LEBANON: GEAGEA URGES DEAL ON PRESIDENCY, PRESSURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000837

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: GEAGEA URGES DEAL ON PRESIDENCY, PRESSURE
ON LAHOUD TO AVOID DUAL GOVERNMENT


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) In a June 8 meeting with the Ambassador, Lebanese
Forces leader Dr. Samir Geagea said the key to resolving
Lebanon's political crisis is the presidency, suggesting that
a deal over President Lahoud's replacement is possible if the
Saudis exert their influence with Parliament Speaker Nabih
Berri. Geagea advocated both carrots and sticks in
pressuring Lahoud not to create a second government. While
eager to form a national unity government, Geagea said
cabinet expansion is not a top priority at this time. He was
not enthusiastic about the French initiative to host a
National Dialogue. Despite what Geagea viewed as Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF) reluctance to fight to the end in Nahr
al-Barid, he expected operations to be completed within two
to three days. End summary.


2. (C) Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met with
Christian Forces leader Dr. Samir Geagea in his heavily
fortified residence in Bzummar on June 8. Geagea was
accompanied by his Foreign Affairs Advisors Elie Khoury and
Joseph Nehmeh.

FOCUSING ON PRESIDENCY
--------------


3. (C) Geagea stressed the need instead to concentrate on the
presidency now in order to avoid a second government and
resolve the issue of cabinet expansion. The worse case
scenario would be confrontation with Lahoud. He suggested
that a deal was possible if the Saudis used their influence
with Berri. Berri favors (and March 14 would also accept) MP
Boutros Harb as a presidential candidate, he claimed, but
would need help overcoming Hizballah's objections. The
Saudis, who have a good relationship with Berri, could
provide the necessary "umbrella" to protect him against
Hizballah, he argued, but it would have to be done quickly.
The Ambassador agreed to encourage Saudi Ambassador Abdulaziz
Khoja to meet with Geagea to discuss the idea. The
Ambassador also stressed the need to secure Christian support
for any presidential candidate to avoid giving Free Patriotic
Movement leader General Michel Aoun an excuse to reject the
deal and rebuild his popularity based on a shared sense of
victimhood. Geagea replied that Lebanese Forces would help
manage Harb's campaign and that Patriarch Sfeir has ideas on
the subject as well. If we can solve the Berri problem via a
Harb presidency, he repeated, it would be a "great
achievement."


4. (C) Geagea said that former MP Nassib Lahoud would also be
an acceptable candidate to Lebanese Forces, though detested
by both Hizballah and Berri because they believe (falsely)
that he is associated with Hariri. Neither Nassib nor Harb
would "go astray strategically." Geagea noted that Berri is
also looking at Jean Obeid. The Ambassador responded that an
Obeid presidency would be a gift to Lahoud. Because it would
be based on agreement among the Muslim parties, Aoun would
claim he had been isolated and the Christians would feel
betrayed. Furthermore, the Ambassador stressed, Obeid would
have to prove to the US that he is able to work independently
of Hizballah. Geagea said that he considered Minister of
Justice Charles Rizk a distance third possibility, after Harb
and Nassib Lahoud.

LAHOUD NEEDS INCENTIVES NOT TO FORM A DUAL GOVERNMENT
-------------- --------------


5. (C) The Ambassador expressed US concern that, under a
two-government scenario, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and
others would argue that they need to talk to the second
government, thereby suggesting than an inherently illegal
government has some legitimacy. Suggesting that Defense
Minister Elias Murr probably would assume the same role in a
second government, Geagea stressed the importance of stopping
Lahoud from taking steps to form a second government before
he starts. Though not necessarily pro-carrot, Geagea said he
had been thinking about positive incentives to deter him.
Noting that the President's mandate is over in four to five
months, Geagea argued that any moves that would allow Lahoud
to finish his mandate and be assured of political asylum
(rumors are that Lahoud is preparing to go to Qatar) would
alleviate many of the fears that would otherwise induce him
to form a separate government. Geagea agreed with the

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Ambassador's suggestion that negative incentives would also
be useful. Both carrots and sticks are needed, Geagea said,
but the emphasis first should be on carrots -- with vague
hints of later sticks -- to avoid a confrontation with
Lahoud.


6. (C) Geagea dismissed the Ambassador's suggestion that fear
of Syria was motivating Lahoud, arguing that after his
presidential mandate expires he can easily go to the US or
other places where the Syrians can't get him. "Fear of a
Syrian bullet is not what his driving him," he said. Geagea
agreed, however, with the Ambassador's observation that
Lahoud was nervous about legal actions against him once he
leaves office, adding that the GOL is preparing a criminal
lawsuit for the death of a tortured detainee under Lahoud's
command of the LAF, in addition to corruption charges.

RESERVATIONS ON FRENCH INITIATIVE TO HOST NATIONAL DIALOGUE
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Noting that France had not yet approached him on its
proposal to host a National Dialogue, Geagea said it was his
understanding that the idea was to invite the 14
personalities previously involved in the Dialogue plus
unspecified others. In response to the Ambassador's concern
that France's hosting the meeting would send a signal that
Paris viewed all of Lebanon's political parties equally,
Geagea observed that President Sarkozy had already made a
statement to that effect earlier that day. In any case,
Geagea did not expect Future Movement leader Saad Hariri to
accept France's invitation and said he would tell the French
later that day that Lebanese Forces can not accept the
invitation unless it mirrors the National Dialogue formula.
Geagea further stated he could not accept Berri to head the
Dialogue, as currently his only role is leader of Amal and
not Parliament Speaker because of his refusal to convene
parliament. Patriarch Sfeir would be more appropriate, he
said.


8. (C) Geagea advocated a "solution riche" to forming a
national unity government, dismissing talks of 19 11 and
other formula for cabinet expansion as "tactics." His main
concern was to get Hizballah and Amal on board, with
appropriate guarantees for March 14. Stating that the US has
better relations with Berri, Geagea pressed the Ambassador to
help with Amal. He agreed with the Ambassador's assertion
that Siniora's resignation is a red line.


9. (C) Geagea stated that because Lebanese Forces has no
influence with the two Shia parties, it was left with Free
Patriotic Movement leader General Michel Aoun, whose eye is
fixed on the presidency. Unfortunately Aoun sought to gain
from any developments, such as a second government or
Hizballah coup, that would create chaos to further his
presidential ambitions. Khoury added that Aoun was counting
on a deal with Hariri that he had discussed with the French
to achieve his goal.

LAF NEARING THE END IN NAHR AL-BARID
--------------


10. (C) Geagea said the LAF hoped to finish its operations
in the Nahr al-Barid camp in two to three days. He opined
that the Commander in Chief Michel Sleiman's reluctance to
fight to the end had diluted the LAF's potential. The LAF
should have used the momentum gained after the first two days
of fighting to finish the job. Instead, he explained, the
LAF had been pushed into the confrontation first by Fatah
al-Islam (FAI),then by the GOL and, most importantly, public
opinion that demanded an end to the extremists.
Nevertheless, the LAF was experiencing maximum cohesiveness:
all of the Shia have ignored Hizballah leader Nasrallah's
hints that they should not enter the camp, and the Sunnis are
the most eager to fight FAI. Geagea disagreed with the
Ambassador's suggestion that a victory at Nahr al-Barid would
boost LAF Commander Michel Sleiman's presidential
aspirations, arguing that Sleiman was not immediately
interested in politics and was not actively pursuing the
presidency, though he conceded this might change once Sleiman
finishes his military career.
FELTMAN