LEBANON: BERRI RAISING THE BAR ON NATIONAL UNITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000851

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: BERRI RAISING THE BAR ON NATIONAL UNITY
GOVERNMENT?

REF: BEIRUT 831

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) In a June 11 meeting with the Ambassador, Parliament
Speaker and Amal leader Nabih Berri hardened his positions on
three issues. First, he rejected the 19-11 cabinet formula
he had previous advocated, demanding instead a 17-13 division
(with two seats more for the opposition). Second, Berri
withdrew his earlier promise that the March 8-Aoun ministers
would not resign from the cabinet, thus raising the
possibility that "blocking minority" might indeed become the
"toppling minority" March 14 politicians feared. Third,
Berri said that he would no longer simply accept Maronite
Patriarch Sfeir's choice for president (should Sfeir ever
utter a name),saying that his offer to stand by the
Patriarch had expired. While he seemed slightly more open to
an improved cabinet program to replace the July 2005 agenda,
Berri -- as he has before -- continued to insist on the
resignation of PM Siniora as the key to fixing the cabinet.
Dismissing France's initiative (Ref A) to host a national
dialogue as a poorly planned "political picnic," he
nevertheless welcomed the assistance of the Saudis and others
in serving as mediators. Berri purported to have no bone in
the fight (other than concerns for constitutional propriety)
as to whether a national unity government is formed; the
important thing was for March 14 and March 8 to agree on a
way forward so that parliament can elect a new president on
September 25, as scheduled. End summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by DCM and Pol/Econ Chief,
met with Berri at his residence. Berri was accompanied by
Senior Advisor Ali Hamdan and Amal MP Ali Bazzi (a US
citizen) from the Bint Jubayl district in South Lebanon.

FRENCH INITIATIVE A "POLITICAL PICNIC"
--------------


3. (C) Berri, who had met with French Special Envoy for
Lebanon Jean-Claude Cousseron on June 10, commented that
France's initiative to host a National Dialogue seemed to
lack any real planning and as such could be harmful. He
reportedly told Cousseran he understood the new French
government's need to demonstrate its activism in Lebanon and
its willingness to work with all the players. In the end,
Berri told the Ambassador, the meetings in Paris would be
nothing more than a nice photo op and a "political picnic."
The Speaker did express appreciation, however, for Saudi and
other efforts to play a mediating role between Lebanon's
various political groupings.

PRESIDENCY IS KEY TO RESOLVING POLITICAL CRISIS
-------------- --


4. (C) Berri said the presidency was the key to unlocking
Lebanon's political crisis. Claiming that he would support
whichever candidate March 14 and March 8 agree on, Berri said
the important thing was consensus. Neither group alone had
enough votes in parliament to elect a new president. Voting
would then take place on September 25 as scheduled, and on
November 24 the winner would assume the presidency and form a
new government of his own. If still in office by the time of
the presidential elections, PM Siniora would then have to
resign constitutionally. But, Berri opined, Siniora would be
asked to lead the new government because of his popular
support. (Comment: This would certainly surprise Saad
Hariri, who expects to be PM after presidential elections.
End comment.) Siniora would then seek parliamentary approval
on the formation of a new government. The current debate
over cabinet expansion would become a moot point, Berri
concluded, since the new government would be of the new
presidency's choosing. Berri said he had discussed this
scenario with Patriarch Sfeir.

SINIORA MUST RESIGN FIRST
--------------


5. (C) Berri argued that, constitutionally, Siniora could
neither change nor enlarge the current government without
first resigning. Siniora's resignation is essential to
fixing the cabinet. The real question was, did March 14 want
a new government, with a new cabinet program, or an expanded
version of the current government, with the same cabinet

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program? (Note: Berri's interesting constitutional
interpretations aside, the distinction between a new cabinet
and an expanded cabinet is significant. While a new cabinet
would permit the jettisoning at last of some odious
pro-Hizballah language approved by parliament in the July
2005 cabinet program, it would also necessitate the
resignation of the current cabinet. President Emile Lahoud,
in one of his few absolute powers, has to co-sign the cabinet
formation decree with the Prime Minister. A presidential
veto in this case cannot be overruled. For a simple cabinet
expansion, on the other hand, the old cabinet statement would
remain. But Lahoud would only be required to co-sign the
appointments of the additional ministers, reducing the
chances for presidential mischief. End note.)


