SCENESETTER FOR A/S WELCH'S 5/15-17/07 VISIT TO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 000673

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM LE SY
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A/S WELCH'S 5/15-17/07 VISIT TO
LEBANON

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Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) David: You last visited Lebanon in August 2006.
Then, as now, Lebanon was in deep crisis. Yet the impact of
today's crisis -- when Syria's allies seek to paralyze and
make irrelevant the cabinet of Fouad Siniora and then install
a pro-Syrian president in autumn -- stands in sharp contrast
to the July 2006 crisis, when Hizballah dragged Lebanon to
war with Israel. Then, facing bombs and displacement, the
Lebanese rallied around the PM and his cabinet. Siniora
enjoyed consensus support for his "seven points," including
its call for the state to have a monopoly on arms. Today,
the Lebanese are divided, with Siniora viciously portrayed by
Hizballah, Michel Aoun, and their partners as a U.S.-directed
puppet almost gleefully selling out Lebanon's sovereignty and
Arab identity.


2. (S) While still a minority view, too many Lebanese,
including nearly all the Shia, swallowed this
Syrian-concocted venom. Also worrying, a growing number of
those once identified with the March 14 bloc -- and who still
sympathize with the movement's principles of freedom, unity,
and democracy -- are "tuning out" in disgust at the political
stalemate. Even March 14 activists worry about pro-Syrian
"evidence" purportedly showing that the USG and others are
losing interest in Lebanon and favor re-engagement with
Syria, due to larger, regional considerations.


3. (S) Thus, we suggest using your visit to promote three
goals simultaneously:

-- Shore up the ranks of the March 14 movement by showing
that U.S. and international support for Lebanon remains
unshakable and non-negotiable. Your visit will help reassure
March 14 leaders and supporters alike of continued, strong
U.S. interest.

-- Inspire those becoming disillusioned with politics by
reminding them of the incredible opportunity they now have
for securing that Lebanon's future remains in the hands of
the Lebanese. Upcoming presidential elections are something
to be embraced, not feared.

-- Complicate the ability of Siniora's enemies to use your
visit to weaken him, by crafting a public and private message
that resonates beyond March 14 circles. They expect us to
support March 14: what can we say to the rest of the
Lebanese? By talking about a hopeful, inclusive vision for
the future that nearly all Lebanese share -- a prosperous,
democratic, united, sovereign Lebanon at peace with its
neighbors -- we can underscore that we are not seeking to
isolate or disenfranchise any of Lebanon's communities. To
the extent that we can speak beyond Lebanon, of the Arab
peace initiative and of our hope that Palestinians will soon
have a state to call their own, we also speak to all the
Lebanese, rather than just March 14 supporters.

OPPOSITION TO SINIORA
--------------


4. (S) The consensus that the PM once enjoyed was
intentionally shattered by Hizballah Secretary General
Nasrallah in autumn. Nasrallah leads the charge that
Siniora's allegedly subservient relationship with the USG
has, at best, resulted in nothing for Lebanon and, at worst,
put Lebanon at the mercy of Israel and under a "foreign
mandate." Defying expectations, Siniora -- whose
hyper-cautiousness and excruciatingly slow deliberative
nature often exasperate us -- has been astonishingly
resolute, withstanding an assault that includes the walk-out
of Syria-aligned ministers and the assassination of Pierre
Gemayel in November, a sit-in outside Siniora's offices
beginning in December, violent street demonstrations in
January, commuter bus bombings in February, and the
insistence by pro-Syrians that the Siniora cabinet is null
and void. But while still in office, the PM and his cabinet
are decidedly weakened (as, arguably, are those who tried but
failed to remove him) and find it increasingly hard to take,
implement, or enforce decisions.


5. (S) For a while, it looked as though the two sides --
March 8-Aoun and March 14-GOL -- had exhausted themselves
into a draw. But, over the past week, rhetoric against
Siniora has escalated sharply, suggesting to his advisors

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that pro-Syrians are mobilizing for a dangerous new phase.
The ever-cautious PM strives to avoid giving any excuse for
renewed street action. He will thus seek ways to reduce the
chances that your visit becomes the spark for Hizballah to
reoccupy the largely abandoned "tent city" downtown. He will
look less for USG support of him (which is a given) and more
for something to grab positive attention and defy
expectations, such as -- Siniora is nothing if not consistent
-- a promising word on Sheba' Farms. (For an otherwise smart
man, Siniora is remarkably blind to the political realities
of Israel.)


