WHERE ARE THE DEMONSTRATORS?

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000066

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2027
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV KDEM LE SY
SUBJECT: WHERE ARE THE DEMONSTRATORS?

REF: A. BEIRUT 0001

B. PARIS 0112

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Curiously, the much ballyhooed "anti-Paris III"
labor protests that the March 8-Aoun opposition promised --
from Michel Aoun's front yard -- would shake the foundations
of the Siniora government this week have fizzled. After two
days of lackluster turn-out, the General Labor Confederation
(with its pro-Syrian leadership) suspended temporarily what
was announced as a progressive series of demonstrations,
picketing each day a new GOL institution. What the
sky-is-falling parts of the March 14 majority feared might
result in ministry-by-ministry takeover by Hizballah and
Aounist thugs has not come even remotely to pass. In
addition, the number of participants in the "tent city"
sit-in downtown seems to have stabilized at an underwhelming
few score during weekdays and a slightly less unimpressive
few thousand on weekends (with more showing up for scheduled
speeches).


2. (S) Relieved March 14 leaders credit these welcome
developments to divisions within the labor movement itself
(split like the rest of Lebanon along increasingly hostile
confessional and political lines). "They have their unions,
and we have ours," Marwan Hamadeh told the Ambassador. Some
cite fatigue in non-Hizballah components of the opposition.
In addition, Sunni-Shia tensions are seen as creating a red
line, given fears that sectarian clashes could quickly spiral
out of control (and expand beyond Lebanon) in this
hyper-tense atmosphere. Hizballah, at the moment, seems
unwilling to cross that line. Moreover, a public statement
by LAF Commander Sleiman helped convince people that the LAF
would not stand by idly if GOL institutions were attacked:
no one relishes being blamed for either splitting the LAF or
forcing it to fire upon demonstrators. We also find the
reports of tactical differences among March 8-Aoun leaders to
be credible: Michel Aoun, Suleiman Franjieh, and Talal
Arslan seem eager for aggressive opposition assaults to
topple the Siniora government quickly; Hizballah, Nabih
Berri, and opposition Sunni figures like Omar Karami and
Fathi Yaqin have firmly pressed on the brakes.


3. (S) Certainly, all of these factors played a role in
diminishing enthusiasm for the strikes, as did the surprising
steadfastness of GOL leaders. So, one can reasonably ask, is
the March 8-Aoun opposition movement losing momentum in the
face of the unblinking Siniora cabinet and March 14 forces?



4. (S) Unfortunately, we think that any predictions of a
faltering opposition movement are premature. (We'd welcome
being proven wrong). The primary engine of the opposition is
Hizballah. And it is the absence of Hizballah activists in
this week's labor demonstrations that explains the modest
turnouts. As we do not believe that Hizballah has suddenly
lost the ability to mobilize its followers, Hizballah must
have chosen not to do so. The perplexing question is why.
Talking with the Ambassador, PM Siniora attributed
Hizballah's decision not to activate its "street" to the
Saudi-Hizballah contacts that climaxed in the 12/27 meeting
between King Abdullah and Hizballah's Na'im Qassim and
Mohammed Ra'ad (ref a). Hizballah, Siniora says, does not
want to annoy Saudi Arabia, which street demonstrations and
heightened Sunni-Shia tensions would do.


5. (S) In addition to the possible Saudi connection, we
wonder if Hizballah leaders shifted their focus. Hizballah
leaders like Qassim, along with the pro-Syrian media, have
hinted ominously that UNIFIL should stick to what they insist
is an extremely limited mandate. Editorials claim that the
"old UNIFIL" (i.e., ineffective UNIFIL) is preferable to the
UNIFIL created by UNSCR 1701. On top of ongoing lurid
accounts of bad-boy behavior by UNIFIL soldiers, stories now
circulate in the press about (non-existent) Hizballah-UNIFIL
clashes. A storm of pro-Syrian criticism seems to have
spooked the French UNIFIL contingent from deploying UAVs
shipped to Lebanon. For once aiming their venom at the
French rather than the U.S., pro-Syrian media and Hizballah's
al-Manar have condemned French Ambassador Bernard Emie for
the failure of Nabih Berri's last initiative (that surely not
even Berri thought had a real chance of success) and for
pushing UNIFIL to be overly aggressive. This takes place
against the backdrop of a reported increase in arms smuggling
from Syria to Hizballah weapons depots in the Biqa' Valley.


