UN ENVOY PEDERSEN, MOHAMAD CHATAH ON 1701 REPORT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000876

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UNSC LE SY
SUBJECT: UN ENVOY PEDERSEN, MOHAMAD CHATAH ON 1701 REPORT

REF: BEIRUT 866

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a July 16 meeting with the Ambassador that
focused largely on Lebanon's internal politics, UN Special
Coordinator for Lebanon Geir Pedersen also talked of the next
UNSCR 1701 report. On Sheba' Farms, Pedersen, showing a map,
said that the cartographer's work revealed that the area of
Sheba' Farms is considerably smaller than the expansionist
claims extended by some Lebanese; Sheba' Farms does not
include the upper slopes of Mt. Hermon. But newly discovered
signed documents reinforce Lebanese claims of sovereignty,
Pedersen claimed, dismissing the Ambassador's concern about
the 1701 report inadvertently providing justification for
Hizballah's armed activities. He said that he did not have
new information from the GOL about arms smuggling across the
Syrian-Lebanese border. PM Siniora's senior advisor, Mohamad
Chatah, told us separately that the GOL would provide
information to Pedersen by mid-week. Chatah said that the
Lebanese would propose a tripartite UN-Syrian-Lebanese
mechanism for the border. Talking of his consultations last
week in Israel, Pedersen said that the Israelis gave no
evidence to back up their claims of renewed Hizballah
activities south of the Litani River. As Israel had shown
evidence of arms smuggling on the Syrian-Lebanese border,
Pedersen argued that Israeli intelligence on activities south
of the Litani was less conclusive. Moreover, UNIFIL's 400
daily patrols failed to uncover Hizballah military
activities. End summary.

NEW INFORMATION ON SHEBA' FARMS:
PROBABLY LEBANESE, BUT SMALLER THAN SOME CLAIM
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador called on Pedersen at his home on
June 16. Pedersen, barefoot and sitting at a table
surrounded by documents and maps, was working on his input
into the next UNSCR 1701 report, now being drafted. The
UN-hired contract cartographer, he said, had discovered some
"very revealing" documents about both the land ownership
patterns and probable sovereignty of Sheba' Farms. The
cartographer turned up some old maps signed by Lebanese and
Syrian officials. Thus, there would be considerable new
information about Sheba' Farms included in the next UNSCR
1701 report. But the report would also, Pedersen said,
emphasize the "provisional, temporary nature of the new
findings," since Lebanon and Syria are responsible for
agreeing to their permanent border.


3. (C) The Ambassador expressed strong objections to
Pedersen's comments. The UN, by commenting on Sheba' Farms
sovereignty, risks turning pretext into legal justification
for Hizballah's armed activities and even post-facto blessing
for last summer's Hizballah aggression against Israel. The
cartographer's mandate was to define the geographic scope of
the area in question, without asserting sovereignty claims,
and perhaps offer some options (per the language in UNSCR
1701) for how to deal with the issue. The cartographer
should not have the power to overturn years of Security
Council resolutions and establish a new precedent by which
contract bureaucrats change borders.


4. (C) Pulling out a photocopied map, Pedersen said that
the cartographer had, in fact, "done us all a great service"
by defining the area. Sheba' Farms does not include the
upper slopes of Mt. Hermon or its peak, Pedersen noted; it
does not include the area around Ghajjar. Parliament Speaker
Nabih Berri (who regularly quips to VIP visitors that he
looks forward to hosting them on ski trips to Mt. Hermon once
Sheba' Farms are "liberated") "will be disappointed." (While
Pedersen did not permit the Ambassador to take a copy of the
map, the map showed the eastern boundary of Sheba' Farms as a
continuation of the diagonal line defined further south by
Wadi Assal, all the way up to the Israeli withdrawal line.
This is considerably less than the more expansionist Lebanese
claims. At the southwest corner, the line on Pedersen's map
appeared at its most southern point to be only about a
kilometer from the 1949 Israeli-Syrian demarcation line,
leaving a very narrow passage between the rest of the Golan
Heights and the Israeli-occupied Syrian "bulge" in the
Ghajjar area.)

