LEBANON: SAFADI SEES SYRIAN HAND BEHIND EIDO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000870

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SAFADI SEES SYRIAN HAND BEHIND EIDO
ASSASINATION

REF: BEIRUT 860

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

LEBANON: SAFADI SEES SYRIAN HAND BEHIND EIDO ASSASSINATION

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a June 14 meeting with the Ambassador, Minister of
Public Works and Transportation Mohammad Safadi blamed Syria
for the June 13 assassination of March 14 MP Walid Eido.
Eido and March 14 Youth and Sports Minister Ahmed Fatfat have
both been targets for some time, he claimed, due to their
verbal assaults against the Syrians. The killing won't stop,
with or without the Special Tribunal, he said, and the
Lebanese political impasse won't end until the conflict
between Sunnis and Alawis is resolved. At an upcoming
meeting the cabinet will discuss whether to hold by-elections
to replace two assassinated March 14 MPs or whether to avoid
provoking the opposition. Safadi calculated that while
Hizballah is loathe to lose the protection afforded it by the
current cabinet statement, its Syrian backers are eager to
foment chaos and increase their control. Eido's
assassination will make it harder, but Safadi is still
determined to work simultaneously toward electing a new
president and an acceptable national unity government; he
also sees a need for the GOL to offer better protection to
its MPs and the staff it will select for the international
tribunal. Finally, Safadi believes that Sunni support for
the GOL remains strong up north, despite extensive Sunni
casualties in the army's fighting in Nahr al-Barid camp. End
Summary

SYRIA THE LOGICAL CULPRIT;
ANTI-SYRIANS NATURAL TARGETS
--------------


2. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador, DCM, and Econoff on
June 14 (the day after the assassination of March 14 MP Walid
Eido),Minister of Public Works and Transportation Mohammad
Safadi argued only Syria would conduct an assassination now.
Safadi, a Sunni March 14 stalwart, reasoned that only Syria
would work to interrupt Saudi and French attempts to find a
solution to Lebanon's political impasse. Eido and March 14
Minister of Youth and Sports Ahmed Fatfat have been targets
for a long time due to their frequent verbal attacks against
Syria, Safadi told us. He recounted a story we'd heard
earlier from other sources: upon hearing of the
assassination, a broadcaster with Parliamentary Speak and
Amal leader Nabih Berri's Shia-affiliated NBN television,
thinking she was off the air, commented to a colleague, "at
least they've gotten rid of one, I hope they will get rid of
Fatfat, too." (Note: The videoclip of this is now
circulating widely. End note.) Safadi told us that Fatfat,
upon hearing this, took a copy of the video to UNIIIC as
evidence that he is a potential target for assassination.
Fatfat also confronted Berri, who first angrily accused
Fatfat of threatening him before finally calling Fatfat back
to say he had fired the two responsible employees.

THE KILLING WON'T STOP
UNTIL A SUNNI ALAWITE DEAL IS REACHED
--------------


3. (C) Safadi argued that the series of political
assassinations won't stop -- with or without the Special
Tribunal -- and the Lebanese political impasse won't end
until Sunnis and Alawites resolve their differences.
Although Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is unwilling to
compromise, it is far better to find a solution sooner rather
than later, Safadi said. He expressed frustration that
Syrian Sunnis are quite nationalistic now, and no longer feel
any connection to Lebanese Sunnis, who are now more closely
affiliated with the Lebanese state than any other group. The
Lebanese Sunni "street" is very anti-Syrian, and Lebanese
Sunnis are ready to blame Syria for any problem, Safadi went
on. It is hard to even find a Sunni interlocutor to speak
with the Syrians; the Alawites refuse to talk to Lebanese
Sunni leaders like Siniora, Safadi, or others in the GOL, who
the Syrians view as a threat to the undemocratic regimes in
the region.

