Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BEIRUT744
2007-05-25 15:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: LAF COMMANDER SEES CRUCIAL MOMENT FOR LAF

Tags:  MARR MOPS PGOV PREL PTER LE 
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RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1152
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000744 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2017
TAGS: MARR MOPS PGOV PREL PTER LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: LAF COMMANDER SEES CRUCIAL MOMENT FOR LAF
IN FIGHT AGAINST FATAH AL-ISLAM


Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section 1.4 (d
).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000744

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2017
TAGS: MARR MOPS PGOV PREL PTER LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: LAF COMMANDER SEES CRUCIAL MOMENT FOR LAF
IN FIGHT AGAINST FATAH AL-ISLAM


Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section 1.4 (d
).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) On May 25, the Ambassador met with Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF) Commander General Michel Sleiman. Sleiman
indicated that it was important for the LAF to succeed in its
fight with Fatah al-Islam at the Nahr el-Bared Palestinian
refugee camp, not only for its own credibility, but for
Lebanon as a nation. He stated that given the militancy of
Fatah al-Islam, there are few options except to go into the
camp and "kill the leaders" of group. He was confident that
the LAF had "wide" support for taking military action in the
camp, but he had doubts about some political leaders who may
use the situation to criticize the LAF as a means of
challenging the Siniora government for their own ends.
Sleiman recognized the strong USG support and expressed his
appreciation for the quick response in providing much needed
5.56mm ammunition to the LAF and for the ongoing USG efforts
to secure 105mm tank rounds and 155mm artillery rounds. End
Summary.

GENERAL SLEIMAN SEES CRUCIAL MOMENT FOR LAF
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by Defense Attache and
Poloff, met with General Michel Sleiman at LAF headquarters
in Yarze on May 25. The Ambassador led off with the
importance that the USG places on LAF success in its battle
against Fatah al-Islam at the Nahr el-Bared camp. The USG
sees the LAF confrontation with Fatah al-Islam not only as a
battle for the sovereignty of Lebanon, but crucial in the
battle against international terrorism. The USG identifies
with the struggle facing the LAF: "your fight is our fight."
The U.S. is showing its support by the rapid delivery of
5.56mm ammunition rounds to reinforce the fighting capability
of the LAF.


3. (C) General Sleiman agreed with the stakes in LAF success

against Fatah al-Islam. He indicated that this is a crucial
time for the credibility of the LAF, which needs be seen as
the main government entity which can maintain security in the
country. He felt that success in the battle with Fatah
al-Islam would determine how the Lebanese public saw the LAF
and Lebanon as a nation. He expressed his appreciation for
the quick response in providing much needed 5.56mm ammunition
to the LAF and for the ongoing USG effort to secure 105mm
tank rounds and 155mm artillery rounds. He recognized the
intense efforts of USG in ensuring that the LAF has the
required munitions and equipment to succeed. (Note: The
first C-17 flight landed at Beirut International Airport
today, delivering approximately $6 million worth of 5.56mm
ammunition. End Note.)

LAF HAS PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR MILITARY ACTION,
BUT DOUBTS SOME POLITICAL LEADER'S INTENTIONS
--------------


4. (C) Sleiman said that in a recent meeting, March 14
leaders indicated their strong support for the LAF to take
military action against Fatah al-Islam in the Nahr el-Bared
camp. He also felt that there was "wide support" among the
Lebanese public. Sleiman confided that his main worry was
that some political leaders might "take sides" and use the
military action in the Nahr al-Bared to push their own
political agenda. This would split public support and in the
end would be used to criticize the LAF for its military
actions. For this reason, he would like to see more "public
support" expressed for the LAF from the Biqa area and Sidon,
where sympathy of the Palestinian cause is strongest.

MILITARY ACTION ONLY REAL OPTION
--------------


5. (C) Sleiman made it clear that he saw Fatah al-Islam as a
criminal terrorist group using Nahr el-Bared as a base for
violent action. He did not think that Fatah al-Islam would
surrender peacefully, in light of its militant stance and the
unwillingness of its leaders to negotiate. This left only

BEIRUT 00000744 002 OF 002


one option: the LAF must go into Nahr el-Bared and "kill the
leaders" of Fatah al-Islam. Sleiman indicated that another
reason the LAF needed to take military action was to show the
"willingness of the LAF soldier to fight and not retreat."


LAF USING FATAH AND OTHER PALESTINIAN GROUPS
--------------


6. (C) Sleiman indicated that the LAF, on his instruction, is
using other Palestinian groups, including Fatah, to go into
the camp and gather intelligence on Fatah al-Islam. He told
the Ambassador that for "the first time," the LAF has been
paying Palestinian groups to go into the camp and gather
information. Sleiman added he had put a $200,000 bounty on
Fatah al-Islam leader Shar al-Absi or members of his inner
circle.

MEASURING OUTSIDE PALESTINIAN
SUPPORT FOR FATAH AL-ISLAM
--------------


7. (C) According to Sleiman there are about 6,000 civilians
still left in the refugee camp (which is a lower number than
that provided by UNRWA, which estimated 8,000-10,000
civilians remain). While Sleiman is concerned for civilian
casualties in the event of military operations, he emphasized
that his primary responsibility is force protection for the
army. He was concerned that going into Nahr al-Bared could
generate Palestinian violence in other camps. The LAF could
be faced with further military challenges that put soldiers
at risk. LAF and ISF intelligence reports have indicated
that if the LAF attacks Nahr al-Bared, Fatah al-Islam could
rally the support of about 1,000 fighters from other
Palestinian camps.

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) There is little doubt that General Sleiman is
committed to continuing the fight against Fatah al-Islam, but
he seemed hesitant about moving faster on taking military
action in Nahr el-Bared. Throughout the meeting, the
Ambassador made multiple attempts to convey to Sleiman the
urgent need to move quickly while public sentiment is
strongly behind the LAF, especially among the Sunni
community. The longer the LAF puts off military
confrontation against Fatah al-Islam, the more that public
support for military action will start to dwindle. Also, if
the LAF does not act now, it would be hard to justify its
request for urgent processing of USG military assistance in
the future. End Comment.
FELTMAN