WITH NAHR AL-BARID IN LAF HANDS, DEFMIN MURR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001346

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PARM LE SY QA
SUBJECT: WITH NAHR AL-BARID IN LAF HANDS, DEFMIN MURR
CLAIMS SHAKR AL-ABSI DEAD

BEIRUT 00001346 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, based on 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) On 9/3, Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister
Elias Murr called the Ambassador to report that the wife of
Fatah al-Islam (FAI) leader Shakr al-Absi had positively
identified the body of her husband, apparently killed on the
last day of fighting on 9/2 in the Nahr al-Barid camp. While
Murr said that formal confirmation would await DNA testing,
he was now convinced that both Absi and Abu Selim Taha,
another Fatah al-Islam leader, had been killed. The LAF
killed Nasser Ismail, another terrorist leader, 9/3 (We
caution that, in Lebanon, preliminary information is often
subsequently proven false; we recommend not commenting on
Absi's death until formal confirmation by the GOL.) Murr
reported 39 FAI fighters killed on the last day and 19
arrested (figures slightly above what the media is
reporting). Murr speculated that the decision by FAI to
launch "kamikaze" operations early on 9/2 against the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) was triggered by two
developments: first, FAI somehow knew that the USG, in the
aftermath of CENTCOM Commander Fallon's visit, had delivered
SMAW-D weapons to the LAF, capable of penetrating the FAI
bunkers. Second, Qatar was secretly brokering a potential
surrender deal because of which FAI assumed the LAF had
lowered its guard slightly (an FAI assumption Murr claimed
was deadly wrong). While MP Walid Jumblatt and PM Siniora's
aide Mohamed Chatah found the Qatari role suspicious, Murr
thought that the Qataris had merely been naive, hopeful of
being seen as peacemakers as opposed to the Saudi fighters
within FAI. While a final tally of FAI terrorists killed
needs to await further examination, 158 LAF soldiers and
officers were killed in what is without question a victory
for the LAF and for the state of Lebanon over international
terrorists. The USG role in keeping the LAF equipped was
essential to this success. End summary.

MURR CONVINCED SHAKR AL-ABSI IS DEAD
--------------


2. (S) After having met with the Ambassador for over two
hours on 9/1 to discuss, inter alia, developments in Nahar
al-Barid, Deputy PM and Defense Minister Elias Murr updated
us by phone throughout the day on 9/2 regarding what turned
out to be the final battle for the Nahr al-Barid refugee
camp, in which the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) prevailed over
the Fatah al-Islam (FAI) terrorists. On 9/3, Murr phoned to
say that the body of FAI leader Shakr al-Absi (sentenced in
death in Jordan for the 2002 murder of USAID diplomat Larry
Foley) had been positively identified in six individual
visits: four captured FAI fighters who were with Absi in the
bunker, a Palestinian cleric ("Sheikh Hajj") who had
negotiated with Absi on and off through the Nahr al-Barid
battle, and, most convincingly, his wife, who Murr said broke
down into hysterics upon seeing the body, cursing and
pummeling with her fists those accompanying her to the
Tripoli hospital.


3. (S) Murr said that, with the face badly disfigured by
burning, he would await the results of DNA testing (comparing
Absi with his son, in detention) before making formal
confirmation, probably on Tuesday, of Absi's death. But he
said that he was convinced. He also claimed that witnesses
had identified the body of Abu Selim Taha, another FAI
leader. Mid-day on 9/3, Murr called to report that Nasser
Ismail, who had been a leader of FAI's terrorist operations,
had remained hidden in the Nahr al-Barid ruins. When he
tried to escape with four others on 9/3 after the fighting
had stopped, the LAF killed him as well, arresting the four
others.

"KAMIKAZE" OPERATION ON FINAL DAY
--------------


4. (S) Murr's account of the last day of the battle varies
slightly from what other sources and the media are reporting
(and we note that there might never be a single, accurate
account, although the picture should become clearer in the
coming days). Murr described a "kamikaze" FAI operation that
started on 9/2 at about 3 a.m. against LAF positions, after
what had been a relatively quiet night. (Other sources say

BEIRUT 00001346 002.2 OF 004


that LAF pounding had provoked the suicidal assault by FAI.)
Consistent with other reports, Murr said that the FAI assault
was designed in part to distract the LAF while some FAI
fighters and leaders took other routes to escape the camp.
Murr said that the LAF, which suffered five deaths of its own
on 9/2 (bringing the total LAF deaths to 158 since 5/20),
ultimately killed 39 FAI fighters, including six who were
tracked down outside the camp (including a couple in "sleeper
cell" awakened in Tripoli),and arrested 19. (The media
reports 35 killed and 15 arrested.)


