Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BEIRUT207
2007-02-08 09:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: LAWYER FOR JAILED GENERAL JAMIL AS-SAYED

Tags:  PGOV KCRM PTER SHUM LE SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1607
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0207/01 0390955
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 080955Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7369
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000207 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017
TAGS: PGOV KCRM PTER SHUM LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: LAWYER FOR JAILED GENERAL JAMIL AS-SAYED
MAKES HIS CASE FOR RELEASE


Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Sections 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000207

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017
TAGS: PGOV KCRM PTER SHUM LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: LAWYER FOR JAILED GENERAL JAMIL AS-SAYED
MAKES HIS CASE FOR RELEASE


Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Sections 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Akram Azoury, attorney for the jailed former head of
Lebanon's Surete Generale, Jamil as-Sayed, met with DCM
February 5 to present the case for as-Sayed's release from
prison. Azoury, a respected human rights lawyer, said that
the only basis for the Lebanese government's incarceration of
as-Sayed had been testimony given to the UNIIIC by the Syrian
national Zouhair Saddik, who has since been discredited as a
witness. Azoury reports that Prosecutor General Said Mirza
so much as admitted to UNIIIC Commissioner Serge Brammertz
that as-Sayed remains in jail for political rather than
criminal reasons. Azoury believes that Mirza and
Investigative Judge Elias Eid will not release as-Sayed
unless they receive a political green light to do so, with
Sa'ad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt controlling this political
decision. Azoury cited Brammertz's December 12 report as
signalling that Brammertz no longer felt there was reason to
keep as-Sayed in jail. Azoury also argued that as-Sayed's
release from prison would enhance the political credibility
of the UNIIIC and Special Tribunal. Finally, Azoury supplied
us with four recommendations for changes in the statute that
would govern the Special Tribunal. None are of great
substance, and unsurprisingly, all would run to the benefit
of Azoury's client, as-Sayed. End Summary.


2. (C) This past week, Akram Azoury, attorney for jailed
former Surete General Director General Jamil as-Sayed, sent
two documents to the Ambassador, over a cover letter in
as-Sayed's name. Both texts were addressed to Lebanese
Prosecutor General Said Mirza and Investigative Judge Elias
Eid, and submitted by Azoury in as-Sayed's name. The first
document, dated December 14, 2006, asks for withdrawal of the
arrest warrant against Jamil as-Sayed, based on the content
of UNIIIC Commissioner Serge Brammertz's December 12 report

to the UN Secretary General. The second document, dated
January 9, 2007, criticizes the non-responsiveness of the
Lebanese judicial system to as-Sayed's previous entreaties
for release. It also argues in more detail that his
continued incarceration is politically motivated.

AS-SAYED'S EXONERATION
--------------


3. (C) On February 5, DCM hosted for lunch Akram Azoury,
who was accompanied by Jamil as-Sayed's son Malek, also a
lawyer. Azoury has kept in contact with DCM and other Perm-5
Embassy officials in Beirut since the outset of as-Sayed's
incarceration. He said that Commissioner Brammertz's latest
report, issued December 12, 2006, confirms that Brammertz no
longer believes that there is an evidentiary basis for
keeping as-Sayed in jail. Accordingly, Investigative Judge
Eid should release him immediately.


4. (C) Azoury said that the sole basis for jailing as-Sayed
in late August, 2005 had been testimony that former UNIIIC
Commissioner Detlev Mehlis drew from a Syrian witness,
Zouhair Saddik. Since then, Saddik's testimony has been
discredited by contradictions and inconsistencies with known
facts. His unreliable character was demonstrated when he
absconded to France. Azoury said that Brammertz told Judges
Mirza and Eid of Saddik's lies and contradictions in a
meeting that took place in Mirza's office on December 8, four
days before Brammertz released his report. This is the
reason, Azoury continued, why Brammertz signalled in his
report that Jamil as-Sayed should be released. The relevant
language came in para 96 of Brammertz's December 12 report.
This text reads in pertinent part: "The Commission regularly
shares with the appropriate Lebanese authorities the
substance of all relevant information that it obtains . . .
this includes an analytical report on the credibility of a
witness, recently transmitted to the Prosecutor General and
the Investigative Judge assigned to the Hariri case. This
process is of particular importance where the information is
relevant to individuals who are detained. . ."


