LEBANON: FRENCH AMBASSADOR TRIES TO DOWNPLAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000831

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM LE SY FR
SUBJECT: LEBANON: FRENCH AMBASSADOR TRIES TO DOWNPLAY
KOUCHNER'S DIALOGUE PROPOSAL, SEEKS WAYS TO REDUCE
POTENTAIL DAMAGE

REF: PARIS 2405

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C/NF) In a 6/9 meeting with French Ambassador Bernard
Emie, Ambassador Feltman registered strong concern about the
proposal by French Foreign Minister Kouchner to host Lebanese
political and civil society figures to a national dialogue in
France in late June. Emie (please protect throughout)
indicated that he, too, questioned the idea but had no choice
but to follow insructions. There will be some kind of
meeting in France, he reported, for "second-tier leaders."
Confiding that some in Paris wanted to go so far as to invite
President Emile Lahoud to send a representative, Emie said
that he would attempt to use the 6/10-12 visit of French
special envoy Jean-Claude Cousseran to lower expectations and
restrict the invitation list. Emie welcomed the Ambassador's
suggestion that, if this misguided idea was to be pursued,
then some link be found to the Lebanese National Dialogue, as
a good excuse to limit participation. The Ambassador talked
to several March 14 figures who, while unhappy about the
French initiative, feel they have no choice but to go along.
They expressed support for the idea of using the existing
National Dialogue decisions as a launching point for
discussions. End summary.

EMIE HEARS USG CONCERNS
--------------


2. (C) Meeting with Emie on 6/9, Ambassador Feltman
expressed deep concern about the Kouchner proposal to invite
Lebanese political and civil society leaders for a 48-hour
dialogue session in France in late June. While the gabfest
may not aim at tangible results, perceptions can be deeply
damaging. Asked by Emie to elaborate, the Ambassador noted
the following: First, the March 8-Aoun bloc has already
trumpeted victory, saying that the French initiative
demonstrates that post-Chirac France has "corrected" its
policy by adopting an even-handed approach to Lebanon.
Second, by hosting such an event, France suggests that it
sees as equally valid the pro-independence views of March 14
and the pro-Syrian views of March 8. Third, by appearing to
move away from the long-standing and successful cooperation
with the USG on Lebanon, France is leaving Siniora and his
cabinet more exposed to charges of being American agents.
Fourth, the initiatives makes it appear as though schisms are
developing between French and U.S. positions; the pro-Syrians
will exploit this perception to promote public doubts.
Fifth, if the rumors about the guest list are true, France is
inexplicably reviving the political fortunes of discredited
Syrian agents like Suleiman Franjieh and Talal Arslan.
Sixth, France has put March 14 and GOL leaders in an awkward
position: March 14 and GOL figures tell us that they hate
the French idea, but, if they say no while the March 8-Aoun
bloc embraces the idea, Kouchner will view March 14/GOL
figures as unhelpful and March 8-Aoun leaders as friendly.
Seventh, the Lebanese leaders already declined Saudi Arabia's
invitation to host dialogue sessions, so France is now making
a problem for the Sunnis with Riyadh. Eighth, the Lebanese
are notorious for transferring decision making to outsiders,
and France is now providing an easy opportunity for them to
evade their own responsibilities. Ninth, the
French-sponsored talks could inadvertently become the new
floor for discussion, sweeping away useful precedents such as
Siniora's 7 points, UNSCR 1701, and so on.

EMIE INSISTS FRENCH POSITION UNCHANGED,
EVEN IF NEW TEAM PURSUES NEW TACTICS
--------------


3. (C/NF) Emie took notes and said that he would convey the
Ambassador's concerns to Paris. France and the United States
"are not drifting apart," he insisted. But "you are sending
a confused message," he said, referring the visit of Speaker
Pelosi to Damascus in April and Secretary Rice's meeting with
Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Mu'allim in Sharm ash-Sheikh in
May. Washington also needs to understand that the new team
in Paris is doing what all new teams do: "they think they
know best" and want to show different tactics than those

BEIRUT 00000831 002 OF 004


followed by their predecessors. "Every administration thinks
it is more clever than the last." But at its core,
French-U.S. cooperation on Lebanon remains solid. Emie
referred to the importance of Jean-David Levitte in Sarkozy's
inner circle to reinforce his point about "no evolution" in
French policy toward Lebanon. "Sincerely, I don't perceive a
shift," he said, noting that Kouchner's public comments
during his Lebanon trip "could not have been more supportive"
of the March 14/GOL positions. "Frankly, I am disappointed
by our (March 14) friends. They should know better (than to
doubt)."