6. (C) Berri, who previously insisted upon maintaining the
current cabinet program, indicated some flexibility this time
regarding a new cabinet program. Siniora, he said, asked to
base a new cabinet program on four agenda items already
approved by the Lebanese: the four decisions of the spring
2006 National Dialogue sessions, Siniora's 7-point plan
approved during Hizballah's war with Israel, UNSCR 1701, and
the Paris III reform plan. The 7-point plan is already
incorporated in UNSCR 1701, Berri said (suggesting that he
would not support separate reference to it),and, for the
other three agenda points, Berri himself had been among the
authors. So naturally Berri would support such a cabinet
program. But, he added, he would not enter into specific
negotiations on the program until Siniora resigned without
any "preset conditions." Constitutionally, he argued, there
should be no discussions on the formation of a new cabinet
until this occurred. He claimed that Lahoud also preferred a
new cabinet and new cabinet program.

MARCH 14'S VIEWS NOT CLEAR --
EXCEPT REJECTION OF UNITY CABINET
--------------


7. (C) Berri claimed he would not object if the parties
ultimately decided not to form a national unity government.
He just wanted the March 14 leaders (who need their own
national dialogue table to unite their positions, Berri
quipped) to let him know what they wanted. In fact, Berri
claimed, March 14 leaders never had a real interest in a
national unity government. By focusing on issues like the
Special Tribunal and the presidency, March 14 leaders
diverted attention away from the cabinet. As evidence, Berri
cited the last line of March 14's communique that called for
a national unity government after -- and not before -- the
election of a new president. This, in Berri's mind, proved
that March 14 leaders are not serious in speaking of a 19-11
cabinet now. According to Berri, there would be no need for
a national unity government after the presidential elections,
since the newly elected president would use his
constitutional powers to sign the cabinet formation decree to
shape the cabinet in his own choosing. So March's 14 calls
for a national unity cabinet after presidential elections
were a smokescreen.

RAISING THE BAR ON NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT?
--------------


8. (C) As the conversation continued, it became clear that
Berri no longer accepted the 19-11 formula for cabinet
expansion that he once advocated (and that March 14 leaders
have at last started to consider). Now, he said, he wants
the 17-13 cabinet (with two seats more for the opposition)
that PM Siniora once proposed. The Ambassador noted that the
17-13 proposal is not really workable, as former President
Amine Gemayel would object: he expects to nominate the
replacement for his murdered son Pierre's cabinet seat
(bringing the cabinet share of the March 14 bloc and allies
to 18). With a flick of the hand, Berri waved that concern
away as unimportant.


9. (C) The Ambassador noted that the 19-11 cabinet proposal
was originally presented as a trade: the March 8-Aoun bloc
would approve the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, and, in
return, the March 14 bloc would concede to the March 8-Aoun
demand for a 19-11 cabinet. With the international
community assumed the March 8-Aoun concessions by creating
the tribunal itself, why would the March 8-Aoun bloc now
insist on a larger cabinet share? Berri skirted the
Ambassador's question by stating the current government is
illegitimate, Lahoud is losing patience, and a new government
must be formed.