5. (C) DCM responded that para 10 of Brammertz's December
report noted that the UN Commission and the Prosecutor
General's office might refrain from placing certain
information in the public domain. Was this caveat relevant
here and thus could there be other information against
as-Sayed, beyond the Saddiq testimony? Azoury admitted the
point about para 10, but said it was not a factor in the

BEIRUT 00000207 002 OF 003


case. Former UNIIIC Commissioner Mehlis had recommended the
jailing of as-Sayed solely on the basis of the Saddik
testimony. No further incriminating information has been
found. In sum, Azoury said, even Commissioner Brammertz has
now declared that Jamil as-Sayed should no longer be in jail.
s for as-Sayed's plans if he were released, Azoury said
as-Sayed would stay in Lebanon and comply with any other
terms imposed upon him.


6. (C) Azoury said that it will take a political "green
light" for Mirza and Eid to release as-Sayed. Judges in
Lebanon, he commented, still retain the mentality, left over
from the Syrian occupation, that they cannot take major
judicial decisions without clear approval from those who
wield political power. Azoury said that in as-Sayed's case,
the political decision-makers will be Future Movement leader
Saad Hariri and Druse leader Walid Jumblatt. Azoury observed
that as-Sayed has the highest political profile of the four
generals jailed since August 2005, but he had the least to do
with the assassination of Hariri or the subsequent
investigation. By contrast, jailed General Mustafa Hamdan,
former head of the Presidential Guard, has the lowest
political profile, but was the most involved in the
assassination, especially in compromising the crime site in
the hours and days after the Hariri bombing. Azoury said
that the other two jailed generals, former head of the
Internal Security Forces Ali al-Hajj and former head of
Lebanese Armed Forces intelligence (G-2) Raymond Azar, fall
in between as-Sayed and Hamdan, both in their political
profiles and in their closeness to the assassination. Azoury
said that he has had no contact with the attorneys for the
other generals. He also commented that as-Sayed dislikes
Hamdan personally.

FLAWED JUSTICE; FOLLOWED UP
--------------


7. (C) Azoury reported that he visited UNIIIC Commissioner
Brammertz about six times between June and December of 2006.
In each instance, Azoury's mesage has been that there is no
substantial evidence against as-Sayed, that Judges Mirza and
Eid have been unresponsive to well-grounded legal pleadings,
and that Mirza and Eid are operating on political rather than
juridical motives. Azoury's memo of January 9, 2007 is far
more pointed than any of his previous memoranda, alleging a
series of statements by Mirza and Eid that contravene basic
principles of justice. This memo also recounts a threatening
effort by former Commissioner Mehlis and his assistant
Gerhard Lehmann to induce as-Sayed to finger a culprit, any
culprit, in the Hariri assassination in return for
exonerating as-Sayed himself. Azoury had previously
recounted this story to us only orally. This time he put it
in writing. He also said that he has sent his memos of
December 14 and January 9 to members of Lebanon's governing
March 14 political coalition. Finally, he added that he is
suing Mehlis and Lehmann in Lebanese and German courts for
false accusations and defamation of character.


8. (C) As for political efforts to release as-Sayed, Azoury
said that he raised the issue with his "old friend," Prime
Minister Fouad Siniora. Siniora sent him to see Justice
Minister Charles Rizk. Now, Rizk is reflecting upon the
case, but mainly with a view toward his own presidential
ambitions. Azoury mentioned that a prominent French human
rights lawyer with the organization "Solida" may soon come to
Beirut to look into the case.