4. (C/NF) Adding that "this is not for your report," Emie
(please protect throughout) acknowledged that "this may not
be the most brilliant idea ever of French foreign policy."
Kouchner, Emie said, "still thinks he is just Bernard
Kouchner," someone who has known Lebanon and Lebanese
politicians for decades. He does not realize that, as French
foreign minister, his role must be different. Emie agreed
with the Ambassador that the distinction that Kouchner is
hosting the event in his personal capacity is a subtlety that
will be lost on the Lebanese. But, Emie emphasized, the
event will happen. Emie is under instructions to support it.
Emie said that he would try to "downplay" the event. The
Ambassador noted that, in media-frenzied Lebanon, the arrival
of a senior French envoy, Ambassador Jean-Claude Cousseran,
for consultations 6/10-12 would hardly enable Emie to lower
expectations. "I guess you are right," Emie conceded.
(Comment: We had the impression that the "personal capacity"
descriptions and the "downplay" remarks were lame attempts to
reassure us rather than influence the Lebanese perceptions.
End comment.)

KOUCHNER WANTS TO USE HIS CONNECTIONS
TO FACILITATE INTRA-LEBANESE COMMUNICATION
--------------


5. (C) Emie said that, while the Kouchner initiative "may
be difficult to explain," it is easier to explain what it is
not. France does not intend to transfer Lebanon's (now
suspended) National Dialogue process to Paris. France is not
hosting a regional meeting. France does not want to supplant
Saudi Arabia, which, as in the Taif accord, would probably be
the location where any deal among Lebanese politicians would
be finalized and announced. Unlike the January Paris III,
this is not an international conference on Lebanon. But
France believes that the passage of UNSCR 1757 and the
establishment of the Special Tribunal on Lebanon "opens a new
chapter." It is important for the Lebanese leaders to resume
the communications between them. Kouchner wants to use his
personal connections to Lebanon and his knowledge of the
players to facilitate the contacts among the Lebanese. Maybe
it is best to think of the initiative "as an informal
workshop or a roundtable or a seminar or whatever, nothing
else."

EMIE HOPES TO LIMIT PARTICIPATION
TO DIALOGUE, CIVIL SOCIETY REPRESENTATIVES
--------------


6. (C) Responding to Emie's comment that there will be "no
agenda," the Ambassador asked how a 48-hour workshop would be
organized. Surely there will have to be some kind of script.
Emie said that he expected that people will be invited to
give their thoughts on how to "strengthen the role of the
state." Asked about the list of anticipated guests, Emie
said that it remained a work in progress. The guests would
be "second-tier" political figures and civil society
representatives. It was not true, he insisted, that
decisions had been taken to invite Suleiman Franjieh and
Talal Arslan. Emie's idea was to limit the participation to
representatives of the 14 leaders who had been at the main
table in the National Dialogue as well as people he described
as civil society "facilitators" who are mostly well known to
Kouchner. In that category, Emie mentioned Ziad Barroud,
Ibrahim Shemsiddine, Kamal Muhenna, and Mohammed Sammak.

BUT PARIS HAS SOME "STRANGE IDEAS" FOR GUEST LIST
--------------


7. (C/NF) Pressed by the Ambassador, Emie acknowledged that
such a guest list was his proposal only. Paris, he said, has

BEIRUT 00000831 003 OF 004


some "strange ideas." Indeed, some in Kouchner's circle had
talked about Franjieh and Arslan. Someone had even suggested
that President Emile Lahoud be invited to send a
representative, Emie confided (asking that such thoughts not
be shared with Washington). While saying that he was "fed
up," Emie said that he was confident that people like Lahoud,
Arslan, and Franjieh ultimately would not get invitations.
Jean-Claude Cousseran would "see everybody in town," and Emie
would use Cousseran's visit to narrow down the list of
potential invitees to "something that makes sense." The
Ambassador noted that there is huge difference between a
credible civil society representative such as Ziad Barroud
and Ali Khassan Khalil, whom Emie mentioned as the likely
representative of Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and who is
nothing except a Syrian agent and Syrian liaison with Berri.
"What can I do," Emie said.

