LEBANON: MITRI MOVING AHEAD ON TRIBUNAL, NEW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000817

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MITRI MOVING AHEAD ON TRIBUNAL, NEW
GOVERNMENT MAY HAVE TO "RE-AGREE" ON NATIONAL DECISIONS


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Sections 1.4 (b
) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Acting Foreign Minister Mitri in a 6/4 meeting with IO
A/S Silverberg and the Ambassador thanked the U.S. for its
efforts to pass the tribunal and pledged quick Lebanese
action to establish it. Mitri did not advocate expanding
UNIFIL's mandate, but saw no obstacle to renewing the current
mandate and improving border control through additional
international assistance. Mitri is optimistic that the GOL
will emerge stronger from the current conflict with Fatah
al-Islam, and use that victory to hold the opposition to
previous, nationally agreed policies. Looking ahead to a
political solution, Mitri commented that March 14 is talking
about whether and when to form a national unity government,
but worried that a new government would have to "re-agree" on
previous decisions regarding disarment and relations with
Syria. Finally, Mitri expressed frustration that he was
pulled aside for secondary inspection during his entry and
exit to the U.S., and asked us whether he had been "listed."
End Summary.

PROGRESSING
ON TRIBUBAL
--------------


2. (C) Minister of Culture and Acting Foreign Minister Tariq
Mitri in a 6/4 meeting with A/S Silverberg and the Ambassador
told us that his visit to New York had gone well, and
expressed appreciation for the USUN's efforts to convince
several states not to oppose the tribunal. The next
challenge, A/S Silverberg reminded Mitri, will be to ensure
quick Lebanese and UN action in forming the tribunal, by
identifying prosecutors, international and Lebanese judges,
and a venue. Mitri expressed frustration that SYG Ban had
personally disengaged from the issue -- Ban referred Mitri to
Nicolas Michel for all further contact on the tribunal ---
and had discouraged Mitri's suggestion that UN staff commit
themselves, along with the Lebanese, to a calendar or a
sequential series of steps needed to get the tribunal up and
running. Mitri was confident that even formation of a
national unity government (NUG) would not prevent the
Lebanese government from completing its preparations.


3. (C) Mitri preferred that the UN remain engaged on
approaching various European capitals to discreetly find a
venue for the tribunal; the Hague has already said that it is
not willing to host, but Mitri praised Geneva and Stockholm
for the air of impartiality and neutrality they would impart
to the tribunal. Mitri told us that the March 14 group has
never formally discussed the venue for the tribunal, and
expressed surprise that Walid Jumblatt over the weekend
disparaged Cyprus as not secure. Mitri, in contrast,
believes Cyprus's location is convenient, making it easy for
judges to visit their families and for the prosecutors to
bring witnesses. Cyprus also has a relatively good
day-to-day security environment, Mitri commented, although he
expressed concern about the activities of various active
foreign intelligence services there.


4. (C) Mitri resisted A/S Silverberg's urging that the GOL
announce its 12 candidates for the four Lebanese judge
postions now, so that the Lebanese judges can be appointed at
the same early date as the three international judges. Mitri
argued that Lebanon should announce its candidates just a
week ahead of the UN's selection in order to best provide
security to the candidates; the UN has said it cannot protect
candidates, only appointees, but the Lebanese will face
security risks even if not chosen. Lebanon could provide a
list of 12 names today, Mitri argued, but it will be hard to
find competent candidates with integrity willing to face the
security risks of serving on the tribunal. Mitri agreed to
begin quietly testing the waters with candidates with the
requisite qualifications currently in Lebanon and living
overseas. It is not necessary to appoint a prosecutor
general first, Mitri and Silverberg agreed, although he could
begin work earlier than the judges.

UNIFIL EXTENSION
PREFERABLE TO EXPANSION
--------------


5. (C) Mitri did not believe it advisable to seek Lebanese

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support for expanding UNIFIL's mandate, although he sees no
obstacle to renewing the current mandate for another year;
even in a NUG, Hizballah would not oppose renewal. Fatah
al-Islam's accusation on 6/3 that UNIFIL troops were fighting
alongside the Lebanese army highlights the fact that Lebanon
cannot ask UNIFIL to deploy north of the Litani River. The
need of troop contributors such as Italy and France for
constant reassurance by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is
strange and calls into question the efficacy of UNIFIL; if
the army was strong enough to protect the country it wouldn't
need UNIFIL there in the first place. Any possible extension
will have to involve serious discussions with the Italians,
French, and others "who compete in their caution," Mitri
joked.


