LEBANON: AOUN'S MESSAGE: FORGET ABOUT HIZBALLAH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000726

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING, STATE FOR NEA/ELA,
NEA/FO FOR ATACHCO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: AOUN'S MESSAGE: FORGET ABOUT HIZBALLAH


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) On May 22, an agitated Gebran Bassil insisted on
calling on the Ambassador on behalf of General Aoun, but,
even after an hour conversation, the reasons he requested the
meeting remained obscure. Bassil stressed Aoun's support for
the LAF, but said that the GOL had not heeded Aoun's warnings
about terrorists. Bassil offered a brief proposal for a
national unity government, but shied away from any
discussions of Aoun's relationship with Hizballah. Bassil
said that Aoun is a friend to the Sunnis, although the
Siniora government favors them unfairly. Aoun is worried
that the violence might spread, and that the LAF will not be
able to deal with it. End summary.


2. (C) An earnest but agitated Gebran Bassil engaged the
Ambassador (with Acting Pol/Econ chief) in a game of verbal
tennis on May 22. Bassil, Aoun's son-in-law and foremost
member of Aoun's inner circle, seemed intent on convincing
the Ambassador that the General is right-minded, and
sincerely worried about both the LAF and the state of
Lebanon. He said that Hizballah is very worried about Sunni
extremists as well. However, he dodged every attempt made to
engage him on Aoun's continued relationship with Hizballah,
saying at several points in the discussion, "Forget about
Hizballah!" As the Ambassador pointed out at every turn, the
key issue with Aoun's pitch is that the USG cannot forget
about Hizballah.

GOVERNMENT DID NOT HEED
AOUN'S WARNINGS
--------------


3. (C) Bassil said that "the General" wanted him to tell the
Ambassador how worried he is about the situation, but at the
same time, how he has been warning about the possibility of
terrorist insurrection for at least two years. Aoun had
asked for a Parliamentary security commission in the first
session of Parliament after his return, but never received an
answer. He also pointed out that those arrested for the bus
bombings had apparently confessed to plans to attack Tripoli
and rob banks, and were placed under surveillance. However,
Aoun faulted the Siniora government for not heeding the
warnings, and for allowing the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
and Internal Security Forces (ISF) to compete against one
another. He said that the ISF had taken cameras with them to
the raid on the Fatah al-Islam bank robbers in order to score
a media coup. The ISF never told the LAF about its planned
raid. Therefore, once Fatah al-Islam knew of the strike, the
terrorists could prepare its response before the Army could
prepare itself.

THE GENERAL LOVES THE ARMY
--------------


4. (C) Bassil countered media reports that the General was
critical of how the LAF had conducted itself. On the
contrary, Aoun loves the army and was devastated by the loss
of life. He believes that "the army should terminate this,"
leave the camp surrounded, and try to deal with the other
Palestinian groups to achieve a solution. Bassil said Aoun
was angry both because he is a national leader, and because
he is a former commander of the LAF. He said that the "green
light" to attack Fatah al-islam was given to the LAF too
late. If the army is barely able to deal with Nahr el-Bared,
what if something happens in the camps in the south? Bassil
acknowledged that Aoun is aware that the LAF is not prepared
to enter the camps. Asked if Aoun believes that there is a
tie between the trouble with Fatah al-Islam and the recent
bombs in Beirut, Bassil said that the General believe that
such murderers would seek to kill as many people as possible,
and the bombs were clearly not designed to do that.

FORGET ABOUT HIZBALLAH!
--------------


5. (C) When the Ambassador said that Aoun never criticizes
Hizballah, which is the cause of valuable resources being
diverted away from the real crisis in the north, Bassil said
that Aoun is dealing constructively with Hizballah. The
Ambassador observed that Aoun never criticizes Syria; Bassil
replied that Aoun had criticized Syria the previous day.

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When the Ambassador said that Aoun should remove the tents
from downtown Beirut to free up security resources, Bassil
said that the tents are empty. When the Ambassador asked why
Aoun is not taking action now against Hizballah now that
Syria is out of Lebanon, Bassil again replied, "Forget about
Hizballah!" Bassil said that Aoun knows what to do about
Hizballah, but that Siniora is an unknown; "What can you do
about it? They (the Siniora government) are losers; they
spread lies and their security information is flawed." In
particular he argued that on several occasions Siniora has
appeared to have favored the Sunnis unfairly, such as in
releasing prisoners at the request of the Sunni Mufti.

SUNNIS ARE NOT THE ENEMY
--------------


6. (C) Bassil said that Aoun's relationship with the Shia is
very different from that of others, and because "the Shia are
already behind Hizballah," General Aoun recognizes that
Lebanon cannot be rebuilt without the Shia. "We're not
crazy!" he reiterated. However, Aoun does not intend to give
the Shia "God and money" according to the Hizballah plan for
the Shia. The Ambassador returned frequently to the question
of Aoun's relationship with Hizballah, asking why Aoun did
not make a gesture of reconciliation with the GOL. He
suggested that Aoun could go to Siniora and say, "While we
don't agree on many things, we could cooperate in resolving
the situation in Tripoli." Bassil dodged the question,
although he said later that Aoun is trying to compromise
between what he wants and what Hizballah wants. He also
pointed out that although Walid Jumblatt had said as recently
as previous day that the question of Hizballah arms could be
left until later, in the face of the current crisis, the USG
does not treat Jumblatt as a supporter of Hizballah; why the
General? Told repeatedly by the Ambassador that the USG
cannot support Aoun while he allies himself with Hizballah,
Bassil again retreated behind a plea to, "Forget about
Hizballah!" (Comment: What Jumblatt actually said was that
Hizballah should give its arms to the LAF or even fight with
the LAF to win the battle in the north. End comment.)

WHAT DOES AOUN WANT?
--------------


7. (C) Pressed by the Ambassador again to say what Aoun
wants, Bassil reluctantly and rather vaguely offered Aoun's
proposal: a national unity government with three objectives.
Those objectives would be a resolution to the current
crisis; resolving the Presidency; and no second government.
He said that Aoun was not encouraged about prospects for
success of this formula because no one (i.e., not even A/S
Welch) encouraged Aoun to pursue his initiative. Arguing
that Aoun really wants the international tribunal, even if it
cannot be achieved by internal GOL actions, he admitted that
Aoun does not have the kind of relationship with Qatar that
would allow him to persuade Qatar to adopt a tribunal UNSCR
under Chapter 7.


8. (C) In regard to strife in the north, Bassil recommended
pushing the Palestinians back inside the camps and "not
accepting terrorists." Saying that the terrorists do not
move freely outside of the camps, he protested again about
the "money and God" support that keeps them supplied. He
also suggested that, "We take care of the Shia front, and you
take care of the rest." While not asking the USG to withdraw
support from Siniora, he suggested a full investigation of
the events leading up to the outbreak of violence in Nahr
el-Bared. The Ambassador then offered that, if Aoun insists
on an investigation, it might be useful to open Parliament in
order to call for an investigation. Bassil seemed to
consider this, although he countered by saying that maybe the
Parliament should set up an investigating committee for "all
investigations."

COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) While Bassil never really explained to us what he
wanted or why he was sent to speak to the Ambassador, Bassil
himself seemed to think he was delivering an important
message. To the best of our understanding, one message would
be that the General is very nervous about his position, and
that if violence consumes Lebanon, he will not have friends
to rescue him. "Forget about Hizballah!" is advice the
General should take himself. End comment.
FELTMAN