SCENESETTER FOR CODEL PRICE'S 5/28-29/07

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000740

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

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H FOR MARK SMITH; CAIRO PLEASE PASS TO CODEL PRICE

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TAGS: PGOV PREL LE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL PRICE'S 5/28-29/07
LEGISLATIVE STRENGTHENING TRIP TO LEBANON


1. (SBU) The House Democracy Assistance Commission last
hosted Lebanese members of parliament (MPs) for a legislative
strengthening visit to Washington in April. Then, as now,
Lebanon was in deep crisis. Your visit comes amidst
heightened tensions and renewed security concerns that will
likely continue until the international tribunal to try
suspects in the 2005 Hariri assassination is established, and
a new president is elected. The clashes one week before your
visit between the terrorist group Fatah al-Islam and the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as well as a series of bombings
in civilian neighborhoods have created an atmosphere of
intimidation. Yet the impact of today's crisis -- when
Syria's allies seek to paralyze and make irrelevant the
cabinet and the parliament and then install a pro-Syrian
president in autumn -- stands in sharp contrast to the July
2006 crisis, when Hizballah dragged Lebanon into war with
Israel. Then, facing bombs and the massive internal
displacement of civilians, the Lebanese rallied around the
Prime Minister and the institutions of the cabinet and the
parliament. Today, the Lebanese are divided, with the
government portrayed by Hizballah, Michel Aoun, and their
partners as a U.S.-directed puppet.


2. (SBU) Also worrying, a growing number of those once
identified with the pro-democracy March 14 bloc -- and who
still sympathize with the movement's principles of freedom,
sovereignty, and democracy -- are "tuning out" in disgust at
the political stalemate and increasing security problems.
Even March 14 activists worry that the USG and others are
losing interest in Lebanon and favor re-engagement with
Syria, due to larger, regional considerations.


3. (SBU) Thus, we welcome your visit as an opportunity to
promote several goals:

-- Strengthen the institution of the parliament and
encourage March 14 MPs to work together on a cohesive agenda
to reinforce the position of the government against the
opposition.

-- Shore up the ranks of the March 14 movement by showing
that U.S. and international support for Lebanon remains
unshakable and non-negotiable.

-- Inspire those becoming disillusioned with politics by
reminding them that the upcoming presidential election is a
remarkable opportunity for ensuring that Lebanon's future
remains in the hands of the Lebanese.

-- Reassure all Lebanese that the United States supports a
prosperous, democratic, united, sovereign Lebanon with strong
institutions and at peace with its neighbors; and underscore
that we are not seeking to isolate or disenfranchise any of
Lebanon's communities.

OPPOSITION TO SINIORA
--------------


4. (SBU) The support that PM Siniora once enjoyed has been
eroded by the opposition, but Siniora has been resolute,
withstanding an assault that includes the walk-out of
Syria-aligned ministers and the assassination of Minister of
Industry Pierre Gemayel in November, a sit-in outside
Siniora's offices beginning in December, violent street
demonstrations in January, commuter bus bombings in February,
car bombs in civilian areas in May, and the insistence by
pro-Syrians that the Siniora cabinet is null and void. But
while still in office, the PM and his cabinet are decidedly
weakened (as, arguably, are those who tried but failed to
remove him) and find it increasingly hard to take, implement,
or enforce decisions. Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri has
refused to convene the Parliament throughout its current
session, which was to have begun in mid-March and run through
May 31. As a result, no legislation has been adopted. For a
while, it looked as though the two sides -- March 8-Aoun and
March 14-GOL -- had exhausted themselves into a draw.
However, over the past month rhetoric against Siniora and
bombings in civilian areas escalated sharply, suggesting that
pro-Syrians have entered a dangerous new phase meant to call
into question international support for UN Security Council
passage of the international tribunal under Chapter 7 of the
UN Charter. We expect a possible UNSC vote on the
international tribunal the week of May 28, and the imminence
of this action has sent Syria's sympathizers into action.