5. (S) Murr praised the people of Tripoli in the
surrounding area, saying that they had helped the army in
trying to locate FAI fighters trying to escape. While he did
not rule out the possibility that a few might have managed to
evade the tight LAF checkpoints established throughout the
country and the vigilance of local Lebanese, he did not
believe that FAI leaders or large numbers had gotten away.
The Ambassador noted that, as of 9/1, Murr estimated that 95
FAI fighters remained in the camp. If 39 (including two from
the sleeper cell) were killed and 19 arrested, that left
30-40 FAI fighters unaccounted for from his estimates on
Saturday. Murr said to await final investigation of the
bunkers, interrogation of those arrested, etc. He said that
more bodies may be discovered in the bunkers. Murr said that
he regretted that Absi had been killed, given the
intelligence value of his interrogation.

MURR SPECULATES THAT FAI ASSAULT
DUE TO U.S. WEAPONRY, QATARI DIPLOMACY
--------------


6. (S) Asked what had provoked the FAI "kamikaze" assault
early on 9/2, Murr said that he thought two factors came into
play. First, FAI probably had received word somehow about
the arrival of the U.S.-provided SMAW-D weaponry, a tangible
result of the 8/26 visit of CENTCOM Commander Admiral Fallon.
"We know they somehow we able to monitor what was happening
outside the camp," Murr said. FAI probably had incomplete
understanding about what the USG was providing but knew that
the LAF had new technology to enable penetration of the last
FAI bunkers. "For all the reasons you know, we can't thank
you as much publicly as you deserve," Murr said, "but please
pass on my personal appreciation to everyone." Second, the
FAI fighters had assumed, because of a Qatari diplomatic
effort aimed at getting FAI to surrender, that the LAF would
be more relaxed than usual, allowing the FAI assault to
successfully distract the LAF as other FAI fighters and
leaders escaped. The FAI was "deadly wrong" in assuming the
LAF was not on full alert, Murr said.

QATARI NEGOTIATIONS ON FAI SURRENDER?
--------------


7. (S) Earlier, on 9/1, Murr had gone into detail into what
he insisted was a Qatari diplomatic effort to persuade the
remaining FAI fighters to surrender. According to Murr's
report, an official from Doha arrived a few days ago to work
with the Qatari ambassador. Using the Palestinian cleric
"Sheikh Hajj" as an intermediary with FAI, the Qataris
presented three conditions to the LAF for FAI surrender, all
of which Murr accepted: presence of the Qataris when the FAI
fighters emerged from their bunkers (to prevent the LAF from
executing them),presence of ICRC personnel on the buses
transporting them to MOD (to prevent enraged local Lebanese
or relatives of killed LAF soldiers from murdering them en
route),and ICRC access to them in the MOD prison to ensure
no mistreatment. Late on 9/1, Murr called to report that FAI
had asked for a fourth condition, that the families of Shakr
al-Absi and Abu Selim Taha be given safe passage to Damascus,
a condition Murr said he had not accepted.


8. (S) Asked why the Qataris would be involved, Murr mused
that it had to do with Qatar's competition with Saudi Arabia.
Look at the contrast, he urged. If successful, Qatar would
appear to be a peacemaker, a successful diplomatic player.
By contrast, many of the fighters who would emerge in a
surrender of the 95 persons thought to be remaining on 9/1 (a
number passed from Sheikh Hajj to the Qataris) would be
Saudis. This would be a great embarrassment to Saudi Arabia.
According to Sheikh Hajj, the Qataris themselves did not
take the initiative to get involved but were suggested by
Shakr al-Absi as potential intermediaries. But they quickly

BEIRUT 00001346 003.2 OF 004


saw the diplomatic value of saying yes. In the aftermath of
the 9/2 FAI assault, Murr thought that the Qataris had been
"naive," tricked into persuading the LAF to stand back (which
he insisted the LAF never did). Predictably, MP Walid
Jumblatt and Senior Advisor to PM Siniora Mohamed Chatah
(both of whom independently told the Ambassador of Qatar's
supposed diplomatic initiative) were more suspicious, with
Jumblatt calling the Qatari role "fishy," and Chatah claiming
that "the Qataris are not naive."

