BERRI CLAIMS ONLY SINIORA'S RESIGNATION CAN SAVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000769

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM LE SY
SUBJECT: BERRI CLAIMS ONLY SINIORA'S RESIGNATION CAN SAVE
PARLIAMENT; OTHERS LINK THREAT TO TRIBUNAL VOTE

REF: BEIRUT 655

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Conveying a message to the Ambassador on 5/30 via an
aide, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri warned that President
Emile Lahoud plans to announce the dissolution of parliament
in the coming weeks, using a dubious constitutional
interpretation (described reftel). Hinting at fears of
Syrian retribution, Berri's aide said that, while the Speaker
personally opposes the move, he would have no choice but to
go along. To avoid this scenario, Berri asked the Ambassador
to encourage Prime Minister Fouad Siniora to resign by COB
5/31 (i.e., by the end of the parliament's ordinary session),
in order to provoke the automatic convening of parliament
called for by the constitution in the case of a cabinet
resignation. Briefed on Berri's idea, Siniora, like other
March 14 figures (as well as the Ambassador),found the
timing of Berri's push suspicious -- on the day the UNSC was
scheduled to vote on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
Deputy Prime Minister Elias Murr, Lahoud's ex-son-in-law,
claimed that sources inside the Lahoud family insist the
President will sullenly refrain from dissolving parliament
out of fear he could be tried for violating the constitution
once he leaves office. According to Murr's analysis, Berri
probably used the threat of parliamentary dissolution in
order to tell the Syrians he had made one last-ditch effort
to derail the tribunal. On the margins of Codel Leahy's
meeting with Berri on 5/31, the Speaker insisted to the
Ambassador that Siniora's resignation remained the key to a
cabinet solution. March 14 leaders, in contrast, are willing
to contemplate a Siniora resignation as a technical fix, but
only if a new cabinet deal has been worked out to the last
detail -- including acceptance of a renomination of Siniora
as PM. End summary.

BERRI REJECTS LAHOUD'S SIX-PERSON CABINET;
BUT DID LAHOUD CONVINCE THE PATRIARCH?
--------------


2. (C) On 5/29, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri called the
Ambassador to note that Berri's foreign policy advisor Ali
Hamdan would deliver an "important message" on Berri's behalf
to the Ambassador the following morning. When Hamdan
arrived, he told the Ambassador that the 5/29 phone call
Berri received from President Lahoud and Maronite Patriarch
Sfeir (when Lahoud was having lunch with Sfeir) was "very
bad." Berri believes that Lahoud had gone quite a distance
in convincing the Patriarch that a six-member national
salvation cabinet was the best way forward. A six-person
cabinet, in Berri's view, does not work confessionally; the
Druse, with their tiny population, cannot be equal to the
Shia and the Sunnis in the three seats assigned to the
Muslims out of the six. If one seeks a small government, a
ten-person cabinet (with two Shia, two Sunnis, and one Druse
among the Muslim five) might work, but not six. Lahoud,
Hamdan explained (quoting Berri),is clearly thinking along
the lines of a military coup d'etat, for the six-person
cabinet resembles the military council that (theoretically
more than actually) oversees Lebanon's (largely hypothetical)
defense policy. Hamdan explained Berri's view that there are
also echoes in Lahoud's idea to the six-person cabinet
outgoing President Amine Gemayel appointed in 1988, not a
scenario that Lebanon should wish to repeat.

BERRI SAYS LAHOUD WILL
DISSOLVE PARLIAMENT
--------------


3. (C) But even more disturbing than the Sfeir-Lahoud phone
call, Hamdan said, was a message Berri got from the Baabda
Presidential Palace later that evening. Lahoud will move
sometime after June 1 to dissolve the parliament, using a
dubious interpretation of Article 65 in the constitution.
Maybe Lahoud will wait a month or so (in order to avoid
having to call new elections before the expiration of his
term in November -- the constitution's Article 25 requires
new elections within three months of parliament's
dissolution),but he will dismiss the chamber. This will
free him from the responsibility of the parliamentary
consultative process and parliamentary vote of confidence

BEIRUT 00000769 002 OF 004


needed for a new prime minister and new cabinet. (Reftel
explains how Lahoud might twist the constitution into
justifying his dissolution of parliament, despite the clear
language in Article 65 that makes the cabinet responsible for
dissolving parliament at the request of the president.)
Dissolving parliament would be a catastrophe, Berri believes,
and will lead to the two-government scenario everyone fears.