BEIRUT 00000876 002 OF 004




5. (C) The Ambassador asked Pedersen whether he had
previewed with the Israelis how the UN might handle the
Sheba' Farms issue in the 1701 report. Evading a direct
answer, Pedersen said that, based on his consultations with
the Israelis the previous week, it was clear that the
Israelis knew that there would be "new information that they
don't like" about Sheba' Farms included in the report. The
Ambassador repeated his point that it would be deeply
damaging to the prospects for peace and security if the UN
publishes information suggesting Lebanese sovereignty over
Sheba' Farms, without having arranged a workable solution in
advance. Pedersen said that his impression was that it would
be impossible to get the Israelis to look creatively at
Sheba' Farms without having some kind of resolution on the
issue of the abducted Israeli soldiers; unfortunately the UN
has no information on the fate of the IDF soldiers. Even
after considerable debate, neither Pedersen nor the
Ambassador changed the mind of the other.

SOUTH OF THE LITANI:
UNCONVINCED BY ISRAELI ALLEGATIONS
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador asked whether Pedersen had received
new information from the Israelis regarding Hizballah
activities south of the Litani River that he would include in
the 1701 report. Pedersen said that the Israeli claims were
"mostly all talk." Noting that the Israelis had, in fact,
shared specific examples of smuggling across the
Syrian-Lebanese border, Pedersen said that he told his
Israeli interlocutors that "your intelligence regarding the
area south of the Litani must not be as good. Otherwise, why
would you not share anything with me?" The Ambassador
suggested that sources and methods might be more sensitive
for that area. But neither UNIFIL nor the LAF have seen
anything, Pedersen said. Gamely, he said that he shared the
Israeli allegations with Berri, who said that the Israelis
were "lying, lying, lying." Pedersen reported that UNIFIL
now conducts 400 patrols every 24 hours, some with the LAF.
How could Hizballah military activities and infrastructure
construction be as widespread as the Israelis claim and yet
evade notice altogether? Asked how the Israelis responded to
that question, Pedersen said that they claimed that
Hizballah's tactics are changing, with more reliance on
establishing weapons depots inside houses. But one doesnt'
hide long-range rockets in houses, Pedersen claimed.


7. (C) The Ambassador asked why the Israelis would wish to
lie and potentially unravel the fragile consensus behind
UNIFIL and UNSCR 1701. Saying that he never said the
Israelis were lying, Pedersen said they probably exaggerate
their arguments because Israel wants to expand the mandate of
UNIFIL. He said that he tried but without success to explain
to the Israelis that overreaching on the UNIFIL mandate risks
losing UNIFIL altogether. The situation in south Lebanon is
enormously improved over the situation a year ago, he told
the Israelis, who he said responded with skepticism. The
discussion about south Lebanon was at times "surreal," with
the Israelis claiming not to understand the impact of what
they wanted vis-a-vis UNIFIL mandate on Lebanese politics and
thus on the ability of UNIFIL to remain. He asserted that,
for all of their tough statements, the Israelis themselves
are not certain of the intelligence regarding the situation
south of the Litani. (Note: The meeting with Pedersen took
place before the 6/17 firing of Katyusha rockets from South
Lebanon into Israel; we raised this with Pedersen by phone as
an example that the south is not as trouble-free as he
indicated. End note.)

SYRIAN-LEBANESE BORDER:
WAITING FOR GOL INPUT
--------------


8. (C) For the situation regarding smuggling across the
Syrian-Lebanese border, Pedersen said the concurred with the
Israeli reports and appreciated the "clear" information
provided by Israel. But, unfortunately, the Government of
Lebanon has yet to provide any information about illegal
cross-border activities. The UNSCR 1701 report would be more
credible if it didn't have to rely so heavily on Israeli
reports that will be automatically rejected by Syria, Qatar,
and others. The Ambassador asked about using the information
provided by PM Siniora to the UN's UNSCR 1559 envoy, Terje
Roed-Larsen. Pedersen shook his head, saying that he wanted

BEIRUT 00000876 003 OF 004


"new" information. The Ambassador noted that the information
provided by Larsen was used in Larsen's presentation to the
Security Council but had never been included in any formal UN
report; moreover, it was new information since the last 1701
report. Not commenting on the Ambassador's points, Pedersen
also said that he wished the Israelis would provide some
"real-time" intelligence with the UN, for the UN to share
with the Lebanese regarding arms smuggling across the
Syrian-Lebanese border. "Let's test the Lebanese," Pedersen
argued, by giving them the information they can act upon,
embarrassing Hizballah and Syria in the process. If the GOL
fails to act on such real-time information, that is
important, too, he noted.