INVESTIGATIONS OF CAPTURED FAI FIGHTERS
TO BE CONDUCTED JOINTLY BY LAF-ISF, MURR SAYS
--------------


9. (S) Murr reported that the investigation of the captured
FAI fighters would be conducted by a joint task force made up
of seven officers from the LAF's G-2 intelligence division
and seven officers from the Internal Security Service's
intelligence division, under the leadership of the G-2's
General Georges Khoury and the ISF's Col. Wissam al-Hassan.
It is essential that the two intelligence agencies cooperate,
Murr said. If the G-2 had sole authority and discovered
Saudi or even Hariri connections to Fatah al-Islam, then the
ISF and even March 14 political leaders would tend to
disregard the findings as being somehow politicized against
them. By contrast, if the ISF were in charge and found
Syrian links, then the LAF and March 8-Aoun politicians would
claim that the ISF is exaggerating and distorting to advance
March 14 political goals. Only a joint operation will blunt
the ability of either political camp discrediting the
investigations and interrogations. Murr said that the USG
and other friendly countries would certainly be asked for
assistance, and he promised to see that the USG had access to
information captured, interrogation reports, weaponry seized,
etc.


10. (S) Asked to speculate based on what he knew already
what would be discovered, Murr said that he thought that Saad
Hariri and Lebanon's Sunni politicians were "lucky," in that
all of the Lebanese FAI fighters had been killed. He thought
that the investigation would, however, uncover some
"extremely minor" links between some FAI leaders and the
Hariris and/or Saudis, from before FAI emerged as a terrorist
force. While these links would be similar to other Hariri or
Saudi financing of any number of Sunni institutions, "of
course" March 8-Aoun politicians will try to trumpet them as
proof that Hariri and the Saudis back terrorists. That is
not true, Murr insisted: the point now is that the Hariris
and Saudis fully backed the LAF against FAI. Any "stupid
contributions" should be ignored, and they will be proven to
be "a long time ago" and insignificant, he predicted. Murr
also thought that there would be some evidence that Syria had
facilitated the movement of foreign fighters from Iraq to
Lebanon, including those who joined up with FAI. But, based
on what he knew so far, he did not expect major revelations
linking Syria operationally to FAI. "I wish I could say
otherwise," he said, "but it doesn't seem to be true that
Syria controlled Fatah al-Islam."

COMMENT
--------------


11. (S) Murr is justifiably proud of the LAF and pleased
with his own role -- perhaps somewhat embellished in his
telling, but we'll indulge him, given the clearly positive
influence he exercised -- in pushing an initially reluctant
LAF Commander and a worried, hesitant cabinet into going all
the way in wiping out FAI's strongholds in Nahr al-Barid.
While describing a much-welcome happy ending to a long, tough
struggle, Murr's specific comments should be seen as an
initial read-out of the end of the Nahr al-Barid fight,
subject to further revisions as the details become more
clear. But, after 105 days of fierce fighting, the LAF and
GOL can be proud of an unexpected and unprecedented victory
by the state over a terrorist organization that had
established remarkably deep roots quickly in a lawless bit of
Lebanese territory.


12. (S) Counting severe injuries, the LAF suffered roughly
a one-for-one casualty rate with FAI fighters killed in order
to defeat Fatah al-Islam. In the process, it established
itself as the only truly cross-confessional state institution
that has received near universal backing from Lebanon's

BEIRUT 00001346 004.2 OF 004


otherwise divided population. With the execution by FAI of
LAF soldiers on 5/20, the LAF was forced into this battle
woefully under-equipped. USG responsiveness, in establishing
an emergency airlift of needed ammunition and supplies and by
working at unprecedented speed to approve third-party
transfers, played an essential role in the LAF's success.
Now, as we have reported previously, the "day after" will
pose new and equally difficult challenges to the GOL,
although we hope they are more of a political rather than
security nature.
FELTMAN