LEBANON: UNIIIC BRAMMERTZ APPLIES SCISSORS TO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000090

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2017
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: UNIIIC BRAMMERTZ APPLIES SCISSORS TO
RUSSIAN LETTER


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S/NF) UNIIIC Commissioner Brammertz told the Ambassador
that neither any of the P-5 counties, nor Israel, were among
the ten countries cited for non-compliance in last month's
interim report to the UN Security Council. Indicating some
surprise that this has developed into such an issue,
Brammertz explained that the non-compliance wording in his
latest report was not directed toward counties who had been
asked by the Commission to render voluntary assistance in
technical matters of the investigation, but rather those
counties whose officials were hindering the investigation by
refusing to respond to formal UNIIIC inquiries or by giving
testimony notable for its obfuscation. On January 15,
Brammertz informed Russia's ambassador to Lebanon that his
government was making a serious error in judgment if it
thought the proposed UNSC non-compliance letter would "help"
the Commission with its investigation -- a message which the
Russian ambassador said he would convey to his superiors.
Concerning the investigation itself, Brammertz' chief
investigator expressed confidence that his staff now has a
clear picture of how the Hariri assassination was carried
out, but still requires a credible witness or irrefutable
piece of evidence that would definitively link those
responsible with the crime itself. The chief investigator,
Peter Nicholson, also said that of the 14 acts of political
violence the Commission is investigating, at least six
possess strong linkages in terms of motive and modes
operandi. Finally, Brammertz gave a general outline of his
plan of action for the next six months and the status of the
search for his successor. End summary.


2. (S/NF) The Ambassador and Special Assistant met with
Commissioner Serge Brammertz on January 17 at UNIIIC's
headquarters in Monteverde, located just east of Beirut. At
a later point, UNIIIC chief investigator Peter Nicholson
joined the discussion to give his opinion of the progress
made by the investigation, as well as its upcoming
challenges. This morning's meeting was a result of a January
13 telephone call during which the Ambassador had suggested
to Brammertz that he discuss with Russia's ambassador to
Lebanon his discomfort with the attention being given to the
"non-compliance letter" initiative.

BRAMMERTZ TELLS RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR THEY'RE WAY OFF BASE
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3. (S/NF) Commissioner Brammertz expressed mild surprise
and some consternation that the non-compliance wording in
UNIIIC's Interim Report in December had been turned into an
issue by the Russians -- and he strongly suspected by the
Syrians. Brammertz plainly stated to the Ambassador that
neither the U.S. nor any other member of the P-5, nor even
Israel, were part of the group of ten nations mentioned in
the interim report as being in non-compliance with the
Commission. Perhaps realizing the report's wording had been
slightly ambiguous, Brammertz explained that there was a
considerable difference between nations who for various
legitimate reasons could not or were delaying responding to
requests for voluntary technical assistance made by the
Commission and those nations who were deliberately ignoring
formal UNIIIC summons for witnesses or evidence.


4. (S/NF) Brammertz explained that, of course, his
Commission welcomed, and indeed required, assistance from
nations whose technical or intelligence capabilities could
assist his investigators fill in the gaps they were not
equipped themselves to address. But those he had intended to
indict in his interim report were far different -- namely,
those countries whose officials were deliberately ignoring
and misleading his Commission. He would not divulge the
names of the other non-compliant countries.


5. (S/NF) On January 15, Brammertz met with Russia's
ambassador to Lebanon, Sergei Boukin, and informed the envoy
that if the Russian government was genuinely trying to assist
the Commission, the proposed "non-compliance" letter was
clearly not the way to do it. Noting that he had not asked
and did not seek such "assistance," Brammertz told Ambassador
Boukin that Russia (and by implication Syria) was completely
incorrect if it thought the "guilty" parties included France,
U.S., or the UK. Brammertz added that other names being

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bandied about (i.e. Israel) were also off base. Brammertz
then asked Boukin why would the Russian government try to
"politicize" the investigation when its previous public
pronouncements had so strongly supported its independence and
professionalism.


6. (S/NF) According to the Commissioner, Boukin's response
was cautiously measured. Boukin said that his government was
merely trying to "balance" and "re-calibrate" the
international pressure that it felt had been unfairly
directed against Syria, and was merely using what it thought
was a complaint registered by the Commission in its last
report. As he had in this meeting, Brammertz explained the
difference between non-compliance and voluntary assistance to
a presumably surprised Boukin, who lamely and unconvincingly
explained that he was not involved in the letter initiative.
The Russian ambassador assured the Commissioner he would
relay Brammertz' message to his superiors.


7. (S/NF) Brammertz expressed some wonder at how such an
anodyne statement in a report could blossom into such an
intense matter of debate, but then acknowledged that no
matter how diligent his Commission carried out its
investigation, political realities in Lebanon and the region
would always attempt to create disruptions. Brammertz hoped
his intervention with Ambassador Boukin would help lay the
matter to rest, but said that after nearly a year on the job,
nothing really surprised him anymore.

