LEBANON: HARIRI PROMISES SINIORA WILL SEND SECOND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000651

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2017
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: HARIRI PROMISES SINIORA WILL SEND SECOND
LETTER; ASSURES US THAT SAUDIS ARE ONBOARD


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b)
.

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Indicative of increasing momentum toward Chapter
VII, March 14 parliamentary majority leader Saad Hariri told
the Ambassador in a 5/8 meeting that PM Siniora is about to
send a second, more emphatic letter to UNSYG Ban Ki-moon.
Although Chapter VII was not explicitly referred to in the
draft presented to the Ambassador, Hariri indicated that he
would persuade the Prime Minister to insert that phrase if
the U.S. and France believe it could be pivotal. Hariri,
just returned from a visit to Riyadh, said that despite
rumors to the contrary, the Saudi royal family firmly
supports the use of Chapter VII, if that is the only way to
establish the tribunal. The Future Movement leader also said
he was using his influence to turn off any further travel to
Lebanon by the UN Secretary General prior to a Security
Council vote, saying any such visit would play directly into
the hands of Syria and Hizballah. Lastly, he conveyed the
message that Saudi leadership believes Syria and Iran had a
slight falling out during last week's Sharm al Sheikh
conference, with the Iranians upset that Syria's foreign
minister had apparently wasted an opportunity by allowing
SecState to set a narrow Iraqi agenda for their bilateral
meeting. End summary.


2. (C) Saad Hariri, son of slain former Prime Minister
Rafiq Hariri, met with the Ambassador and Special Assistant
on 5/8 in his heavily fortified residence in West Beirut.
One of Hariri's close advisors, Dr. Ghattas Khoury, also
attended the meeting. Hariri said he had just returned from
Saudi Arabia where he attended the funeral of one of King
Abdullah's closest family members and was returning almost
immediately due to the death of yet another royal prince. He
indicated that PM Siniora was currently in London and would
be visiting several other capitals this week in an
accelerating effort to gain additional support for the
approaching showdown in the Security Council.

INCREASED PACE TO GATHER SUPPORT
--------------


3. (C) MP Hariri clearly indicated that the time for
negotiation with the opposition was over and that all
energies were now directed toward winning passage of Chapter
VII authority. Based upon his consultations in Riyadh, he
said the Saudis had sent a message to the Syrian regime
during the Sharm al Sheikh conference that the Special
Tribunal was going to happen, with the implied message that
the Syrians should instruct Hizballah accordingly.
Responding to recently heard rumors that Saudi Arabia was not
truly onboard with the Chapter VII option, Hariri flatly
stated that King Abdullah was completely supportive of the
effort and had instructed his foreign policy apparatus "not
to stop for any reason until the measure has passed."


4. (C) The majority leader also said that PM Fouad Siniora
had spoken with SYG Ban Ki-moon on 5/7 and had re-emphasized
that the internal process was hopelessly stalemated and if
the UN was serious about the tribunal, the Security Council
would have to use its authority -- and as soon as possible.
Reportedly, PM Siniora also informed the SYG that another
visit to Beirut was not necessary and could well be
counter-productive, because it would reward the delay tactics
of Syria and its proxy, Hizballah. Hariri also said he would
lobby UN Special Envoy to Lebanon Geir Pedersen to advise the
SYG of the futility of another visit to Beirut. (The
Ambassador met Pedersen later in the day; Pedersen said that
he, too, recommended against another Ban trip to Beirut.
"When you have the nine votes, move!" Pedersen emphasized.)


5. (C) In a further attempt to quiet unfounded rumors of
wavering Lebanese commitment to Chapter VII, Hariri stated
that Siniora was about to send a second letter to Ban
Ki-moon, with significantly more specific language in it
explaining previous unsuccessful efforts to resolve the
impasse internally and the unrealistic and ultimately
unreasonable demands the anti-tribunal opposition, and its
Syrian masters, were making. Hariri presented a draft of the
proposed Siniora letter and asked the Ambassador for his

BEIRUT 00000651 002 OF 004


comments and suggested changes. The Ambassador said he would
ask Washington and New York for their views, particularly on
the operative "request" paragraph of the letter and would
respond as soon as practicable. (Note: The draft text of
this section of Siniora's letter is contained below.)


6. (C) Referring to other reports that the Russians thought
that Siniora may be hedging a bit, Hariri explained that
Russian President Putin may have misconstrued Siniora in a
5/6 telephone call in which Siniora understandably mentioned
that an internal political solution would have been
preferable, when what the Prime Minister wanted to emphasize
was that it had been attempted, but had failed. Hariri
continued that PM Siniora had also emphasized to the Russian
president that "those that want civil war" (i.e. Syria) in
Lebanon should not be rewarded and that Putin had indicated
he understood.


7. (C) Referring to related diplomatic efforts, Hariri,
whose father was a close friend of French President Jacques
Chirac, said that Chirac has also just spoken with Putin and
urged him to throw Russia's important support to the
tribunal. According to Hariri, Putin listened to the
persuasive French president and had indicated a possible
change of heart when he assured Chirac that "at the end of
the day" Russia would support Lebanon.


8. (C) Other efforts underway by Hariri and PM Siniora
include receiving a promise from Pakistan's President
Musharrif to lobby Indonesia and the Senegalese President's
assurances that he would urge support for the tribunal from
their neighbors Ghana and the Congo, current members of the
Security Council. Lastly, Hariri said he would use his
considerable influence in South Africa to help win over their
support as well.