BEIRUT 00000851 003 OF 004




10. (C) Berri also withdrew his previous guarantees that he
would ensure that the March 8-Aoun bloc would not use its
cabinet decision to topple the cabinet at will. (If more
than a third of the ministers resign, a cabinet is considered
constitutionally fallen.) He claimed that his earlier
promise not to have the "blocking minority" become a
"toppling minority" was linked to the tribunal. Now the
tribunal was passed, there was no more need for such
guarantees. Why, he asked (suggesting implausibly that logic
might occasionally prevail in Lebanese politics),would the
March 8-Aoun politicians withdraw from the cabinet, when they
know that the cabinet will inherit the presidential powers if
no presidential elections occur? The Ambassador noted the
danger that President Emile Lahoud might appoint a second
cabinet, a destructive act that would be facilitated by the
collapse of the Siniora cabinet that March 8-Aoun ministerial
resignations would provoke. Berri claimed that he would not
support a second cabinet, but he refused to renew his
previous promise to keep the March 8-Aoun ministers in the
cabinet.

NO LONGER WILLING
TO BACK PATRIARCH'S CHOICE
--------------


11. (C) Asked by the Ambassador whether he would guarantee
the majority that presidential elections will take place --
another demand by the March 14 bloc in the case of a national
unity cabinet -- Berri bristled, I will give the guarantee
"for my country, not March 14." The Ambassador asked Berri
whether he still stuck to his position that he would support
any presidential candidate named by Maronite Patriarch Sfeir.
Berri shook his head. While he was willing to coordinate
and consult with the Patriarch, the Speaker's earlier vow to
go along with the Patriarch's choice was linked entirely to
the drive to oust Lahoud from office early. Had there been
early presidential elections to replace Lahoud, then Berri
would have gone along with the Patriarch's choice. Now, no.

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) Berri, as usual, postured as the great facilitator
and defender of Lebanon's constitution. Yet as any
indefatigable readers of our previous reporting would
recognize, Berri was busily rewriting the history of his own
positions, in favor of hardening them considerably. After
all, whatever the origins of the idea, he was the first
public advocate of the 19-11 cabinet split, and the downtown
"tent city" sit-in was erected in support of a 19-11
government. Yet just as March 14 leaders started to consider
the idea seriously (with Saudi Ambassador Khoja pushing it),
Berri has moved on. The withdrawal of his previous guarantee
against ministerial resignations and his refusal to consider
assurances regarding presidential elections will dampen any
interest by March 14 leaders to consider a national unity
proposal. Indeed, Walid Jumblatt and Saad Hariri, speaking
to us after a March 14 leadership coordination session on
June 12, told us that, in the face of the growing appetite by
the March 8-Aoun bloc, they will put any potential political
initiatives regarding the cabinet on hold until after the
Nahr al-Barid fight concludes.


13. (C) Hariri's confidante Ghattas Khoury tells us that
Hizballah has passed on a similar message to Hariri, adding
that Hassan Nasrallah will not even deign to accept Hariri's
offer to meet until Hariri has publicly accepted the 17-13
split and the need for Siniora's resignation. Hariri (as
well as his March 14 partners) considers both demands red
lines. The question is whether Berri and Hizballah are
simply offering an opening negotiating stance. Our March 14
contacts believe that, in fact, Berri and Hizballah have been
ordered by Damascus to harden their positions, now that there
are signs that 19-11 might actually be accepted by the March
14 politicians. Berri's abandonment of his long-standing
position about accepting the Patriarch's choice for president
might also be linked to realization that, against all
expectations, the Patriarch might actually give a name.


14. (C) Meeting with the Ambassador and DCM on June 13,
Minister of Information Ghazi Aridi -- traditionally the most
"pro-Syrian" and "pro-Hizballah" of Walid Jumblatt's
advisors, with close contacts and friends in the March 8 camp
-- told us that he finds the Berri-Hizballah hardened
position as evidence that Damascus does not want a solution

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to Lebanon's cabinet crisis. Damascus, Aridi claims, will
permit only two options for Lebanon: either chaos or a
president of Damascus' choosing. Damascus hopes to use the
upcoming presidential elections and the fear of chaos in
order to force the United States to renew engagement with
Syria. As for his old friend the Speaker, Aridi said that
Berri no longer exists: he has become simply a mouthpiece
for Syrian orders.
FELTMAN