6. (C) Mitri argued instead that it would less risky to
control arms smuggling through other means, such as
increasing bilateral assistance, sending more UN assessment
missions, using sanctions and warnings against supplier
nations, or extending the northern border pilot program.
Lebanon is making efforts to control the border, Mitri
argued, and instead of blaming Lebanon for not sealing the
border the international community should use UNSCR 1701 to
hold other states responsible for arms smuggling. He hoped
that the UN border monitoring group's report would help the
international community increase assistance.

RESTARTING DIALOGUE
ON PALESTINIAN ARMS
--------------


7. (C) Mitri is optimistic that the GOL and the army will
emerge from the conflict with Fatah al-Islam (FAI) with
greater credibility. He envisions the governing March 14
group to use a victory Nahr el-Barid to hold the opposition
to implementation of nationally agreed points. First, Mitri
tied the issue of FAI's well-armed battle with the LAF to the
issue of smuggling. Where did more than 300 FAI fighters
come from, and why are they better armed than the army, Mitri
asked? This bolsters the majority's case for better
controlling the border. Second, an LAF victor will make it
harder for the opposition to resist the agreed national
dialogue objective of disarming Palestinians outside the
camps. There can be no action to disarm the Palestinians
without national consensus, Mitri noted.

HIZBALLAH BETWEEN
DAMASCUS AND TEHRAN
--------------


8. (C) Mitri observed an apparent split between Iranian and
Syrian demands of Hizballah and wondered whether Hizballah
will side with Syrian-supplied militants inside the camps or
instead support the army to maintain its objectives of civil
peace and strong public support. Hizballah has not expressed
strong support for the army despite good relations between
the two entities; the army has at times been closer to the
opposition than to the majority, Mitri confided.

NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT
WILL REQUIRE RE-AGREEMENT
--------------


9. (C) Looking ahead to a political solution, Mitri commented
that the Syrians are looking for an excuse to form a second
government, so the GOL can only hope that the opposition is
now ready to accept the blocking minority that it wanted
earlier. There are some preparations underway to establish a
NUG, Mitri admitted gradually, including his own discussions
with Siniora, and Berri's statement on June 4 that the
opposition would accept either Siniora's resignation or a
blocking minority. However, when Prime Minister Siniora
hinted at a NUG on Saturday the opposition reacted by
demanding that he resign. Mitri admitted that the Lebanese
population and the Saudis and French are all urging him to
form a NUG. He worried that Michel Aoun is "in presidential
mode," and might not accept an offer of just 5-6 ministers.


10. (C) Mitri wondered how much time Lebanon has before Syria
urges Lahoud to appoint a second government, and wondered out
loud if March 14 could wait a little longer, at least until
after the tribunal is officially created on June 10, and
until the GOL has gained strength from a clear LAF victory in
Nahr al-Barid. Lebanese politicians are greedy for even a
few months, Mitri commented; but he acknowledged that
moderate citizens who support the government have lost

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patience, while Hizballah and Aoun supporters remain adamant.


11. (C) Mitri commented that formation of a NUG would require
the expanded GOL to "re-agree" on issues already agreed on,
including the national dialogue commitment to disarm
Palestinians outside the camps, the decision to delineate the
border and establish diplomatic ties to Syria, and last
summer's 7-point plan. Mitri hoped that once Aoun is inside
the government his ministers might vote differently from
Hizballah on some issues, which might create a different
dynamic.

U.S. IMMIGRATION SECURITY
--------------


12. (C) On a personal note, Mitri expressed frustration at
what he described as the disrespectful treatment he received
when entering and exiting the United States for
tribunal-related discussions the previous week. On his last
few official trips to New York Mitri has been pulled aside
after immigration officials swiped his diplomatic passport,
prompting him to believe that he has been "listed" as suspect
for some reason. This time, as he was departing for Beirut,
he was pulled aside for a secondary search and treated so
rudely by the TSA examiner that his Air France escort
objected to TSA. (Comment: While we suspect the secondary
search was related to Mitri's travel destination, we are not
aware of any reason that he should have been consistently
pulled aside by immigration upon entry. The other Lebanese
officials traveling with him were not pulled aside; he seemed
particularly miffed, given that he outranks the others. We
also wonder whether Mitri has inadvertently been "listed,"
and if so on what basis. End Comment.)
FELTMAN