MURR ON NASRALLAH SPEECH: HARMFUL, BUT GOL/LAF

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000746

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2027
TAGS: PTER PREL MOPS PREF MASS LE SY
SUBJECT: MURR ON NASRALLAH SPEECH: HARMFUL, BUT GOL/LAF
STILL DETERMINED TO ATTACK FATAH AL-ISLAM

REF: BEIRUT 743

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) In a 5/26 meeting with the Ambassador, Deputy Prime
Minister and Defense Minister Elias Murr attacked as
"unacceptable" Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah's
televised speech the previous evening. While according to
Murr Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman
also rejected Nasrallah's "red line" prohibition on the LAF
entering Nahr al-Barid camp, Murr said that Nasrallah had
underscored his point by sending Hizballah security chief
Wafiq Safa' to threaten Sleiman. Murr said that, in the
aftermath of Nasrallah's speech, the LAF needs to worry about
a potential split (should the Shia soldiers cite Nasrallah's
red lines in refusing orders to invade the camp),about Sunni
political cover (with Nasrallah suddenly appearing to be
defending Sunnis),and about terrorist attacks elsewhere in
Lebanon (initiated by either Fatah al-Islam or al-Qaida) that
could distract the LAF. Nevertheless, Murr said that the GOL
and LAF remained determined to eliminate Fatah al-Islam from
Nahr al-Barid, with a full-scale attack perhaps to begin in
two or three days. PM Siniora, MP Saad Hariri, and MP Walid
Jumblatt also vowed that their political support for LAF
action remained strong. Separately, the Ambassador met with
UNRWA Commissioner General Karen Abu-Zaid and UNRWA Lebanon
Field Director Richard Cook on 5/26. They estimated that
about 3,000 civilians remain in the camp, trapped by Fatah
al-Islam snipers who refuse to allow the last of their human
shield to depart. End summary.

MURR DESCRIBED NASRALLAH'S SPEECH
AS "HARMFUL BUT NOT FATAL" TO LAF PLANS
--------------


2. (S) Deputy PM and Defense Minister Murr told the
Ambassador on 5/26 that Nasrallah's speech the previous
evening was "harmful but not fatal" to GOL and LAF plans to
fight Fatah al-Islam in the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp. Murr
said that he, PM Siniora, and LAF Commander Michel Sleiman
all agreed that it was "unacceptable" for Nasrallah to be
putting down red lines for what the LAF can and cannot do.
Even MP Michel Aoun is uncomfortable with Nasrallah's stated
prohibition on the LAF entering Nahr al-Barid, Murr said,
noting that Aoun's senior advisor (and son-in-law) Gebran
Bassil had given radio and television comments that no one
can set red lines for the LAF in fighting terror.


3. (S) Murr said that he assumed Nasrallah, "who must hate
Fatah al-Islam as much as I do," had several motivations in
breaking his previous silence on the LAF campaign in the
north. First, Nasrallah is signaling to Fatah al-Islam to
avoid Hizballah and Shia targets if, as Murr expects, Fatah
al-Islam cells elsewhere in Lebanon initiate attacks either
to distract the LAF from Nahr al-Barid or in reaction to LAF
attacks in Nahr al-Barid. Second, Nasrallah must fear that
the LAF might actually win this battle, which would then put
Hizballah in an awkward situation: Hizballah has justified
its arms in part on the argument that Lebanon has a weak
army. If the army wins, then Hizballah's arms become easier
domestically to oppose. Third, "Syria doesn't want Fatah
al-Islam destroyed." Syria, Murr said, probably ordered
Nasrallah to give such a speech.

HIZBALLAH THREATENS SLEIMAN
--------------


4. (S) Murr claimed that Nasrallah, to drive home his
point, had sent Hizballah security chief Wafiq Safa' to see
Sleiman before the speech, warning Sleiman that the speech
would contain important information for him. Safa' returned
to Sleiman again after the speech, to threaten the Commander
that he will never be president and may not survive at all if
he were to order the LAF into Nahr al-Barid. While deeply
offended by Nasrallah's speech and Safa's threats, Sleiman
nevertheless felt it prudent to pass a message back to
Nasrallah that the question of invading Nahr al-Barid is
largely out of his control. He noted that he is under
extreme pressure from Murr and Prime Minister Fouad Siniora,
Murr said, claiming to have a reliable source within

BEIRUT 00000746 002 OF 003


Sleiman's inner circle.