CHATAH: GOL TO PROVIDE INFORMATION
ON SYRIAN INTERFERENCE BY MID-WEEK
--------------


9. (C) Later in the day on 6/16, the Ambassador met with
Mohamad Chatah, Senior Advisor to Siniora. Chatah
acknowledged that the Lebanese needed to provide input to
Pedersen on the 1701 report. Calling Internal Security
Forces intelligence chief Wissam al-Hassan by phone, Chatah
reported that Hassan should have a report prepared by
Tuesday, "Wednesday at the latest," on Syrian interference
and arms smuggling, included some "pretty dramatic stuff"
related to the Nahr al-Barid fighting. PM Siniora would then
address the Lebanese public with the allegations and also
provide the evidence to the UN for the 1701 report. The
Ambassador urged Chatah to follow through, noting that, too
many times, when the Arab League sends a delegation (as is
happening this week),Siniora decides to postpone any
initiatives, out of deference to requests from Arab League
Secretary General Amr Moussa. (The Ambassador later met with

SIPDIS
Minister of Communications Marwan Hamadeh and spoke by phone
with MP Saad Hariri and Druse leader Walid Jumblatt, to urge
them to intervene with Siniora to make sure that the GOL
provided strong input on the Syrian-Lebanese border for the
1701 report.)

LEBANON TO PROPOSE TRI-PARTITE MECHANISM
TO ADDRESS BORDER SMUGGLING?
--------------


10. (C) Chatah said that Siniora was musing about asking
the UN to set up some kind of tripartite committee for the
Syrian-Lebanese border. This approach, he explained, would
be parallel to the tripartite coordination chaired by UNIFIL
between the GOL and Israelis. Politically, it would send a
strong message to Syria's Lebanese allies that, suddenly,
Syria and Israel were seen as equivalent problems. Such a
mechanism with Syria would also provide cover for closer
UNIFIL-sponsored coordination. Chatah said that Siniora
calculated that Syria would also have a hard time rejecting
participation; it would be embarrassing for Syria to tell the
UNSYG no, if Ban Ki-Moon endorsed Siniora's suggestion.
Previous ideas for dealing with the Syrian-Lebanese border --
UNIFIL deployment, European observers -- all led to
saber-rattling from Syria, which claimed that such action no
the Lebanese side would be considered a hostile act. But if
a tripartite mechanism was established, Syria would probably
feel forced to go along, however begrudgingly. Syria would
probably be less inclined to seal its borders to legitimate
trade under a tripartite mechanism


11. (C) Of course, Chatah added, Lebanon's written
submission regarding the UNSCR report would also reiterate
the regular Lebanese demands regarding a cessation to Israeli
over flights UN custody for Sheba' Farms, Israeli withdrawal
from northern Ghajjar, lack of Israeli disclosure regarding
the location of cluster bomb use, and so forth.

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) We will continue to press Siniora and the GOL on
submitting to the UN as much information as possible
regarding Syrian interference and arms smuggling across the
Syrian-Lebanese border. But it occurs to us that the UN also
has its own information now, from LIBAT (the Lebanon
Independent Border Assessment Team). Besides what is
reported reftel, we have heard that LIBAT documented with
lots of telling examples the considerable problems along the
border. If Pedersen argues that he has an obligation to
include "new information" turned up by the UN itself (through

BEIRUT 00000876 004 OF 004


its contractor) on Sheba' Farms, then certainly he also has
an obligation to use the UN's new information on the
Syrian-Lebanese border as well. We will push him on this.
If LIBAT has details, they should be included in either the
UNSCR 1701 report or the LIBAT report itself -- or both -- in
order to help corner those who would have the international
community do nothing regarding the Syrian-Lebanese border.
Such compelling details will also help ensure that any
tripartite border mechanism starts off by addressing specific
examples rather than by engaging in endless, fruitless debate
about whether or not there is a problem.


13. (C) As for Sheba' Farms, despite the relatively good
news that Sheba' Farms is more modest in size than some
Lebanese assert -- and having that modest size blessed in a
UN report can help limit, but not eliminate, the expansionist
claims -- we seem to be facing a no-win situation. If the
report comes out as Pedersen seems to be suggesting, then
Hizballah will point to the international confirmation that
it was right about Lebanese sovereignty claims all along.
But if we intervene strongly with the UN now to get the
language dropped, UN bureaucrats predictably more sympathetic
to the Lebanese side will surely leak news of our
intervention. Just as they did during last year's war,
Hizballah will seize the opportunity to ask the Lebanese
public about the real value of our support for Siniora. Our
friends here will argue that we, Israel, Hizballah, and Syria
seem to be inadvertently working in tandem to "prevent a
solution" to Sheba' Farms. We hope that there are some quiet
conversations already underway between USG and UN officials
on the treatment of Sheba' Farms in the upcoming report.
FELTMAN