TO AVOID THIS SCENARIO,
SINIORA MUST RESIGN
--------------


4. (C) Thus, Hamdan said that Berri's urgent message
related to how to avoid this scenario. The best way to do so
would be to have parliament convene before the expiration of
its ordinary session on May 31. This removes the pretext,
since Article 65 allows the dissolution of parliament when it
has not met "for no compelling reason" in its ordinary
session. But because now it was too late for the requisite
48-hour notice for a parliamentary session, the only way to
get the parliament to open in time was the automatic opening
that occurs in the case of a cabinet collapse. Thus, Berri,
through Hamdan, solicited the Ambassador's help in convincing
PM Siniora to resign (causing a constitutional fall of the
government) in time that parliament opens automatically
before midnight on 5/31.

BERRI WILL FEEL FORCED
TO GO ALONG WITH DISSOLUTION
--------------


5. (C) The Ambassador asked Hamdan whether Berri thought
Lahoud's move to dissolve parliament would be legal.
"Absolutely not," Hamdan responded. Then it seems fairly
simple to block Lahoud's initiative, the Ambassador
responded. The March 14 MPs -- 70 out of the 128-member
house (now numbering only 127, given Pierre Gemayel's murder)
-- will not accept Lahoud's act. If the Speaker and his bloc
stand with the March 14 majority, MP Michel Aoun will surely
join them, out of embarrassment if not conviction. Even if
Hizballah accepts Lahoud's order as legitimate, if no one
else does, Lahoud just makes himself look even more
irrelevant.


6. (C) Hamdan shook his head. The Speaker, even though he
disagrees with Lahoud's action, will be "forced" to stand
with Lahoud. Pressed on why that would be, Hamdan would only
respond "you know why." The Ambassador asked whether Berri
would really obey a Syrian order to go along with a blatantly
illegal dissolution of the institution he heads, knowing that
he would immediately become as much of an international
pariah as Lahoud is. The Speaker "won't have a choice,"
Hamdan responded. The Ambassador said that he hoped the
Speaker was not the coward Hamdan painted him to be. "Not at
all," Hamdan responded defensively; that is why the Speaker
is asking the Ambassador to help avoid such a scenario
altogether.

TIMING SUSPICIOUS
--------------


7. (C) The Ambassador said that he found the timing of
Berri's message suspicious: twelve hours later, the UNSC
members will gather to vote on the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon. If Siniora resigns, then UNSC members might very
well hesitate, in hopes that a new cabinet might be able to
get parliament to ratify the tribunal agreement. Hamdan
rejected the linkage, saying that Berri had already
internalized the fact that the UNSC would create the
tribunal. He is merely trying to save parliament.


8. (C) Hamdan and the Ambassador then talked of a variety
of scenarios (extended caretaker cabinet, technocratic
replacement cabinet, etc.). The Ambassador said that he
agreed that, in the aftermath of the passage of the Special
Tribunal, it was time once again to focus on the resolving
the cabinet crisis. He would recommend to March 14 leaders
that they consider new initiatives. But he could not
recommend that Siniora resign and remove the legitimacy and
power that March 14 gains through the cabinet, especially
when Lahoud and Berri would remain in place. If Berri really
believes that it is in Lebanon's interest for Siniora to
resign, then he should talk directly to Siniora and the March
14 leaders. Hamdan said that Berri, who has snubbed Siniora

BEIRUT 00000769 003 OF 004


for months, would now be very pleased to meet with Siniora to
discuss any initiatives.


9. (C) The Ambassador separately saw PM Siniora, Minister
of Communications Marwan Hamadeh, Druse leader and MP Walid
Jumblatt, and former MP Ghattas Hariri (close to Saad
Hariri). All four had similar reactions: Berri was making a
last-ditch effort to derail the tribunal. The dramatic news
of Siniora's resignation would surely make some UNSC members
decide that it is better to wait. Hamadeh laughed off the
threat of Lahoud dissolving parliament -- "no one will
recognize (the dismissal)" -- and said that it was not
altogether bad for Berri to be in such an uncomfortable
position. Will Berri really accept losing his position,
Hamadeh mused.

MARCH 14 NEEDS TO TABLE
NEW INITIATIVES TO SOLVE CRISIS
--------------


10. (C) Siniora and the March 14 leaders were receptive to
the Ambassador's idea that, in the aftermath of the
tribunal's adoption, they could not simply continue to say no
to the concept of a national unity cabinet, especially when
the idea in principle sounds so appealing to a large number
of crises-weary Lebanese. They need an initiative to address
the cabinet crisis that is broadly appealing -- and that will
toss the political ball in the March 8-Aoun court. Even if
March 8-Aoun leaders reject the initiative, that's fine, as
long as March 14 leaders present reasonable ideas of
resolving the crisis. They need to look serious and sincere
in trying something.