MURR WORRIED ABOUT ATTACKS ELSEWHERE
--------------


5. (S) Despite of all of this, Murr said that he, Siniora,
Sleiman, and the other political and security leaders felt as
compelled as ever to do what it takes to eliminate the Fatah
al-Islam threat from Nahr al-Barid. Still, in light of
Nasrallah's speech, they had three worrisome questions.
First, did Nasrallah use his speech to signal to the Shia
soldiers that they should defy any order to enter the camp,
thus splitting the army? Murr said that he was fairly sure
that the Shia would stay with their units but added that "we
need to watch this." Second, will the pro-Syrian Sunnis
start to split the heretofore Sunni solidarity against Fatah
al-Islam? Nasrallah "cleverly" positioned himself as a
defender of the Sunnis. Murr said that he had told Saad
Hariri that he needed to be "even more aggressive" in
distancing Lebanon's Sunnis from Fatah al-Islam and
maintaining Sunni solidarity as cover for the LAF. Third,
will Fatah al-Islam or its allies set off bombs and launch
attacks elsewhere in Lebanon, that would distract or deter
the LAF from its Nahr al-Barid fight? Murr's tone suggested
that he thought such attacks were inevitable, and he noted
that "we should move quickly before they burn the country."

MURR PREPARED TO ISSUE
INVASION ORDER HIMSELF
--------------


6. (S) Murr said that, at this point, he thought the LAF
would be physically prepared to enter Nahr al-Barid in two or
three days. He said that, ultimately, he would be the one to
give the order, since Sleiman wants deniability. Once the
invasion order is given, then Sleiman would be prepared to
issue the tactical orders. In terms of cabinet approval,
Murr claimed to have worked out with Siniora an arrangement
by which the LAF would start the operation and then the
cabinet would be called into session to give post-facto
blessing. This was, the LAF can preserve the element of
surprise. As he had before (reftel),Murr said that he saw
no other option than to take over the camp, as Fatah al-Islam
fighters will not surrender. He predicted a "tough battle"
with significant casualties on the LAF side. Let us hope, he
said, that more Palestinian civilians can escape before the
fighting begins. Murr repeated his estimate that, once
pro-Syrian Palestinian groups joined Fatah al-Islam fighters,
the LAF would face about 1,000 terrorists inside the camp.

UNRWA ESTIMATES CIVILIANS AT 3,000;
TRAPPED BY SNIPER FIRE
--------------


7. (S) Separately, the Ambassador met on 5/26 with UNRWA
Commissioner General Karen Abu-Zaid and UNRWA's Lebanon Field
Director Richard Cook. They estimated that about 3,000
Palestinian civilians remain in the camp, in horrific
conditions. According to what they are hearing from sources
(including some UNRWA local employees) inside Nahr al-Barid,
the remainder of the residents are essentially trapped: if
they try to leave, they are fired upon by Fatah al-Islam
snipers, who wish to retain a human shield. As for the
discrepancies between UNRWA estimates and the GOL's
considerably higher figures of 6-8,000 residents remaining,
Cook offered two explanations. First, the actual number of
people living in Nahr al-Barid was probably a few thousand
people less than those officially registered. Second, there
are civilians remaining in what are essentially slums
adjacent to the camp but outside its official boundaries.


8. (S) The Ambassador also spoke by phone on 5/27 with PM
Siniora, MP Saad Hariri, and MP Walid Jumblatt. All vowed
that Nasrallah's speech had made them more determined to see
the LAF end the Fatah al-Islam threat in Nahr al-Barid.

COMMENT
--------------


9. (S) A few days ago, the GOL and LAF were not physically
prepared for a full assault against Fatah al-Islam in Nahr
al-Barid. But the political will was there. Soon the GOL
and LAF will be physically prepared (in terms of ammunition,

BEIRUT 00000746 003 OF 003


evacuation of civilians, sufficient troop strengths) -- in
large measure because of the quick USG responsiveness in
delivering and facilitating military assistance at rapid
speed. But, at that point, the worry becomes whether the
political will might have evaporated. Whatever his hope of
protecting the Shia from Fatah al-Islam wrath, Nasrallah was
undoubtedly using his Friday night prime-time speech to sow
political doubts about the wisdom of invading the camp. So
far, his words do not seem to have weakened the determination
of key political and security leaders. Indeed, the fact that
Aoun's senior advisor has publicly distanced the Aounists
from the "red lines" Nasrallah would impose on the LAF
suggests that the speech has backfired a bit politically.


10. (S) But the two or three days Murr claims the LAF still
needs before being able to proceed into the camp is a very
long time in surprise-plagued Lebanon. And if a full-scale
assault inside what is now probably a booby-trapped camp
begins, it is likely to take considerable time and cause
considerable civilian and LAF casualties. This means that
the political will must be sustained well beyond the initial
order to attack. We note that Murr's worries about multiple
attacks elsewhere in the country are shared by others.
During the Ambassador's meeting with Murr, in fact, the
Defense Minister was receiving messages from both LAF and ISF
intelligence warning of potential al-Qaida and Fatah al-Islam
attacks elsewhere in Lebanon. We defer to Embassy Damascus
for analysis of Syrian thinking, but it seems to us that
Bashar al-Asad would be quite satisfied to see multiple
attacks inside Lebanon, just as the LAF contemplates moving
against Fatah al-Islam and as UN Security Council members
prepare to vote on a resolution establishing the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon.
FELTMAN