MARCH 14 CLINGING
TO CONSTITUTIONALITY

BEIRUT 00000870 002 OF 003


--------------

. (C) Safadi told the Ambassador that the next offiial
cabinet meeting, scheduled for June 16, willdiscuss whether
to call for immediate by-electios for the two assassinated
March 14 MPs, Pierre emayel and Walid Eido. March 14 is
down to just68 members in the 128-member parliament. The
cabnet is currently undecided; they are consulting layers
to determine whether it is constitutional t hold
by-elections without the consent of the prsident, although
it is clear the president's refsal to sign the government's
decree to hold electons within 60 days of the assassinations
is uncostitutional. March 14 members are concerned that,if
they take what would be seen as an unconstituional step, the
opposition will respond with addtional unconstitutional
actions, including the fomation of a second government. The
GOL is clingng to constitutional integrity as a symbol of
it legitimacy, Safadi explained. PM Advisor Mohamme Chatah
told DCM in a subsequent meeting that th cabinet almost
certainly will pass a decree callng for by-elections, but
has one concern. If caling elections led to President
Lahoud initiatin early his long-rumored plan to establish a
secod government, that second government might receive
support in south Lebanon where UNIFIL operates, rquiring
UNIFIL to work with it in some way for oerational
effectiveness.

OPPOSITION MOTIVATIOS
--------------


5. (C) The last thin Hizballah wants is a second government,
Safadi easoned, because it would lose the protection
affrded it as "the resistance" by the 2005 cabinet
eclaration. While the current government if it stcks to
the cabinet program cannot allow the armyto stop
"resistance" arms shipments with impunit, chances are slim
that a new cabinet would agreeto a declaration that includes
similar language rotecting Hizballah. Similarly, Safadi
argued, ran wants to maintain influence in Lebanon through
Hizballah, and would prefer that the majority an opposition
reach an agreement to end the politicl impasse.


6. (C) In contrast to Hizballah's Leanese political
interests and those of its Iranin backers, Safadi went on,
the Syrians are unwiling to compromise. They want to create
chaos inLebanon so Syria can reassert control over what it
views as its territory or sphere of influence. Te struggle
is now between individuals rather tha states, Safadi argued;
it is a struggle to the eath between Bashar al-Assad and
Walid Jumblatt nd others.

POLITICAL NEXT STEPS
--------------


7. (C) Echoing sentiments expressed by Rik the day before
(reftel),Safadi said Eido's asassination will make it
harder to form a nationa unity government, as Sunni-Shia
tensions escalae. He noted that residents of the southern
suburs celebrated the assassination by passing out candes,
as they did after the assassination of MP Giran Tueni in
December 2005. Safadi told us thathe is planning to
approach Saad Hariri to offer imself as an intermediary,
since his lack of invovement in the 1975-1990 civil war
means he is unainted by a militia past and thus better able
totalk to all sides. Lebanon can't withstand large ivilian
casualties like in Iraq and Gaza, he arged, so some action
is necessary, and the GOL stil needs to work on solving the
twin problems of a new national unity cabinet in conjunction
with electing a new strong, pro-March 14 president. The
easiest way out, Safadi told us, is entirely new
parliamentary elections; March 14 would do well, at least up
north.


8. (C) In addition, the GOL will have to provide better
security to its MPs and to the four Lebanese judges and the
deputy prosecutor who will be selected to work on the Special
Tribunal, Safadi stressed. MPs are already expressing
outrage that the GOL offers Parliamentarians only minimal
protection, and more MPs could defect from the March 14
alliance. Safadi reflected that he is lucky to be able to
afford his own security guards to supplement the three
assigned to him by the Ministry of Interior, and to have a
strong sense of security awareness that most MPs lack.
Safadi expressed concern that as long as the assassinations
continue, the opposition has the upper hand in keeping
pressure on March 14 MPs and ministers.

BEIRUT 00000870 003 OF 003



NEWS FROM TRIPOLI
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9. (C) Safadi, a Tripoli native, estimated that 95 percent of
Sunnis there support the GOL; the remaining five percent are
extremists, however, able to cause significant damage. Rival
Sunni politicians Omar Karami and Najib Mikati are not
popular, Safadi reported; Mikati has spent a lot of money to
regain popularity, but at this stage has gained little.
Noting that most of the casualties were local Sunnis killed
in surprise attacks on checkpoints, Safadi claimed
northerners do not resent the army for killing Sunnis in
their battle in Nahr al-Barid camp, and are not resentful
that primarily Sunnis have been killed, according to Safadi.
In addition, he argued that northern Sunnis are
disproportionately represented in the LAF, and that the GOL
has intentionally downplayed any Shia involvement in the Nahr
al-Barid battle to avoid raising sectarian tensions.


10. (C) There are more Fatah al-Islam (FAI) fighters in Nahr
al-Barid than expected, Safadi noted. In addition, more than
30 Saudi nationals are involved, and quite a few camp
residents or outlaws hiding in the camp have joined forces
with FAI because they see a common cause in fighting the LAF,
Safadi assessed.
FELTMAN