11. (C) Agreeing, Siniora said that he would call Berri on
May 31 to ask for an appointment to go over in detail his
"17-13" cabinet that would be based on an agreed cabinet
agenda. As for Siniora's resignation, it is something to use
as a technical matter once a solution to the cabinet crisis
is ended, at which point the resignation would simply trigger
implementation of the solution. But the solution, Jumblatt
emphasized, would include returning Siniora as PM. (Later in
the evening, Hamdan called back for Berri, saying that the
Speaker had changed his mind: he would not receive Siniora
yet. We passed that word to the PM.)

MURR BELIEVES LAHOUD
WILL NOT DISSOLVE PARLIAMENT
--------------


12. (C) In a separate May 30 meeting with the Ambassador,
Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Elias Murr had a
slightly different spin on Berri's urgent message to the
Ambassador. Murr, who until last year was married to
Lahoud's daughter Karine (and whose father Michel remains on
good terms with Emile Lahoud),quoted sources from "inside
the family" as saying that, yes, Lahoud definitely wanted to
dissolve parliament. But, ultimately, he came to understand
that he must not do so. His hesitation does not stem from a
sudden, unanticipated injection of decency and sound
leadership but rather out of fear that he could be challenged
in court with breaking the constitution, once he is out of
office and his presidential immunity evaporates. So, for the
wrong reasons, Lahoud came to the right conclusion: he can't
dissolve parliament. Asked why Berri would be so insistent
that is Lahoud's intentions, Murr said that Berri wanted to
frighten the Ambassador and March 14 figures into working
hard to convince Siniora to resign. And he would also use
this tale to report back to the Syrians that he had made a
creative, last-ditch effort to derail the tribunal vote in
New York.


13. (C) While waiting for Codel Leahy to assemble on 5/31,
the Ambassador had a brief conversation on the side with
Speaker Berri. The Ambassador noted the improbability of
Siniora resigning before Berri's suggested deadline of 5/31.
"Never mind," Berri said; "tell him to resign tomorrow, next
week, whenever." Berri insisted that Siniora's resignation
would force people to solve the cabinet crisis, by provoking
mandatory consultations on a new cabinet. The March 14
majority has "nothing to fear," Berri said, as the March 14
majority will again be able to pick the PM of its choice.
The Ambassador argued that it was implausible to believe that
Lahoud would sign a cabinet decree if the cabinet included
Siniora, Minister of Justice Charles Rizk, and Murr again,

BEIRUT 00000769 004 OF 004


yet March 14 leaders wanted all three. "Trust me," Berri
said; "I can help with Lahoud." But Siniora must resign
first.

COMMENT
--------------


14. (C) Ever since the Shia ministers walked out of the
cabinet on November 11, Hizballah and its allies have
demanded that Siniora resign. Defying expectations, Siniora
has survived the cabinet walk-out, the large demonstrations,
the erection of the "tent city" sit-ins, the violent clashes
in January, various security incidents, and so on. Berri's
threat of an impending parliamentary dissolution if Siniora
does not resign is consistent with this pattern of
intimidation against Siniora. We wonder what Lahoud told
Patriarch Sfeir about a Siniora resignation. Sfeir is
believed to see Siniora as untrustworthy, a Sunni politician
who tends to ignore Christian interests. As March 14 leaders
tell us repeatedly, it is an uphill battle to convince Sfeir
that the March 8-Aoun propaganda against Siniora is based on
unfounded rumors. (French Ambassador Emie, on 5/30, showed
us with some alarm an interview with Sfeir in the French
newspaper Le Croix, in which Sfeir said that, as a first step
to resolving Lebanon's woes, the cabinet should be replaced.)



15. (C) As for whether Lahoud is really contemplating the
dissolution of parliament, we do not know whether this is a
serious risk. To even the most casual, non-expert reader of
the Lebanese Constitution, it seems a laughable concept that
Lahoud would attempt to do this without the cabinet.
Unfortunately, if Lahoud, Berri, Hizballah, and the
ever-troublesome Michel Aoun all back such action, the actual
words of the constitution will not matter: the crisis is
suddenly deepened. With the tribunal now behind us, the
point of such a patently absurd and destructive move would be
related to Lahoud's calculation on what to do to advance
Syria's interests in upcoming presidential elections. We
like Murr's reasoning that Lahoud fears subsequent legal
action and hope that we can somehow use that alleged worry to
find ways to discourage Lahoud from moving in the direction
of dissolving parliament and appointing a second cabinet.
FELTMAN