6. (S) Hizballah and its allies may even seize upon your
visit to repeat the tiresome charge that the USG is working
secretly with Siniora to "implant" the largely Sunni

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Palestinian refugee population permanently in Lebanon, to
give the Sunnis a surge of demographic power at the expense
of the Christians and Shia. To avoid giving fodder to those
who use this issue politically against us, when the question
of the "right of return" is raised -- as it often is -- we
state simply that, once the question of Palestinian refugees
can be addressed, certainly Lebanon's special needs and
concerns will be taken into account.

TRIBUNAL, CONSIDERED FAIT ACCOMPLI
--------------


7. (S) You are arriving in Lebanon on a day when the news is
dominated by Siniora's letter to UNSYG Ban requesting UNSC
approval of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. One of the
propaganda tools against Siniora has been potential UNSC
Chapter VII approval of the tribunal. The same people who
blocked parliamentary approval process in Lebanon now scream
that Siniora's request to the UN is akin to treason. Yet
curiously, now that we are on the threshold of UNSC action to
create the tribunal, the level of rhetorical protests on this
issue has dropped. It seems that, across the political
spectrum, everyone sees the tribunal as a fait accompli
(which, of course, it is not). Pro-Syrians are no longer
fighting the creation of the tribunal in favor of promoting a
stance that they simply will not cooperate with any tribunal
created under Chapter VII. Since the tribunal won't be
immediately operational, we predict little immediate impact
of this refusal to cooperate, although we are likely to face
a crisis later. Siniora, who worries that a UNSC failure to
establish the tribunal will lead to a collapse of his cabinet
that has staked so much on the tribunal, will seek your views
on timing and prospects for action in New York. If he has
more homework to garner UNSC support, we should push him to
move quickly.

CABINET CRISIS UNRESOLVED
--------------


8. (S) While the UNSC underscored recently that the Siniora
cabinet is the legitimate government of Lebanon, the lack of
Shia representation, a gap created by the Shia ministers
themselves, unquestionably creates problems in
sectarian-sensitive Lebanon. The demand for a National Unity
Cabinet that would include Aoun and give a blocking minority
to Hizballah and its allies is the ostensible justification
for the anti-Siniora protests. The PM and others propose
various solutions. Siniora offers a 17-13 cabinet on the
basis of a new agreed cabinet agenda; some speculate that the
resigned ministers will return to work as caretakers; others
favor a technocratic cabinet until presidential elections.
We do not believe that either bloc is serious about fixing
the cabinet before having more clarity regarding presidential
elections. In the meantime, President Lahoud maintains that
the cabinet has ceased to exist, leading to fears that he
will appoint a competing PM, creating a "two government"
scenario akin to the disastrous 1988-1990 period. We see
increasing evidence that the "two government" scenario is,
indeed, what the pro-Syrians intend to create.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
--------------


9. (S) With the tribunal seen as a fait accompli and no
serious negotiations underway regarding the cabinet, the
Lebanese focus increasingly on the November 24 expiration of
Lahoud's extended term as the opportunity to solve this
crisis or, alternatively, as the time Lebanon will descend
definitively into chaos and civil war. Unless assured they

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approve the choice, the pro-Syrians and Aoun threaten to
boycott the parliament session that will elect Lahoud's
successor. While the March 14 majority will most likely
elect a new president despite a boycott, he (or she -- lest
we forget Nayla Mouawad) would suffer problems of legitimacy
due to quorum questions and to the lack of Shia participation
in the voting. This, too, would lead to a "two government"
crisis, with the March 8-Aoun bloc following a
Lahoud-appointed cabinet and uncertainty over how the army
would react.


10. (S) March 14 leaders -- at least those who are not
presidential candidates themselves -- tell us privately that,
with the tribunal established and Syria on the defensive,
they will consider a "consensus" president to avoid the
two-government confrontation everyone fears. Patriarch
Sfeir, too, favors a president with credibility that bridges
the political divide. In theory, this is a sensible approach
in this dangerously divided country. But the question is
whether the pro-Syrians will consider a truly independent
figure. We suspect that Hizballah will propose a candidate
unacceptable to March 14 (i.e., Aoun),in order to trade for
one who appears reasonable but who in fact will be controlled
by Syria. The Patriarch is aware of this danger, but he is
also concerned that March 14 Muslims -- Hariri and Jumblatt
-- could do the same, trading an acceptable Christian for one
under their influence.


