LEBANON: AOUN RECEPTIVE TO RAPPROCHMENT WITH MARCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000896

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNSC AA
SUBJECT: LEBANON: AOUN RECEPTIVE TO RAPPROCHMENT WITH MARCH
14 CAMP, OPPOSES SECOND GOVERNMENT

REF: A. BEIRUT 851

B. BEIRUT 875

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a June 18 meeting with the Ambassador, Free
Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader General Michel Aoun agreed
that a second government would be catastrophic for Lebanon.
The FPM is exploring cooperation with the March 14 majority
to form a national unity government, but claims the ball is
in March 14's court. While appearing vaguely positive, Aoun
refrained from making explicit guarantees that the FPM would
not resign from a newly formed government. Aoun said he
would not oppose by-elections for the seats of two
assassinated March 14 MPs. He agreed that the Lebanese Armed
Forces were doing well in Nahr al-Barid and offered his
suggestions for improving Lebanon's security forces. End
summary.


RAPPROCHEMENT WITH MARCH 14?
--------------


2. (C) In a June 18 meeting with the Ambassador, DCM, and
Pol/Econ Chief at his residence in Rabieh, Aoun, accompanied
by his advisor and son-in-law Gebran Bassil, agreed with the
Ambassador's assertion that the formation of a second
government would be catastrophic for Lebanon. Aoun had heard
that President Lahoud was looking to form a second government
by July 15 if the current political impasse was not resolved.
This would allow time, he reasoned, before the
recently-scheduled August 5 by-elections and before Lahoud
became preoccupied with the legal procedures leading up to
the September 25 presidential election. But, Aoun concluded,
we will not arrive at this.


3. (C) The FPM leader expressed his willingness to explore a
national unity government with the March 14 camp to avoid
such a scenario, but wondered aloud whether Amal and
Hizballah would agree. The Ambassador noted that March 14
feared PM Siniora's resignation or a constitutional collapse
of the cabinet (due to resignation of more than a third of
the ministers) more than it hestitated to join with the Aoun
bloc, especially if Aoun guaranteed that he would not resign
from the newly formed government. Emphasizing that he was
speaking in a personal capacity, the Ambassador urged Aoun to
talk to PM Siniora, arguing that agreement between the FPM
and March 14 on the cabinet would circumvent Parliament
Speaker Nabil Berri's obstructionism by robbing his Amal
party (and its Hizballah allies) of the ability to force the
government to fall. (Note. If Aoun's FPM joins March 14 in
an expanded government and gives guarantees not to resign,
the remaining opposition groups Amal and Hizbollah would not
have enough combined cabinet seats to form the one-third plus
one majority needed to topple the government. Should Amal
and Hezbollah resign from an expanded cabinet, the issue of a
lack of Shia representation in an expanded government,
however, cited by Lahoud and his supporters to discredit the
current government's legitimacy since the November 2006
resignation of five Shia cabinet members, would continue to
pose a problem. End note.)


4. (C) The Ambassador stressed that now was the time for Aoun
to prove the USG wrong, i.e., that, as he asserts, he is not
part of the Hizballah/Berri March 8 bloc. The FPM took a
first step in distancing itself from Hizballah when it
supported the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in Nahr al-Barid
rather than accepting Hizballah's red line that the LAF
should not enter the Palestinian camp. Now it could take a
second important step by supporting the government's efforts
to form a national unity government by giving a guarantee of
not resigning, rather than side with the March 8 opposition.


5. (C) While appearing to be positive, Aoun refrained,
however, from providing explicit assurance that he would not
resign from a reconstituted government, arguing that it was
not in FPM's interests to resign as long as there was no
agreement on the Presidency. (Note. Support for Aoun's
presidential ambitions are his sine qua non for the FPM's
continued alliance with Hizballah and Amal. End note.)
Nevertheless, he did tell us to "consider (the question of a
national unity government) solved." The Ambassador again

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urged him to provide a formal guarantee not to resign;
otherwise, Aoun's assertion that his party had no reason to
resign was no better than Berri's own unconvincing "why would
March 8 resign?" (Ref A) in the eyes of a wary March 14.

BALL IS IN MARCH 14'S COURT
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador further suggested that Aoun could use
March 14's fear of Siniora's resignation to the FPM's
advantage, in particular by extracting concessions that March
14 will finally move on a new electoral law, clearly in the
interest of all of Lebanon (but not necessarily in the
interest of all political leaders). Aoun, visibly warming to
the idea, said an agreement must be reached soon. Bassil
interjected that the FPM would need guarantees of its own,
noting that he had recently held a four-hour discussion with
Siniora's chief advisor Mohamad Chatah to discuss cooperation
between the two sides. Unfortunately, he said, Chatah did
not appear to have any decision-making authority and needed
to check with Siniora before responding to the FPM's
overtures. Acknowledging Chatah's goodwill, Bassil further
said the PM's advisor now realizes that the FPM can be a good
partner on security matters but is somehow unable to
translate this into concreate measures. The ball is now in
March 14's court, he concluded.