9. (C) Azoury argued that releasing Jamil as-Sayed would
enhance the credibility of the Special Tribunal process that
has now engulfed Lebanon's internal political scene. (Azoury
noted here that Jamil as-Sayed himself favors early
establishment of the Tribunal.) As-Sayed's release, with
some official acknowledgement that there is no credible
evidence against him, would bolster confidence in the the
Special Tribunal by showing that the UN-sponsored process can
act fairly toward those who are accused, and render justice
without regard to political imperatives.

THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
--------------


10. (C) Quite understandably, Azoury had some ideas on the
Special Tribunal to try suspects in the Hariri assassination
and related crimes, as authorized in UNSC Resolution 1664.
He said there is a distinction between the Special Tribunal
for Lebanon and other international tribunals. The Lebanese
Tribunal is set up to try only a single case (and perhaps

BEIRUT 00000207 003 OF 003


other related cases),rather than broad-reaching charges of
genocide. The impact of this is that the Lebanon Tribunal
will be adjudicating a classic criminal case, rather than
seeking a political judgment of guilt for say, 100,000 deaths
that have not been examined individually -- as had been the
case with the Carla del Ponte prosecution of Slobodan
Milosevic.


11. (C) Azoury, after recounting the Tribunal's political
difficulties in Lebanon, said a solution would be the
following: members of the Security Council should ask the
new UN Secretary General to write a letter to the Lebanese,
in which the SYG says that the "go sign" for the Tribunal
will not be given until the Commission has finished its work
of identifying the suspects in the assassination. (Comment:
On February 7, we ran this idea by Judge Ralph Riachy, one of
the GOL's two judges who have been negotiating the Tribunal
with the UN. Riachy was entirely dismissive, saying that it
is not the role of the UNIIIC to come up with such a
definitive statement on who is guilty, or at least almost
certainly guilty. End Comment.)


12. (C) Azoury also provided us with a paper on
modifications to the proposed Statute for the Special
Tribunal. He makes four suggestions:

-- There should be a mechanism to allow for the dismissal of
judges, and for judges to recuse themselves.

-- There should be a mechanism to allow for releasing
suspects who are jailed provisionally.

-- Legal recourses of the defendants (e.g., apppeals) should
be provided for, independent of the Tribunal itself, since
the Tribunal will pass out of existence at some future time.

-- There should be a mechanism to hold the Tribunal's judges
responsible for serious or intentional mistakes.

We will find it interesting to see if the internal Lebanese
political debate on the Tribunal picks up any of these
proposals, all of which run to the favor of defendants.

COMMENT
--------------


13. (C) As we have reported before, this is an extremely
awkward issue. While hinting obliquely that he suspects
as-Sayed's involvement in the Hariri assassination, UNIIIC
Commissioner Brammertz has told us that he has no solid
evidence that would meet international standards in
justifying the ongoing detention of as-Sayed and the three
other generals. Brammertz has noted his discomfort with the
human rights and legal aspects of these detentions. But even
Brammertz recognizes that releasing as-Sayed would be
interpreted as an enormous victory for Syria and its Lebanese
proxies. Were as-Sayed freed, March 14 leaders would be
demoralized, believing (perhaps rightly) that the
investigation is much further from the truth than hoped.


14. (C) Knowing of Brammertz' concerns, we have long urged
the GOL to investigate how as-Sayed, a public servant,
obtained the USD 20 million in his local bank accounts, in
hopes that the GOL would be able to press other charges to
keep him in jail. The GOL has failed to follow up, perhaps
out of fear of what would be discovered regarding the origin
of those funds. Given as-Sayed's power and connections to
the Syrian occupying authorities for many years, surely the
Lebanese could have found something on which to base his
ongoing detention. In any case, given Prosecutor General
Mirza's general timidness and his close connections to the
Hariri family, we do not expect Mirza to release as-Sayed
soon.
FELTMAN