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6. (S) All of these developments suggest to us that, for
Hizballah, chipping away at UNSCR 1701 and defanging UNIFIL
are higher tactical priorities for now than taking aggressive
measures to overthrow Siniora's cabinet. Compared with
besieging the Grand Serail, rhetorical (or even physical)
attacks on UNIFIL are far less risky in terms of potential
Sunni-Shia clashes: The Sunnis (thinly represented on the
ground in the south) have little emotional investment in
UNSCR 1701 or UNIFIL and are not likely to take to the
streets to defend either. And the more ominous and frequent
the anti-UNIFIL speeches by Hizballah, the more fearful
UNIFIL contributing countries will be about the safety of
their troops. It will be dismaying but not surprising if, as
a result (and as Hizballah no doubt intends),UNIFIL patrols
become more passive and less frequent. Hizballah can achieve
some of its agenda without worrying about crossing the
Sunni-Shia red lines.


7. (S) Yet if, as we suspect, Hizballah is now
concentrating on incrementally rolling back UNSCR 1701, it
does not come at the expense of Hizballah's other objectives.
Indeed, threatening UNIFIL can help with other goals. The
surprising French willingness (ref b) to allow a delay on
establishing the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (along with the
apparent French allergy for Chapter VII for the tribunal) is
undoubtedly linked to French fears for its UNIFIL troops.
Attacking UNIFIL can also embarrass and further weaken the
GOL, especially as Siniora is so closely associated with
UNSCR 1701. In Beirut, a continuation of the stand-off
between the opposition and GOL is not inimical to Hizballah's
interests. After all, the opposition has succeeded in
weakening the Siniora cabinet legally and politically by the
Shia walk-out and the physical encirclement of the Grand
Serail. Short of additional murders that would topple the
cabinet, this situation can continue indefinitely and does
not hurt Hizballah. Moreover, Hizballah is surely satisfied
that momentum regarding the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
indeed seems stalled, with no obvious way to move forward
that will guarantee successful establishment of the tribunal.



8. (S) A Hizballah focus on UNIFIL and UNSCR 1701 does not
mean that Hizballah is abandoning the use of demonstrations.
Hizballah's firebrand allies like Michel Aoun, wanting to
keep his supporters motivated, will certainly insist upon
such shows of force. Hizballah will oblige sufficiently to
maintain Aoun's Christian cover. Particularly in the lead-up
to Paris III, we fully expect more demonstrations of varying
sizes and in diverse locations in the coming days. We hear
very mixed predictions about how strongly Hizballah and its
allies will work to prevent the appearance of victory for
Siniora's cabinet at Paris III. But -- however much this
approach must frustrate Aoun -- Hizballah does not seem
interested in using a single demonstration as the decisive
blow against the Siniora cabinet. Hizballah, for whatever
reason, seems willing to wait. (We would like to think that
Hizballah's failure to turn out the crowds for the labor
demonstrations that were announced to much fanfare on Monday
would infuriate Aoun and make him think twice about the
trustworthiness of his allies. But such a conclusion would
demonstrate a level of introspection that we have not
heretofore witnessed in the General.)


9. (S) Even if we are right about Hizballah's current
focus, Hizballah's calculations will change depending on what
the March 14 bloc does. Although little substantive dialogue
passes between the two sides of Lebanon's political divide,
each watches the other's moves carefully. Some March 14
leaders -- emboldened by the failure of the labor
demonstrations this week -- propose that the majority carry
through on its own threat to force open a parliamentary
session under Deputy Speaker Farid Makkari (a Greek Orthodox
member of Hariri's Mustaqbal bloc) to overcome Nabih Berri's
foot-dragging. Just as the Sunnis would be outraged by a
physical attack on the Prime Minister (always a Sunni),the
Shia will see a parliamentary session not chaired by the
Speaker (a Shia) as a declaration of war. Hizballah would be
less willing in this case to rebuff Aoun's calls for
overrunning the Grand Serail. Despite a less dramatic week
politically than expected, we anticipate that Hizballah and
its allies will maintain the possibility of using "the
street" for weeks to come. Despite the respite felt by the
March 14 bloc this week, a palpable sense of foreboding
remains.
FELTMAN