7. (C) Aoun later stated that, in addition to making progress
on the new electoral law, the FPM and March 14 could reach
agreement on two points on the security front: the
Palestinian issue and Lebanon's relationship with Syria. He
did not anticipate any major initiatives on regional security
issues, but recalled his 1990 article (published before the
Madrid conference) advocating a comprehensive peace plan
between Lebanon, Israel and Syria. Aoun said Bassil and
Chatah also discussed portfolio allotments in a new cabinet.


8. (C) At a separate lunch with the Ambassador and Pol/Econ
Chief the same day, Aoun MP Ibrahim Kenaan, apparently
unaware of the Bassil-Chatah discussion, said he had held a
(separate) discussion with Chatah regarding a "Declaration of
Principles," to which the two sides would publicly subscribe
in an effort to form a new cabinet. Like Bassil, Kenaan was
sketchy on the details. Kenaan also indicated that the FPM
had its sights set on the Ministry of Justice.

FPM WON'T OPPOSE BY-ELECTIONS
--------------


9. (C) Noting that is was President Lahoud's "prerogative" to
sign the June 16 cabinet decree calling for by-elections to
replace the two assassinated March 14 MPs Pierre Gemayel
(November 21, 2006) and Walid Eido (June 3, 2007),Aoun said
he would not oppose the elections. The Ambassador stressed
that Lahoud's refusal to sign the cabinet decree (Ref B)
sends a message that "murder pays." Aoun sidestepped the
allegation, countering that the two seats should be deducted
from the 128-member quorum, creating a new quorum of 126, in
which March 14 would still have the majority. The Ambassador
further argued that Lahoud is essentially using an
administrative process to violate the constitution, which
requires that elections be held within 60 days after a
vacancy occurs. Aoun replied that the solution was an
accelerated formulation of a new government; once a new
cabinet was in place, he argued, Lahoud would sign the
decree. Following the parliamentary by-elections (scheduled
for August 5),Lahoud could then consult with the new
parliament to form a new government.


10. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question as to
whether the FPM would field a candidate in Pierre Gemayel's
Metn district (where Gemayel's father Amine, brother of
assassinated President Bashir Gemayel and potential
presidential candidate is widely expected to run despite his
current disavowals),Aoun said that depended on Amine's
behavior; the FPM was still reeling from the insult of
Amine's refusal to accept Aoun's condolence call after
Pierre's assassination, and there had been no efforts at
reconciliation since. Aoun, noting that the FM had not
fielded a candidate in the elections to replace MP Gebran
Tueni (assassinated December 12, 2005),argued that, in any
case, the ruling of a country does not depend on one seat.

IMPLICATIONS OF NAHR AL-BARID
--------------


BEIRUT 00000896 003 OF 003



11. (C) Agreeing with the Ambassador that the Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF) was doing a good job in Nahr al-Barid, Aoun
seized the moment to expound on his ideas for improving
Lebanon's security. First, the LAF needed more equipment.
Aoun also advocated the creation of two units, an
anti-terrorist unit and what he termed and "anti-subversive
warfare" unit in addition to traditional military units and
was working on a plan in this regard. Lebanon also needed an
operations center comprising all of its various intelligence
services, including Surete Generale, army intelligence (G-2),
and the intelligence branch of the Internal Security Forces
(ISF). A quick response team also was needed to react to but
also prevent security incidents. Lamenting the lack of a
parliamentary security committee (which he had proposed in
2005),Aoun said what was needed was a body able to consult
with the heads of al the security forces to delineate
responsibilities. The confusion that currently reigned made
Lebanon more vulnerable than necessary to security threats,
Aoun argued, noting that Al-Qaeda now has operations in
Lebanon.

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) With Aoun, the primary question is always whether
the General is a willing ally of the Syrians or not. If he
is simply an unwitting participant in their schemes, then it
should be theoretically possible to appeal to his ego and
ambitions to peel him away from his unholy alliance with
Hizballah and the assorted pro-Syrians in Lebanon. For some
time now, some of his MPs and many of his supporters have
been expressing discomfort with his positions, leading to
wistful thinking on the part of March 14 activists. If Aoun
would give credible guarantees that his ministers would not
resign from an expanded cabinet, for example, then March 14
leaders should find the concept of a national unity
government less frightening: the potential resignation of
Shia ministers would not (as it didn't in November) spell the
constitutional collapse of the cabinet. But if -- as we
expect -- the only guarantee Aoun seeks in return is the
presidency, of course, then there can be no deal. While we
think the odds remain stacked against any kind of Aoun-March
14 deal, we will continue to nudge March 14/GOL leaders and
the Aounists into exploring possible cabinet options and
guarantees.
FELTMAN