LEBANON: A/S SILVERBERG MEETS WITH PM SINIORA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000805

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2017
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: A/S SILVERBERG MEETS WITH PM SINIORA


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b)
.

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) On 6/5, PM Siniora informed A/S Silverberg that LAF
operations against Fatah al-Islam terrorists cornered in the
Nahr al-Barid refugee camp were proceeding according to plan
and that only two outcomes were acceptable: surrender to
Lebanese justice, or elimination. Siniora agreed with the
A/S that Lebanon and its friends should move quickly to
follow up on the success of UNSCR 1757, specifically noting
that Lebanon's Ministry of Justice was already "sifting"
thorough candidates for both the tribunal's judges and
assistant prosecutor. Concerning site selection, Siniora
believed that both Cyprus and Malta presented security
concerns, and implied that a site on mainland Europe would
work best. With regard to finances, the Prime Minister said
it would be difficult to reprogram Lebanon's already scant
resources without parliamentary approval, but that he would
do all he could to contribute Lebanon's fair share for the
operation of the court. Finally, Siniora -- predictably --
made a very serious plea for the U.S. to move forward on
Shebaa Farms, cautioning that an absence of movement on this
key issue would make progress on other critical objectives
exceedingly difficult. End summary.


2. (C) Prime Minister Fouad Siniora met with Assistant
Secretary for International Organizations Kristen Silverberg

SIPDIS
and the Ambassador at his offices in the Grand Serail on the
afternoon of June 5. Senior advisor and former Ambassador
Mohamed Chatah, Ambassador-designate Antoine Chedid, and
advisor Rola Nouraddine attended the meeting, as well as the
Embassy's Public Affairs Officer, Special Assistant, and
newly-arrived Pol/Econ Chief. Although still
heavily-fortified, elements of LAF's elite air assault
regiment which has been guarding the Prime Minister and his
cabinet since last November have been reassigned to join the
forces engaged at the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp outside of
Tripoli. Despite this temporary reassignment of troops, the
Serail palace still appears very well protected but by the
Internal Security Forces (ISF) national police, not LAF.

CONSOLIDATING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF 1757
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3. (C) A/S Silverberg emphasized to the Prime Minster the
need to maintain the political momentum of UNSCR 1757 and
move quickly in three areas: tribunal site selection,
financing, and the selection of judges. PM Siniora agreed
completely with this assessment and said he has been in touch
with UNSYG Ban Ki-moon twice since last Wednesday's action in
the Security Council. Siniora said the UNSYG is keen to move
forward with all possible speed as well, and that the
Government of Lebanon intends to use whatever resources it
has to help establish the tribunal.


4. (C) Concerning site selection, Siniora expressed unease
over placing the tribunal in either Cyprus or Malta. He said
that Syrian intelligence has numerous assets in Cyprus, while
the security of establishing the court in Malta may be
compromised as well, but by Libyan agents. Siniora indicated
that placing the new tribunal in a secure European city would
be preferable.


5. (C) Since the UN-Lebanon Special Tribunal Agreement
calls for 12 Lebanese candidates to be submitted to the UN
selection process for the positions of tribunal judges and
assistant prosecutor, Siniora said his Ministry of Justice
was already compiling lists of appropriate jurists for
consideration. Interestingly, he said that well-respected
Justice Choukri Sader would probably not be one of those
nominated because his expertise rests with administrative,
vice criminal, law. But he added that Justice Ralph Riachy,
who along with Justice Sader has worked closely with OLA
Chief Nicolas Michel for the past year, would be a prime
judicial candidate. One of the leading candidates for the
assistant prosecutor position would be the ministry's liaison
with UNIIIC, Justice Joyce Tabet. PM Siniora indicated the
identification and vetting process was now Minister Charles
Rizk's top priority.


6. (C) Finally, Siniora acknowledged the need to identify
Lebanese funding for at least part of the tribunal's initial

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budget. The Prime Minister confided that Speaker Berri's
continued closure of parliament was making it difficult to
reprogram funds, but he assured A/S Silverberg a way would be
found, perhaps drawing on some discretionary funds built into
the budget. He reiterated his government's commitment to do
all in its power to quickly and smoothly establish the
long-sought court, because the closer it came to reality, the
more effective it would be in curbing Syria's continuing
aggression toward its neighbor.

ARMS SMUGGLING AND BORDER SECURITY
--------------


7. (C) A/S Silverberg asked Siniora for
politically-feasible initiatives that could tighten Lebanon's
still-porous border with Syria. When asked his opinion
regarding a possible push to strengthen UNIFIL's mandate when
it comes up for renewal in August, Siniora urged the U.S. to
consider the possible consequences. Siniora said that in its
present "cornered" state, Syria could conceivably view a
deployment of UNIFIL troops to the eastern border as
tantamount to an act of war by Lebanon. The Prime Minster
maintained that the very fact the UNSYG has sent a "border
assessment mission" to Lebanon is, at least for now,
sufficient warning to Syria to conform to international
norms. When the Ambassador pointed out that recent
cross-border weapons smuggling by Syria was actually worse
than even a month ago, Siniora argued that it was a clear
sign of Syrian desperation over the deteriorating situation
of their Fatah al-Islam (FAI) proxies in the Nahr al-Barid
refugee camp. The Prime Minster counseled patience and urged
the U.S. to allow the UN assessment team to make its report,
as well as the release of the forthcoming 1701 report in the
Security Council. Siniora made it clear he wanted only a
simple UNIFIL renewal in August, not an expansion of the 1701
mandate.


