NABIH BERRI SEEKS USG HELP TO DERAIL LAHOUD-SYRIAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000655

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM LE SY
SUBJECT: NABIH BERRI SEEKS USG HELP TO DERAIL LAHOUD-SYRIAN
PLOT TO DESTROY PARLIAMENT (NO KIDDING)


Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------


1. (S) Describing President Emile Lahoud as a "bastard,"
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri used a 5/9 meeting with the
Ambassador to seek USG help in derailing what Berri suspects
is a diabolical Syrian-inspired plot Lahoud plans to
implement to destroy Lebanon's parliament. (Yes, gentle
reader, the previous sentence is correct as written.) As if
forgetting that he is the one holding the power to open
Parliament's doors, Berri outlined a scenario by which
Lahoud, drawing on his insistence that the Siniora cabinet
does not legally exist, will use a creative interpretation of
the constitution to dissolve parliament unilaterally when it
fails to meet in its ordinary session that expires May 31.
At that point, Lahoud will argue that he is free to appoint a
new prime minister and cabinet, without the need for
parliamentary approval. And this sets up a scenario by which
Lebanon is plunged into new legislative elections. The
emerging pro-Syrian majority would then elect Lebanon's new
president, or the Lahoud-appointed cabinet would inherit the
powers of the presidency. Describing the "plot" to destroy
the constitutional institution he controls, Berri gave a very
believable performance of vein-popping rage.


2. (S) As the new cabinet begins work, the March 14
majority would continue to recognize the Siniora cabinet and
the existing parliament and proceed with its own presidential
elections. Lahoud's scheme as described by Berri would, at a
minimum, set up two entirely parallel structures: two PMs,
cabinets, parliaments, and presidents. But it would be more
likely that Lebanon would be plunged into chaos, with
institutions splitting and the army sitting on the sidelines
as the two parallel structures battled for supremacy. To
avoid this, Berri advocates a first step that we have long
urged he grab: open the parliament, thus preventing Lahoud
from dissolving it. He is now on board, but under limited
conditions he seeks our help to impose with our March 14
contacts. We are inclined to do so, in order to avoid his
worst-case scenario, but we have to consider carefully what
tricks Berri himself has up his sleeve. When asked about the
impact of potential Chapter VII approval of the tribunal,
Berri threw up his hands: "approve it Under Chapter VII,
Chapter 67, or whatever -- I don't care!" While Berri seemed
to speak with far more candor than usual, we, of course,
remain skeptical that the alliance he advocates to thwart a
Syrian-inspired plot is a lasting one. End summary and
comment.

SPEAKER SAYS LAHOUD TO DESTROY
THE HOUSE OF BERRI -- I.E., PARLIAMENT
--------------


3. (S) Shooing the aides and Embassy notetaker from the
room immediately after the television cameras had panned the
ordinary-looking meeting, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri
opened his 5/9 meeting with the Ambassador with what struck
us as a self-evident observation: "Lahoud is a bastard!"
Berri pronounced, jumping from his chair. Berri, who
insisted that the Ambassador not share this information with
anyone, said that he had belatedly put two and two together
to discover a diabolical plot by Lahoud to destroy Lebanon's
parliament. At the last moment, Berri relized that he was
being used by Lahoud in a scheme that would throw him out of
his own position asspeaker and possibly thrust him into
permanent irelevance. "Lahoud hates me, and he knows I hate
him. He thinks he's found a way to beat me."

AHOUD STARTS BY DECLARING
SINIORA CABINET NULL AND VOID
--------------


4. (S) oing into detail while thumbing through the
Lebaese constitution, Berri explained that the scheme tarts
with Lahoud's repeated insistence, submittd frequently in
writing and orally, that the Siniora cabinet does not exist
legally at all -- not ven in caretaker status. This
establishes a recrd that there is a constitutional vacuum
where te office of the Prime Minister and the cabinet as
whole should be. Thus, the powers of those offices can be
argued to revert to the President himslf.

