendations regarding the exact
composition of the cabinet. As with the tribunal team, this
team would have only three or four days to develop a cabinet
slate. As the cabinet will only be expanded, not changed,
Siniora does not have to resign, nor does the cabinet
statement need to be revisited.

-- Having concluded the steps above, both parties would sign
a binding agreement regarding acceptance of the tribunal and
the expanded cabinet in line with the recommendations made by
the two teams.

-- At that point, Speaker Berri would convene the parliament
in an extraordinary session, to announce the expanded cabinet
and the intention to pass the tribunal documents.

-- The new cabinet would then meet and automatically
approval the tribunal documents, passing them onto President
Emile Lahoud. If Lahoud still rejects the tribunal, the
cabinet would again pass the tribunal documents and transfer
them to the parliament, which in its special session would
ratify them. (Khoja explained that this would restore
Lebanon's constitutional process. When the Ambassador noted
that March 14 leaders have previously rejected as too risky
the idea of submitting the tribunal documents to a new
cabinet without a two-thirds majority on their side, Khoja
explained that the binding nature of the March 8-March 14
agreement eliminates the danger.)

-- The new cabinet would focus on Paris III reforms and the
drafting and passage of a new legislative election law.

-- Presidential elections will take place in autumn, as
scheduled; Lahoud will serve out the remainder of his
extended term (expiring November 24). (Upon the election of
a new president, the cabinet is considered constitutionally
as resigned, meaning that a new cabinet -- and new cabinet
decree -- will need a parliamentary vote of confidence at
that time.)

-- Legislative elections will take place as scheduled in
2009 and will not be moved forward.


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3. (S) Khoja said that Berri has already signed on to these
outlines of a deal. When MP Saad Hariri was in Saudi Arabia,
he passed on his approval to Prince Bandar bin Sultan.
Despite having met three times since Saturday with Hizballah
representative Hajj Hussein Khalil, "I am still waiting for
Hizballah's answer," Khoja said. Khoja said that he had also
met with March 14 Christian representatives Nayla Mouawad and
Nassib Lahoud, both of whom found the proposal attractive.
As for Walid Jumblatt, his advisors Marwan Hamadeh and Ghazi
Aridi also liked the idea, Khoja said. He will brief PM
Siniora upon the latter's return (anticipated sometime this
evening) from his Arab tour.


4. (S) Michel Aoun, Khoja said, will be a problem: he will
see that, under this scenario, while he will have four
cabinet seats, he is unlikely to become president. In fact,
Khoja mused, Aoun's anticipated objections might explain
Hizballah's delay in responding: Hizballah may not yet be
prepared to show its willingness to abandon Aoun. Asked by
the Ambassador whether he had the impression that Hizballah
wanted a way out of the political stalemate, Khoja paused to
think before answering yes.


5. (S) Khoja acknowledged that the approvals of Berri and
Hariri could evaporate, depending on the details. The
limited duration of the first two steps (on the tribunal and
cabinet formation) will help focus people and thus reveal how
seriously they desire a solution. Khoja said that he still
has no clear idea from Berri or Hizballah what are the
concerns regarding the tribunal documents.


6. (S) As for the one neutral minister, Khoja said that
Berri was still opposed to having a non-voting minister.
Thus, if the "neutral" minister was going to vote, then it
was critically important that he/she be truly neutral. March
14 leaders will be on alert, watching carefully for
characteristic Berri tricks to turn the neutral minister into
someone permanently on the March 8-Aoun side. Khoja said he
proposed that Berri give five names to Siniora, with Siniora
able to choose one. Khoja himself would help Berri pick the
names to be forwarded to the PM, to ensure credibility of at
least part of the slate. "What do you think about (former
Foreign Minister) Jean Obeid?" Khoja asked, arguing that
Obeid's presidential ambitions would make him -- despite his
known links to Syria -- unwilling to offend either side.
Obeid would not side with the pro-Syrians and risk alienating
the March 14 MPs who will have the decisive voice in electing
the next president.


7. (S) Comment: With Amr Moussa keeping away and little
direct dialogue taking place across Lebanon's political
divide, Khoja is on a lonely quest: he seems to be the only
person actively shuttling between the two sides, and he seems
to have an almost naive faith that, somehow, the right
formula can overcome objections to the tribunal. We suspect
that his diplomacy explains Hizballah's decision not mobilize
its supporters for labor demonstrations over the past week,
as Hizballah does not seem eager to annoy the Saudis at the
moment. Khoja's ideas are a definite improvement over
earlier versions and show the influence of March 14 leaders
on his thinking. (Less than a week ago, Khoja still
advocated giving the March 8-Aoun minority a blocking and
"toppling" minority.) But, with each side here deeply
suspicious of the other, Khoja will have to hammer out the
details if he hopes for broad acceptance of his proposal.
While we think he is playing a constructive role --
especially in terms of lowering tensions in advance of next
week's Paris III conference -- Khoja specifically asked us
not to push his proposals, lest we taint them by association.
We will, however, quietly explore his ideas with our close
contacts on the March 14 side. We agree with Khoja that how
the neutral minister is chosen is key to securing solid March
14 approval -- and March 14, in our view, should be careful
to avoid saying no and letting the March 8-Aoun forces out of
the corner.
FELTMAN