LINKING FRENCH INITIATIVE
TO NATIONAL DIALOGUE DECISIONS
--------------


8. (C) Noting that he was sharing only his personal views,
the Ambassador suggested to Emie that he work with Cousseran
on parameters for the initiative that would by definition
limit the participation to representatives of the 14 National
Dialogue leaders and the civil society facilitators. For
example, the Ambassador noted, the 2006 National Dialogue
session came to four decisions (disarming the Palestinians
outside the refugee camps, establishing good relations based
on mutual respect with Syria, working with Syria to demarcate
the common border, and establishing the Special Tribunal).
With the Nahr al-Barid fight presumably over by the time of
the French initiative, maybe the participants could discuss
how to implement the National Dialogue decision on disarming
the Palestinians outside the camps.


9. (C) Such an approach, the Ambassador said, would limit
the participation in the way Emie prefers while also
reinforcing, rather than undermining, an important decision
already taken by Lebanon's political leaders. Politically,
even if in the aftermath of Nahr al-Barid the pro-Syrians
don't want to see further LAF action, it would be hard for
people to come out against such a focus: the Lebanese public
want to see the Palestinian military bases dismantled. And,
in the unlikely event that a consensus did emerge about
action to take against the Palestinian military bases outside
the refugee camps, the French will have done a real service
for the Lebanese state. Emie said that he liked the idea
"very much" and would share it with Cousseran.


9. (C) Subsequently, the Ambassador shared his idea --
again, emphasizing that he was sharing his personal ideas,
not a USG official position -- with Senior Advisor to the PM
Mohammed Chatah, MP Saad Hariri, Druse leader Walid Jumblatt,
and Minister of Communications (allied with Jumblatt) Marwan
Hamadeh. All thought that, if the French initiative must for
forward, a focus on how to implement the National Dialogue
decisions taken a year ago made sense. We conveyed that back
by phone to Emie, who expressed hope that March 14 and GOL
leaders would make that point to Cousseran. All groused that
they were being cornered into accepting the French invitation
to send representatives. Hamadeh noted that, if the
Americans are unhappy about now being consulted, "imagine how
we feel."

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) For all the reasons cited in the second paragraph
above, Kouchner's initiative is ill advised and has the
potential to result in misperceptions with damaging political
repercussions here. But, short of the kind of major security
calamity in Lebanon that none of us wishes to see, we do not
envision any way to dissuade the French from proceeding. The
initiative has already been announced publicly, and Cousseran
arrives today. Thus, in our view, our best approach is to
try to steer the French in the most constructive direction
possible.


11. (C) As we said privately to Emie, it strikes us that
the unimplemented decisions of the March-July 2006 National
Dialogue are potentially a good starting point for the French

BEIRUT 00000831 004 OF 004


discussions. By linking the discussions to the National
Dialogue, people like Lahoud, Franjieh, and Arslan are
automatically excluded. And the participation of those March
8-Aoun representatives who will be invited derives not from a
"correction" in French foreign policy but rather from a 2006
Lebanese decision. (Per Emie's idea, Kouchner can still add
some of his civil society friends as "facilitators.")
Moreover, in light of the dramatic events of Nahr al-Barid,
this may, in fact, be the right time for the Lebanese to
think seriously about how to dismantle the Palestinian
military bases outside of the refugee camps. At a minimum,
making reference to the 2006 National Dialogue reinforces
rather than undermines the useful decisions already taken by
the Lebanese themselves. (It would be even better for the
French to invite participants on the basis on how to
implement the Lebanese obligations in UNSCR 1701 or how to
secure the Lebanese-Syrian border, as such an invitation
would undoubtedly kill the initiative: Hizballah and
probably some others wouldn't go. But France would surely
not buy this approach.)


12. (C) Even if it is unrealistic to think that the French
initiative could result in a consensus behind specific
approaches regarding Palestinian arms, encouraging the French
to move in this direction should limit the potential damage
of this initiative: even the Hizballah representative,
mindful of Lebanese public opinion, will have to pay lip
service to the need to disarm the Palestinians. While we
should not say this in advance for fear of spooking the
French, if we can persuade them to focus their initiative on
the National Dialogue's decisions on Palestinian arms, the
initiative might in the end result in giving us some good
ideas or at least good statements that are consistent with
the need for UNSCR 1559 implementation. We will talk with
March 14 leaders today (Sunday) who will see Cousseran, in
hopes that they can promote a constructive approach.
FELTMAN