REQUEST FOR ACTIVE U.S. INVOLVEMENT
--------------


9. (C) But what was really needed at this point, Hariri
maintained was engagement at the highest levels in the USG,
perhaps even at the White House. Hariri suggested that
direct requests for support of Chapter VII at that level
would ensure passage, particularly when one considered the
list of still-undecided council members. Hariri also asked
for advice as to whether sending a parliamentary delegation
to New York would be effective at this point, or perhaps a
second letter from the pro-reform parliamentary bloc. He
indicated they were willing to try any maneuver to achieve
the tribunal, because without it, a democratic Lebanon will
probably not survive.

STRATEGY ONCE THE TRIBUNAL IS ESTABLISHED
--------------


10. (C) Hariri felt that once the tribunal is established,
all the energies of March 14 should be directed toward the
upcoming presidential election. Trying to force the
Parliament open against the stubborn opposition of Nabih
Berri was almost hopeless until the start of the presidential
season sometime in mid-September. He agreed with the
Ambassador that March 14 has a less-than-stellar record when
it comes to projecting a clear, appealing message, but they
were working hard to eliminate that critical weakness.


11. (C) But beyond formulating a message, Hariri said it
would also be necessary to re-engage with Speaker Berri.
Despite his obvious flaws, he viewed the Speaker as the
unavoidable conduit for reaching some sort of agreement with
the opposition over the issue of the presidency. He did
express confidence that if the tribunal is finally
established, it would help immeasurably in the anticipated
negotiations because a definite shift in fortunes would be
evident to the people of Lebanon.


12. (C) Hariri explained how his lengthy negotiations with
Berri earlier this spring had essentially been put on hold
and he believed he could pick up close to where the talks had
recessed. The primary objective, he believes, is to somehow
get representatives of the Shia community back into the
government. He thought that would require some adjustment in
the cabinet, most likely an expansion which would permit
greater flexibility in representation, but under no

BEIRUT 00000651 003 OF 004


circumstances should March 14 give the opposition the
undeserved victory of a new government.


13. (C) In his opinion, the key to the situation in Lebanon
are negotiations with Iran, whose leadership he believes have
a suspect opinion of Syrian judgment and strategy. Hariri
said he couldn't believe that Iran, after investing so many
resources in Hizballah, would jeopardize their prize
possession for the sake of the Syrian regime. Accordingly,
he argued the Iranians want to close the book on the tribunal
and concentrate their efforts on Lebanon's presidency, with
the goal being a president who would protect Hizballah's
privileged position and relative immunity from the laws that
govern all the other confessions in Lebanon.


14. (C) He bluntly stated that almost all of Lebanon's
presidential aspirants now realize the next president will be
somewhere between the two opposing camps. "All except Aoun,
of course" who would never admit to a reality which does not
result in his presidency. He concluded that it was really
only Syria that does not want some type of resolution to the
question of the presidency -- they would much prefer
political chaos, which would presumably facilitate a Syrian
return.


15. (C) Perhaps reflecting allegiance to his principal
source of power, Hariri stated that Saudi Arabia was
Lebanon's best hope of influencing Iran toward more
acceptable behavior. Interestingly, he said that in his many
discussions with Saudi leadership, their biggest fear is
being "left out in the cold" as a result of some
unanticipated agreement between Iran and the U.S. He
recounted the steps that he says Saudi Arabia has taken to
advance stability in the region: taking the initiative to
discuss issues with Iran, calling a meeting of seven Islamic
countries in Pakistan, resurrecting their original Middle
East peace initiative, and trying to assist struggling Iraq
through significant debt write-offs. According to Hariri,
his benefactors are still waiting for others to step forward
as they have, and seeing "how far out in front" they are in
the region is making them increasingly nervous. In closing,
Hariri suggested that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia cooperate
more closely on regional solutions, particularly making a
genuine effort to finally resolve the decades-old tragedy of
the Palestinian people.

TEXT OF DRAFT SINIORA LETTER
--------------


16. (C) Text of draft Siniora letter to SYG Ban Ki-moon
(Note: the opening three paragraphs, which the Ambassador
read but was given a copy, were simply a recap of the
political events that led to the present impasse.)

Begin quote:

In light of the above, and further to the communication of
the parliamentary majority to you on May (insert date)
reaffirming their position in support of the Special
Tribunal, the Lebanese Government believes that the time has
come for the United Nations to help Lebanon make the Special
Tribunal a reality. We therefore ask you, as a matter of
urgency, to put before the Security Council our request that
the Special Tribunal be put into effect. A binding decision
regarding the Tribunal on the part of the Security Council
will be fully consistent with the importance the UN has
attached to this matter from the outset, when the
investigation commission was established. Further delays in
setting up the Tribunal would be most detrimental to
Lebanon,s stability, to the cause of justice, to the UN,s
own credibility, and to peace and security in the region.

End quote.

COMMENT
--------------


17. (C) It is good news that Siniora, apparently, tried to
dissuade Ban Ki-Moon from traveling again to Beirut. Geir
Pedersen told the Ambassador separately that a SYG trip would
be "bad for the UN (as the SYG's mission would fail) and bad
for Lebanon" (as the SYG's trip would simply delay action,
leaving Lebanon in dangerous limbo for a longer period of

BEIRUT 00000651 004 OF 004


time). So, if the Ban trip is definitively off, then PM
Siniora should presumably conclude the drafting of his
letter. We know that Mohamad Chatah was waiting for a copy
of the draft resolution, to align as closely as possible the
language in the Siniora letter to what is in the resolution.
To the best of our knowledge, the GOL does not yet have the
draft UNSCR.


18. (C) We will provide any comments from Washington and
New York on the timing and the language of the letter to PM
Siniora and Chatah when they return from the PM's private
trip to the UK (where he is attending his daughter's
graduation) and official visit to Portugal. We do not expect
that Siniora will be able to send his letter any earlier than
Friday evening, given his travel and his need to consult with
his cabinet and March 14 allies.
FELTMAN