STATUS OF THE INVESTIGATION
--------------


8. (S/NF) Chief investigator Peter Nicholson joined the
meeting and said he was "upbeat" on recent progress and
relatively optimistic that the Commission's investigators
were closing in on "critical" paths of inquiry. Some
previous lines of inquiry had already been closed, with a
more clearly defined focus as a result. The focus is on what
happened inside Syria and Lebanon. Nicholson acknowledged
the interim reports had been bland and "technical" to a
fault, and perhaps had given those responsible for the crime
cold comfort that the Commission was making little progress.
Brammertz interjected the Syrians in particular now appeared
increasingly confident that they could stall the
investigation and wait it out.


9. (S/NF) Irrespective of the current confidence of the
Syrians, Nicholson said they now have a clear picture of how
the Hariri crime was carried out, as well as its most
probable perpetrators. What the investigation now needed was
a credible witness or irrefutable piece of evidence that
would link the lead suspects to the actual crime/crimes.
Nicholson said it was quite clear that at least six of the
crimes were carried out by the same organization, using the
same modus operandi. The evident professionalism of the
operations' execution, as well as the technology and
explosives employed, led him to believe that little if any
written evidence still exists.


10. (S/NF) In his view, the best chance to close the case
and bring it to a prosecutable level would be to "turn" a
person or persons who could provide or describe the link
between those responsible and the crime. Brammertz'
investigators have scheduled another 150-200 interviews over
the next six months, and of these, approximately 30 are with
individuals who may have the knowledge that could provide
this critical linkage. The difficult part is to convince one
or more of those involved to "make a deal" with the
Commission.

BRAMMERTZ URGES TRIBUNAL BE ESTABLISHED NOW
--------------


11. (S/NF) Nicholson indicated the Commission has some
"carrots and sticks" to induce such testimony, but the
present political realities make it difficult to effectively
employ them. Brammertz said one way to apply pressure on
these potential witnesses is to establish the Special
Tribunal as soon as possible. In Brammertz' view, the longer
the tribunal is delayed, the more convinced potential
witnesses become that any testimony they give will eventually
fall into the wrong hands, with unpredictable consequences.
Brammertz urged the U.S. and others to push as forcefully as
possible for an expeditious establishment.


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12. (S/NF) Brammertz continued that another development
that could facilitate witnesses coming forward would be a
change in the Lahoud presidency. The Commissioner said that
as long as Lahoud remains as a clear symbol of Syrian
influence in Lebanon, his presence would likely dissuade
individual cooperation with the investigation. Brammertz
realized this issue was a matter for the Lebanese people to
resolve, but he was aware of its clear impact on the
investigation.

THE NEXT SIX MONTHS
--------------


13. (C) Even though the current UNIIIC authorization
expires on June 15, Brammertz said he was confident its staff
would continue its work in one form or another. If the
Special Tribunal was established and fully operational, he
envisioned a careful and thorough turnover of the evidence
and any continuing strands of the investigation to competent
tribunal staff. Brammertz also realized that the Commission
itself might be extended if a transfer could not yet be
accomplished in June. No matter the scenario, he said it was
important that his successor be chosen soon.


14. (C) Brammertz indicated that one highly-sought
candidate, a UK jurist currently working at the ICC, had just
withdrawn his name from consideration, citing the difficult
working conditions in Lebanon. But Brammertz also noted that
at least three other strong candidates were being reviewed,
all of whom possessed top-drawer credentials in both
investigative and managerial competencies. Interestingly, he
remarked that all three candidates had considerable
experience in the prosecution of war crimes, which he felt
was an important advantage in this type of investigation.


15. (C) He said the Commission was now operating on a dual
track: a strategic compilation of evidence according to
international judicial standards, as well as on a tactical
track with regards to a focused effort to solve the 14 cases
under investigation by June 2007. Brammertz expressed
cautious confidence that barring unforeseen obstacles, both
objectives were within reach.

PERSONNEL MATTERS
--------------


16. (SBU) Confirming previous rumors, Peter Nicholson made
known his intention to return to the ICC next month. Project
leader Rosemary Nidary, the only American on the
investigation staff, also intends to return to her position
with the Office of the U.S. District Attorney in New York.
Commissioner Brammertz said he was very sorry to lose two
staff of their caliber, but at the same time understood that
protracted service in Lebanon eventually took its toll. He
was confident that either outside replacements or in-house
promotions would capably fill the voids.


17. (SBU) One issue that clearly irritated Brammertz and
which he made no effort to conceal, was the obtuseness and
illogical nature of the UN hiring process. The UN's
bureaucratic demands for filling any vacancy was intensely
time-consuming and often inconsistent -- and it was driving
Brammertz to distraction, as well as consuming precious time.
One difficult-to-believe episode involved Brammertz' request
for a forensic investigator. When this request finally made
it through the UN human resources labyrinth, the position was
listed in the UN recruitment announcement as a medical
pathologist. This incident produced Brammertz' mirthless
remark that "Ambassador Bolton would love that story."
FELTMAN