BEIRUT 00000740 002 OF 004


PALESTINIAN CAMPS
--------------


5. (SBU) The opposition may repeat the charge that the USG
is working to "implant" permanently into Lebanon the largely
Sunni Palestinian refugee population, thus giving the Sunnis
a surge of demographic power at the expense of the Christians
and Shia. To avoid giving fodder to those who use this issue
politically against us, when the question of the "right of
Palestinian return" is raised -- as it often is -- we state
simply that, once the question of Palestinian refugees can be
addressed, certainly Lebanon's special needs and concerns
will be taken into account.

CABINET CRISIS UNRESOLVED
--------------


6. (SBU) While the UNSC underscored recently that the
Siniora cabinet is the legitimate government of Lebanon, the
lack of Shia representation, a gap created by the Shia
ministers themselves in their resignation from the Cabinet,
still creates problems in sectarian-sensitive Lebanon. The
demand for a National Unity Cabinet that would include
Christian opposition leader General Michel Aoun and give a
blocking minority to Hizballah and its allies, is the
ostensible justification for the anti-Siniora protests. The
PM and others propose various solutions. Siniora offers a
17-13 cabinet based on a new agreed cabinet agenda; some
speculate that the resigned ministers will return to work as
caretakers; others favor a technocratic cabinet until
presidential elections. We do not believe that either bloc
is serious about fixing the cabinet before having more
clarity regarding presidential elections. In the meantime,
President Lahoud maintains that the cabinet has ceased to
exist, leading to fears that he will appoint a competing
Prime Minister, creating a "two government" scenario akin to
the disastrous 1988-1990 period. We see increasing evidence
that the "two government" scenario is, indeed, what the
pro-Syrians intend to create.

PARLIAMENT CLOSED,
BUT NOT INACTIVE
--------------


7. (SBU) Speaker Berri has refused to open a formal
parliamentary session despite weekly protests by March 14
MPs; Berri argues that the parliament cannot refer laws to an
unconstitutional cabinet. Some parliamentary committees
continue to meet to discuss draft legislation and initiatives
with "resigned" and acting ministers. Your visit will be an
apt reminder to Berri that he has a constitutional as well as
a personal role to play in resolving the political stalemate,
while your legislative strengthening mission will help
bolster an institution that has eroded to the detriment of
the nation. Parliamentary effort will be an essential part
of any enduring political resolution; key laws on economic
and political reform are awaiting parliamentary review and
action. These issues were raised by Speaker Pelosi when she
led a House delegation to Beirut on April 2, which included
meetings with PM Siniora and Speaker Nabih Berri.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
--------------


8. (SBU) With no other easy resolution in sight, the
Lebanese have focused on the November 24 expiration of
Lahoud's extended term as the opportunity to solve this
crisis or, alternatively, as the time Lebanon will descend
definitively into chaos. Unless assured they approve the
choice, the pro-Syrians and Aoun threaten to boycott the
parliament session that will elect Lahoud's successor. While
the March 14 majority could elect a new president despite a
boycott, that president would suffer problems of legitimacy
due to quorum questions and to a possible lack of Shia
participation in the voting. This, too, could lead to a "two
government" crisis, with the March 8-Aoun bloc following a
Lahoud-appointed cabinet, and uncertainty over how the army
would react.

HIZBALLAH'S ARMS
--------------


9. (SBU) Given the focus on the international tribunal,
cabinet crisis, and presidential elections, little has
happened practically to restrict Hizballah's arms. We await

BEIRUT 00000740 003 OF 004


the arrival of a UN team to look at the Syrian-Lebanese
border soon, with a view toward developing future efforts to
stem arms smuggling to Hizballah from Syria. Arms smuggling
continues, and there is widespread public speculation that
Iranian-funded land purchases are linking the
Hizballah-controlled areas in the south to
Hizballah-controlled parts of the Biqa' Valley. While there
have been a few "good news" stories (including the Lebanese
army seizure of weapons claimed by Hizballah),the GOL has
not undertaken any serious, sustained efforts to control
Hizballah's arms. This is another reason why the presidency
is so important: the cabinet could more easily take
meaningful steps, if the president is on the side of the
state.

