Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BEIRUT866
2007-06-15 09:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: UN ASSESSMENT TEAM IN AN UNCOMFORTABLE

Tags:  IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000866 

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NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2017
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: UN ASSESSMENT TEAM IN AN UNCOMFORTABLE
POSITION


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b)
.

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000866

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NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2017
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: UN ASSESSMENT TEAM IN AN UNCOMFORTABLE
POSITION


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b)
.

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) At a 6/14 meeting requested by the International
Donors Border Security Sub-group, members of the UN border
assessment team spoke in worrying tones of what their team
had found in its two-week examination of the Lebanese-Syrian
border. In contrast to his aloof address to the same group
when his team first arrived in Lebanon, team leader Lasse
Christiansen admitted that "significant gaps" exist that
allow the unauthorized passage of both goods and personnel
across the border, particularly in the border areas located
in or near militant Palestinian camps which were beyond the
control of Lebanon's security services. It was evident the
LIBAT team was uncomfortable with what they had found and
stated several times that although they understood their
mandate was strictly to conduct a "technical assessment,"
they were now faced with a "dilemma" about how to report to
UNSYG Ban Ki-moon evidence that "illegal decisions" have been
made by personnel assigned to guard the border. Although the
team refused to discuss specific recommendations they plan to
submit to the SYG on June 22, Christiansen said they would
likely offer an array of possible solutions ranging from
technical assistance, to advisory teams, and possibly an
international border force. What was clear, the team leader
summarized, was that the LAF was neither equipped nor trained
to execute a comprehensive border regime on its own. End
summary.


2. (C) The Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team
(LIBAT) met with the informal Border Security Sub-group in
West Beirut on June 14. Representatives from Canada, France,
U.K., Denmark, Germany and the U.S. had requested the meeting
to obtain an early readout of the conclusions LIBAT had
reached from their discussions with political leaders,
members of Lebanon's security services, and field surveys
conducted along the eastern and northern borders. Based upon

an initial May 30 discussion with the team, sub-group members
were not expecting a great deal from today's meeting. At
that earlier meeting, team leader Lasse Christiansen had said
his team would be examining the entire range of smuggling
activities (i.e. not only illegal arms shipments, but also
low-level activity, such as common smuggling and its economic
impact). At that time, several sub-group members suggested
that considering the serious circumstances Lebanon was in, it
would be far better to concentrate on border security
recommendations that would effectively staunch the flow of
destabilizing weapons, rather than the low-grade smuggling of
consumer goods. At the time, the team leader said he would
take it under advisement and abruptly ended the meeting.

CHANGE OF ATTITUDE
--------------


3. (C) The LIBAT team on June 14 was a much less confident
group. Team leader Christiansen said his five-person team
was "slightly wiser now" and described the team's field
surveys to the five official crossing points, as well as
inspections to several more remote areas of the border, as
the most valuable part of their assessment mission. He still
maintained that his core mandate was to concentrate on
"technical matters," but he conceded it was impossible to
ignore the very real problems of insufficient resources,
political complexities, and evidence that "illegal decisions"
were being made by security personnel assigned to guard the
border that allowed the transfer of unidentified persons and
goods.


4. (C) LIBAT members described large stretches of the
border that would be "difficult, if not impossible" to seal
completely. In particular, they noted that border regions
straddled by militant Palestinian operating camps were
essentially "no-go" areas for Lebanon's security forces, who
depended on difficult-to-maintain perimeter patrols to
monitor and control cross-border traffic. Christiansen spoke
of one interview with a junior LAF commander who said that to
enter such areas would entail almost certain exchanges of
fire.


5. (C) This discussion brought up the role of the LAF.
Christiansen said he planned to note in his report the

BEIRUT 00000866 002 OF 003


inherent difficulty of employing Lebanese army units for
border security. He stated it was clear from their field
observations that the army was over-extended and not
particularly motivated to patrol borders. Christiansen said
that more than one LAF commander expressed the hope that the
army would be able to turn over the task to a more
appropriate security organization. Emphasizing that army
units were not trained for the mission, he implied that one
of his recommendations would be the creation of a dedicated
border security force that would possess the mobility,
communications, and appropriate firepower needed to stop
smuggling at any level. Although he was not familiar with
the detailed concept of operations of the German-led Northern
Border Pilot Program, Christiansen said he believed the
integrated border security approach they were pursuing could
possibly lead to the establishment of a modern, effective
border force, which would free the army to concentrate on its
more traditional responsibilities.


6. (C) Addressing the "complicit" behavior by certain
security personnel that they suspect has contributed to a
problematic border, team members said they had been "puzzled
and worried" by the fact that despite incontrovertible
evidence that arms were being smuggled into Lebanon, regional
LAF, ISF, Customs and Surete General commanders they
interviewed said they had almost never intercepted an illegal
shipment. The LIBAT team leader said his team did not have
the time or the mandate to investigate this phenomena, but
implied he intended to report to the SYG that it was a
significant problem that required a solution.

"A DILEMMA"
--------------


7. (C) Returning once again to his position that his team
was only directed to investigate technical matters,
Christiansen acknowledged he now faced a dilemma, because it
was clear the border situation required far more than
technical measures. Although he declined to discuss specific
recommendations his team would be submitting to SYG Ban
Ki-moon on June 22, he did indicate that he would be offering
a range of possible solutions: robust technical assistance
to Lebanese forces already on the border; international
advisory teams to train Lebanese forces; perhaps even an
international monitoring force itself. But it was clear that
he viewed such recommendations with caution, giving the
impression he was anxious about possible criticism from
Security Council members that he had overreached his mandate.
Christiansen said he and his colleagues would be returning
to New York on June 16, discuss their findings, make a
decision on the parameters of the report, and spend a week
drafting the final document. Since LIBAT is reporting
directly to the SYG, he was unsure whether their findings
would serve as an annex to the upcoming 1701 report or be
released to the Security Council separately.


8. (C) When the floor opened to questions, the French
representative asked whether LIBAT had uncovered clear
evidence of illegal arms shipments. Christiansen replied in
the negative, but reiterated that his team was not focused on
that issue. He did acknowledge, however, that it would be
impossible for his report to ignore the conditions
(over-stretched security units, sections of the border not
under GOL control, poorly equipped/trained personnel,
rudimentary communications, complete lack of technical border
monitoring equipment) and political realities (undeniable
existence of arms in Lebanon, lack of a clearly delineated
border) that has created a complex situation that must be
rectified.


9. (C) The U.K. representative asked if LIBAT believed the
German-led Pilot Project was the "right track" to pursue to
assist the GOL. Christiansen stated that although it was
still in its early stages, the pilot project appeared to be
the best near-term solution to securing Lebanon's borders.
If the concept proved effective, Christiansen saw no reason,
based upon his team's assessment, that it could not be
extended to the entire border region. But he did restate his
conviction that the project's heavy reliance on the
over-extended LAF may be risky and that an optimum long-term
solution was the establishment of specialized border agency.


10. (C) In closing, the LIBAT team leader said his team was
also convinced that the lack of a delineated border between

BEIRUT 00000866 003 OF 003


Lebanon and Syria was a serious obstacle to a secure
frontier. He noted with chagrin that in some ways Lebanon
was worse off than Afghanistan, which even though it had to
deal with aggressive Taliban cross-border incursions, at
least possessed a clearly defined, recognizable border.
FELTMAN