11. (S) As you will be asked about presidential elections,
we suggest that you note that everyone in Lebanon and the
international community agrees on the importance of elections
on time and in accordance with the constitution, free of
outside interference. A two-government scenario is in no
one's interest. We can avoid interpreting the ambiguous
quorum requirement by referring to the Patriarch's statements
that there is no more important responsibility for any MP
than to show up to cast a vote for president. And,
obviously, no: the U.S. does not have a candidate, but we
are confident that the successful choice will be committed to
Lebanon's freedom and democracy. We have been asking people
recently to think ahead about how, ideally, they would like
to see Lebanon politically and economically six years from
now (when the new president's term expires) and then
suggesting that they consider which presidential candidate
can best move Lebanon in that direction. When thinking
ahead, few favor a pro-Syrian candidate.

HIZBALLAH'S ARMS
--------------


12. (S) Given the focus on the tribunal, cabinet crisis, and
presidential elections, little has happened practically to
restrict Hizballah's arms. Politically, the picture is a bit
more encouraging: Saad Hariri at last questions Hizballah's
arms even publicly, and Siniora's renewed emphasis on the
"seven points" from last summer indicates his commitment to
the supremacy of the state (while again underscoring his
ideas on Sheba' Farms). The German pilot project on the
northern border now has funding (including quiet partnership
with the USG regarding communications) and is proceeding
well, if slowly. We await the arrival of a UN team to look
at the Syrian-Lebanese border soon. But arms smuggling
continues, and Iranian-funded land purchases are reportedly
linking the Hizballah-controlled south to
Hizballah-controlled parts of the Biqa'. While there have
been a few "good news" stories (including the Lebanese army
seizure of weapons claimed by Hizballah),the GOL has not
undertaken any serious, sustained efforts to control
Hizballah's arms or stop smuggling. This is another reason
why the presidency is so important: the cabinet could more
easily take meaningful steps, if the president is on the side
of the state.

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
--------------


13. (S) Not unreasonably, Siniora and others are obsessed
with security concerns: you will note that everyone we
visit, fearful of assassination, is holed up in fortified
compounds, and those political figures who come to see you at
the Embassy will be accompanied by many bodyguards. Besides
the worry about Hizballah and its allies seizing on an excuse
to provoke populist demonstrations that could easily turn
violent (a worry that explains why the GOL has never moved to

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clear the downtown streets of the sit-in tents),the threats
are credible that al-Qaida is planning attacks against
Lebanese and international institutions. The GOL fears
Syrian-backed terrorist groups will conduct more
assassinations or random attacks such as the February bus
bombings. Few people believe that the murder of two young
Lebanese three weeks ago was simply a clan feud. The
question does not seem to be whether Lebanon will suffer
another terrorist attack but when. We are providing constant
assistance, and, happily, rival Lebanese security agencies,
aware of the seriousness of the threats, are working in
closer coordination than we have seen before.

YOUR MEETINGS
--------------


14. (S) Your meetings are naturally heavily weighted in
favor of the March 14 alliance with its agenda that overlaps
our own regarding Lebanon's sovereignty and independence.
Besides your discussions with PM Siniora, three March 14
leaders -- former President Amine Gemayel, MP Walid Jumblatt,
and MP Saad Hariri -- will host meals for you. You will also
meet with a group of March 14 Christians (including Nayla
Mouawad, Nassib Lahoud, and Boutros Harb) as well as,
separately, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea. Lest we be
accused of not listening to the other side, we have also
arranged for Michel Aoun to come to my residence to see you
and for you to meet with Parliament Speaker Berri (a meeting
that also helps check the Shia confessional box). We have
also arranged for meetings with Patriarch Sfeir and Lebanese
Armed Forces Commander Sleiman.


15. (S) In addition, we welcome using your visit to
highlight USG contributions to the American Educational
Institutions in Lebanon, after giving more than $64 million
over the past decade. We have arranged for you to present a
check for $970,000 to Lebanese American University President
Joseph Jabra (who met with the Secretary recently in
Washington) and 5-6 LAU students, as part of the USG's
support of scholarships for LAU.