NEXT, PREVENT PARLIAMENT FROM MEETING,
AN USE CONSTITUTION TO DISSOLVE IT

BEIRUT 00000655 002 OF 004


--------------


5. (S) The next step for Lahoud is to wait until May 31,
when the ordinary session of the parliament expires, without
the parliament having met in a single session. At this
point, Lahoud invokes Article 65, which allows for the
dissolution of the parliament if, "for no compelling reason,
(the Chamber of Deputies) fails to meet during one of its
regular sessions. . . . While Article 65 empowers the
Council of Ministers at the request of the President to
dissolve the parliament, if there is no Council of Ministers,
then Lahoud will argue that he is solely responsible.

WITHOUT PARLIAMENT, LAHOUD
IS FREE TO APPOINT PM, CABINET
--------------


6. (S) Once the parliament is dissolved (and, more
importantly for the purpose of this discussion, Berri is
without a job or role),then Lahoud will appoint a new prime
minister. While Lebanon's parliament calls for mandatory
consultations by which the president is bound to ask the
candidate who receives the most support from MPs to try to
form a cabinet, if there is no parliament, then there are no
MPs to bestow their choices for PM in the president's hand.
Moreover, the new PM can choose whatever ministers he and
Lahoud agree upon, as well as whatever government program
they want, because there is no parliament to give a vote of
confidence. "A coup d'etat!" Berri roared.

AND LAHOUD GIVES PRESIDENCY
TO ANOTHER PRO-SYRIAN STOOGE
--------------


7. (S) At this point, two scenarios emerge. Article 25 of
the constitution calls for new parliamentary elections within
three months, in the case of the dissolution of the
parliament. While elections would by necessity be conducted
under the discredited 2000 election law (as there is no
cabinet and no parliament to approve a new law),a pro-Syrian
majority would certainly emerge this time, given the near
certainty that March 14 supporters would boycott both running
and voting. That pro-Syrian majority in the new faux
parliament would then be in place in time to elect Lebanon's
next president to succeed the stooge extraordinaire when
Lahoud's term expires November 24. The second scenario would
be that no elections take place, and the cabinet appointed by
Lahoud assumes the role of the presidency until such time as
new parliamentary elections can be held.

'PLOT' EXPLAINS LAHOUD'S RECENT CURIOUS ACTIONS
--------------


8. (S) Berri said that this "plot" explains two recent
developments that previously he found curious. First, he
wondered why Lahoud had not "taken the pressure off me" for a
month, by invoking Article 59 of the constitution. That
article gives the president the right to ask parliament to
adjourn for a month. Berri said that he wanted Lahoud to use
that, so that he was not the only person blamed for keeping
parliament closed. But now he realizes that Lahoud, had he
used Article 59, would not be able to invoke the constitution
in dissolving parliament -- there would suddenly be a
"compelling reason" why parliament didn't meet. The second
strange thing is that, according to information Berri has,
Prime Minister Siniora offered to Lahoud in a recent phone
call to resign, once the tribunal was established, if Lahoud
would recognize his cabinet as a caretaker cabinet according
to the constitution. Lahoud reportedly refused. That struck
Berri initially as strange, since Siniora's resignation offer
would normally be something Lahoud should seize. But, if
Lahoud recognized Siniora's cabinet as a caretaker cabinet,
then the normal consultative process would begin, derailing
the coup plot.

OPENING PARLIAMENT -- BUT IN A LIMITED WAY
--------------


9. (S) The Ambassador noted that there was one easy way to
avoid the entire scenario: open parliament at once, as so
many people have been urging. "I'm coming to that," Berri
said, stating that he needed our help. He said that he
wanted to open parliament in such a way so as to avoid
implying legitimacy on the Siniora cabinet and to prevent
parliamentary action that could "split the country." He said
that the Speaker of the European Parliament was coming to

BEIRUT 00000655 003 OF 004


Lebanon soon, and thus Berri was thinking about calling a
session for MPs to hear the European visitor. He would have
done the same for Speaker Pelosi, had he realized in April
what Lahoud intended. This session to hear the visitor would
count as an ordinary session, thus depriving Lahoud of the
constitutional ability to dissolve parliament. But, to do
this, Berri urged the Ambassador to help him convince the
March 14 majority to send only MPs, not government ministers
and not Siniora, and to agree to listen to the visitor and
leave, without trying to force further parliamentary action.