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
--------------


10. (SBU) Not unreasonably, Siniora and others are obsessed
with security concerns: you will note that most people whom
we visit, fearful of assassination, are holed up in fortified
compounds, and those political figures outside the Embassy
are accompanied by bodyguards. The clashes this past week
between the army and the terrorist group Fatah al-Islam in
Tripoli and the Nahr el-Barad Palestinian refugee camp, stand
as the worst internal fighting in Lebanon since the 1975-90
civil war. The series of bombings in Beirut and Mount
Lebanon (in a Christian neighborhood, a Sunni neighborhood,
and most recently in a mixed Druze- Christian area) are
similar to a series of bombings in the spring of 2005, meant
to intimidate rather than to produce mass casualties. In
both cases, we -- along with most Lebanese -- suspect Syria
or its Lebanese sympathizers of trying to foment instability
and opposition to the establishment of an international
tribunal.

YOUR MEETINGS
--------------


11. (SBU) Your meetings will include March 14 leaders Saad
Hariri and Fouad Siniora, with their agenda that overlaps our
own regarding Lebanon's sovereignty and independence, as well
as a variety of parliamentarians from across the political
and confessional spectrum. Lest we be accused of not
listening to the other side, we have arranged for those
sympathetic to General Aoun to see you and for you to meet
with Parliament Speaker Berri (a meeting that also helps
check the Shia confessional box). Finally, we have arranged
for you to meet with Maronite Patriarch Sfeir, a senior
powerbroker in the divided Christian community.


12. (SBU) In terms of points to make in the major meetings,
for Siniora, the agenda is obvious: gaining control over
Fatah al-Islam and stemming violence in the Palestinian
camps, winning UNSC approval of the tribunal, solving the
cabinet crisis, stopping arms smuggling, and holding upcoming
presidential elections. Siniora will bring up Sheba'a Farms
and his view about an appropriate response to the Arab peace
initiative.


13. (SBU) With Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, we suggest
focusing on the need for Berri to open parliament before the
expiration on May 31 of the ordinary season. This will build
on the demands of the Lebanese themselves. We guess that
Berri does not want to lose the international connections and
legitimacy that accrue to him due to his position, and we
suggest you emphasize to Berri the need for him to think of
his responsibilities and his legacy. Berri will want a
signal from us that we are not going to impose our own
presidential candidate. We recommend underscoring how
important it is for his bloc to show up for the presidential
elections rather than try to defeat the democratic choice by
using the quorum tool as a veto.


14. (SBU) Maronite Patriarch Sfeir's surprise 5/11 visit to
President Lahoud suggests that the Patriarch may have been
sparked to activism either by belated desperation caused by
the seriousness of Lebanon's political crisis or by a stern
warning from the Vatican. While he will not choose a
candidate for fear of splitting his own community, we should
encourage him to make clear what qualities are needed in a
new president. We also suggest reinforcing to him the
serious danger Michel Aoun's alliance with Hizballah poses
for his relationship with us and thus for the future of
Lebanon's Christians.

BEIRUT 00000740 004 OF 004




15. (SBU) Your meeting with Aoun's advisors (the General
himself will be in Paris for a book signing) is a chance for
you to deliver the message that the appeasement of Syria and
Hizballah during a time of crisis for the GOL is
unacceptable. We have noted that such an approach will
naturally limit our enthusiasm for cooperation with Aoun. We
should caution Aoun's followers of the cost to their
reputations and relations with us of taking steps such as
boycotting a parliamentary session to elect the president or
of backing a Lahoud-appointed faux cabinet.


16. (SBU) We need to push March 14 figures -- Hariri and
the parliamentarians -- to come up with a compelling message
to the Lebanese about why the Lebanese should continue to
support the March 14 bloc: what is the vision of Lebanon's
future that March 14 can offer?
FELTMAN