16. (S) In terms of points to make in the major meetings,
for Siniora, the agenda is obvious: winning UNSC approval of
the tribunal, Siniora's ideas on solving the cabinet crisis,
stopping arms smuggling, upcoming presidential elections.
Siniora will bring up Sheba' Farms and his view about an
appropriate response to the Arab peace initiative.
Restricted to what he can achieve inside Lebanon given the
pro-Syrian boycott of his cabinet, Siniora in many of his
conversations is now reverting to the (frequently tiresome)
pan-Arab sentiments he carried with him to office and which
he deployed to such ill effect during Secretary Rice's first
meeting with him in July 2005, at the start of his
premiership.


17. (S) With Berri, we suggest focusing on the need for
Berri to open parliament before the expiration on May 31 of
the ordinary season. This will build on the demands of the
Lebanese themselves. Berri has indicated privately (Beirut
655) that, despite being responsible, even he is
uncomfortable with the implications of the shuttered
parliament. We guess that Berri does not want to lose the
international connections and legitimacy that accrue to him
due to his position, and, indeed, many of our contacts have
suggested to us that we emphasize to Berri the need for him
to think of his long-term reputation and prospects. Berri
will want a signal from us that we are not going to impose
our own presidential candidate. We recommend underscoring
how important it is for his bloc to show up for the
presidential elections rather than try to defeat the
democratic choice by using the quorum tool as a veto.


18. (S) Patriarch Sfeir's surprise 5/11 visit to Lahoud
suggests that the Patriarch may have been sparked to activism
either by belated desperation by the seriousness of Lebanon's
political crisis or by a stern warning from the Vatican.
While your meeting with Sfeir is mostly intended to reassure
Lebanon's Christians of our support, we recommend reminding
Sfeir that he is the one person who may be able to prevent a
presidency controlled either by Syria or by March 14 Muslims
(Hariri and Jumblatt): while he will not choose a candidate
for fear of splitting his own community, we should encourage
him to make clear which candidates are unacceptable. We also
suggest reinforcing to him the serious danger Michel Aoun's

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alliance with Hizballah poses for his relationship with us
and thus for the future of Lebanon's Christians.


19. (S) LAF Commander Michel Sleiman is frequently talked
of (although, tellingly, not by the Patriarch) as a
"compromise" presidential candidate. People in touch with
Emile Lahoud claim that the pro-Syrians are counting on the
LAF to side with the "second government," should Lahoud
appoint one. Your meeting with Sleiman (which is not yet
confirmed) will be a good opportunity to underscore that our
strong support for the LAF is based in large measure to the
LAF's upholding of the legitimate institutions of Lebanon.
Subtly, you can help remind him of the cost to his reputation
of siding with a government appointed by a man on his way out
and recognized by only Syria and Iran.


20. (S) Your meeting with General Aoun is one of the last
opportunities for Aoun to show us that he can be as
constructive and moderate as his increasingly desperate
followers claim he wants to be. We have pointed out to
Aoun's followers (who have come to us in increasing numbers
to urge bridge-building with the General) that the General's
views seem to be to appease Syria, to appease Hizballah, but
to confront Siniora. We have noted that such an approach
will naturally limit our enthusiasm for cooperation with
Aoun. They have promised that you will hear of a new,
positive initiative. We'll see. We should caution him of
the cost to his reputation and relations with us of taking
steps such as ordering his MPs to boycott a parliamentary
session to elect the president or of backing a
Lahoud-appointed faux cabinet. (He may not care, but at
least he will be sufficiently forewarned.)


21. (S) For the March 14 figures -- Gemayel, Hariri,
Jumblatt, Geagea, the other Christians -- the message is as
much the camera spray at the start of each meeting,
demonstrating our solidarity, as the substance. But we need
to continue to push them to come up with a compelling message
to the Lebanese about why the Lebanese should continue to
support the March 14 bloc: what is the vision that March 14
offers to Lebanon's future? The pro-Syrians and the
political stalemate they have created have done much to
tarnish March 14's reputation, and March 14 leaders have not
exactly been nimble with developing a counter PR strategy.
An occasional March 14 meeting with communique (such as took
place last night) is not sufficient to persuade the average
Lebanese that March 14 is the future.


21. (U) David, my staff and I look forward to welcoming you
back to Beirut.
FELTMAN