10. (S) Help me convince them, Berri begged, to see that,
even if they don't like such a limited session, it is better
than having no sessions. Berri clarified that he did not
want the Ambassador to share with March 14 leaders the entire
plot he described, just the fear that Lahoud could try to
dissolve parliament if it doesn't meet. "If I read about
this in the papers, I'll have to keep parliament closed
completely." (Comment: Berri was not explicit, but we think
he was suggesting that he is under Syrian orders to deny any
legitimacy to the Siniora cabinet. Having the ministers sit
as usual on the dais behind the Speaker would do that, so he
wants our help in avoiding such a scene. He is also under
orders, presumably, not to allow controversial discussions
such as Hizballah's arms or the tribunal to reach the Chamber
floor. But he does not seem to be under -- at least not yet
-- an absolute Syrian order to keep the chamber completely
shuttered. So, under the proposed session, Berri could tell
the Syrians that he scrupulously followed their orders and
had no idea that they intended the parliament to be closed
entirely. We don't doubt that Berri plays games even with
the Syrians. End Comment.)


11. (S) The Ambassador asked Berri whether he really
thought Lahoud was so clever as to come up with such a
complicated scheme on his own. "Of course not!" Berri
shouted. The Syrians gave him the basic outlines, and
Lahoud's legal advisor Selim Jeressaiti came up with the
implementation plan. The Ambassador asked whether Michel
Aoun would bring his bloc along. Yes, because the stereotype
about Aoun being obsessed with the presidency is true. All
the pro-Syrians have shown him how the status quo will never
result in an Aoun presidency, whereas this situation might.
"I am really worried," Berri said.

BERRI EXPRESSES LITTLE CONCERN
WITH UNSC ACTION ON TRIBUNAL
--------------


12. (S) The Ambassador asked Berri how Chapter VII
consideration of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon affected
his thinking: if the UNSC established the tribunal now,
would it be easier for him to call for a more normal
parliamentary session? Berri said that the tribunal and the
Lahoud scenario he described aren't related at all. Throwing
up his hands, he said of the tribunal that the UNSC should
"approve it under Chapter VII, Chapter 67, or whatever -- I
don't care!"

COMMENT
--------------


13. (S) Talk of two cabinets has been buzzing through
Lebanon's political circles for weeks. But Berri's scenario
-- which did not strike us as that far-fetched, now that we
have been musing on it all afternoon -- sets up two entirely
parallel structures. The March 14 majority would continue to
recognize Siniora's cabinet and the existing parliament, as
would most of the international community. But what would
the Lebanese Armed Forces do, if Hizballah-filled mobs start
to try to take over ministries or even the Grand Serail in
order to install "their" ministers? And what happens when it
comes time to elect a new president? We have only until May
31 to prevent such a scenario from unfolding, if what Berri
suspects is what the Syrians and Lahoud actually have in
mind.


14. (S) Taking it all personally, Berri struck us as truly
infuriated that someone would tinker with "his" institution.
He postured as if he had been left out of the Syrian scheming
(or, more correctly, let in on only part of the Syrian
scheming). If he now realizes that he was being used by the
Syrians to destroy the institution he heads, maybe he can be
a useful ally in denying Lahoud the pleasure of picking his
own PM and cabinet. But it is not plausible that Berri told
us everything he knows or thinks, about this or anything

BEIRUT 00000655 004 OF 004


else. Maybe he was part of the planning but only belatedly
realized that there is no guarantee he will be back as
Speaker in what would be a far more Hizballah-dominated
second parliament. Maybe he doesn't want to be torn between
leaving his current position upon Lahoud's dissolution
orders, when he knows that the March 14 rump parliament will
continue to meet and enjoy international legitimacy. We tend
to agree that it is better to have a parliament session even
under Berri's restricted scenario than to have no parliament
session at all, but we must think about how Berri might be
trying to enlist us in foisting his own ideas onto the March
14 majority. We cannot recall a more significant or
interesting meeting with the Speaker. Stay tuned.
FELTMAN