8. (C) Concerning the UN assessment team, the Ambassador
noted they had not put in a stellar performance in front of
the international donor border security sub-group meeting
last week when they first arrived in Lebanon. In response,
Siniora and his senior advisor, Mohamed Chatah, said they
would shortly be meeting with the UN team, and would express
unambiguously their desire that the team focus on issues that
could lead to 1701 violations, namely, the passage of heavy
weapons across Lebanon's eastern border.


9. (C) According to Siniora, not only would a precipitous
effort to expand UNIFIL's mandate to encompass the Syrian
border not give enough time to allow the 1701 process and the
UN assessment team to do its work, it might also backfire in
that there may not be enough votes in the Security Council to
gain passage. In that case, the success of UNSCR 1757 could
be mitigated. Chatah interjected they would revisit the
issue in a few weeks time: following the 1701 progress
report, the findings of the border assessment team, and
resolution of the situation in Nahr al-Barid (and related
Syrian reactions). In essence, by postponing a change to
UNIFIL's mandate, Siniora was asking the U.S. not to give
Syria an excuse to "lash out."


10. (C) Perhaps to counter-balance his caution regarding
UNIFIL's mandate, the Prime Minister stated that the
German-led Northern Border Pilot Project was progressing
"very well," with full participation by the applicable LAF,
ISF and Customs units. With any luck, he believed the
project would prove itself and be expanded along the entire
325-km length of Lebanon's frontier.

LAF OPERATIONS AT NAHR AL-BARID
--------------


11. (C) PM Siniora conveyed confidence and satisfaction
with LAF's performance at Nahr al-Barid. He proudly claimed
that almost no Palestinian civilians had been injured in the
operation thus far, and using a tactical map to illustrate,
showed how LAF forces were exercising restraint and care to
"surgically" attack FAI extremists, while avoiding those camp
areas where "up to 3,000 refugees" still remained. Siniora
also revealed that, if at all possible, the LAF did not
intend to enter the "old camp," but would concentrate on
"reducing" militant positions in the less cluttered newer
areas. And in order to conserve the general goodwill the
Lebanese public was now demonstrating, Siniora indicated he
was striving to keep LAF casualties as low as tactically

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possible.


12. (C) With regard to reported recent fighting in the Ain
al Helweh refugee camp, located in the southern city of
Sidon, Siniora said it was still localized and his government
was working closely with mainstream PLO leadership to contain
the sporadic firefights. He explained the fighting was one
of the many legacies of the Syrian occupation, when they
consciously divided the Palestinian refugee community, with
the result being numerous sub-groups that were difficult to
control. Siniora argued that besides increased prestige for
the army and the democratic government, one of the best
developments from the recent fighting was a clear sense in
the Palestinian community to begin to re-evaluate their
previous laissez-faire attitude toward armed Palestinian
groups in the camps. Siniora indicated that once the crisis
was past, he would engage with responsible Palestinian
leadership to solve the problem of illegal arms in the camps
once and for all.

SHEBAA FARMS...AND ITS CONSEQUENCES,
ACCORDING TO SINIORA
--------------


13. (C) Turning somber, PM Siniora informed A/S Silverberg
he now believed that "certain indications" concerning Shebaa
Farms given at the end of last summer's conflict "had not
been kept, nor would be." As he has with numerous visiting
senior U.S. officials, Siniora explained that unless movement
on Shebaa occurred soon, it would be "very difficult, if not
impossible" to achieve full implementation of UNSCR 1701, as
well as the highly beneficial effects of GOL's 7 Point plan,
with its eventual promise of normalized relations with Israel
under the terms of the 1949 Armistice Agreement.


14. (C) Stating that "the promise of last July has not been
kept," Siniora said that only the transfer of Shebaa to UN
custodianship would remove the last effective argument that
Hizballah uses to maintain its arms. The Prime Minister
agreed with the A/S that Hizballah would probably raise other
claims, but countered that any such claims would be hollow
and ineffective. But more importantly in Siniora's view, not
only would it disarm Hizballah, but it would demonstrate to
the Arab world that diplomacy works. This in turn would
empower Arab moderates and help turn the tide against the
senselessly destructive policies of Arab extremists. He
argued that so much is at stake, he finds it almost
inconceivable that the West does not move forward quickly on
this critical issue.


15. (C) In response, A/S Silverberg postulated that if
Shebaa was turned over, but Hizballah still defiantly kept
its arms, wouldn't the whole exercise simply empower
Hizballah instead of moderates. And the worst outcome would
be if the UN inadvertantly gives Hizballah justification for
its arms, by declaring Shebaa Lebanese in advance of any
willingness by the Israelis to change the situation on the
ground. But Siniora countered there was no advantage to
stubbornly holding onto what he insisted was a strategically
unimportant piece of land when to allow it to pass into UN
control would set in motion a powerful sequence of events
that would greatly strengthen moderation. Both Siniora and
Mohamed Chatah urged the U.S., not to allow the process to
drift through an interminable delineation process, when a
clean solution was so readily available. By taking Shebaa
out of the argument, Siniora concluded, a remarkably
comprehensive regional solution could be attained that would
deliver critical benefits to Lebanon, Israel, and the forces
of moderation and stability.



16. (U) This cable was not cleared by A/S Silverberg prior
to release.
FELTMAN