DAS CHRISTENSEN'S MEETING WITH BEIJING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 000925

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2032
TAGS: PREL MARR MNUC TSPA PGOV CH SU BM IR
SUBJECT: DAS CHRISTENSEN'S MEETING WITH BEIJING
UNIVERSITY'S WANG JISI AND COLLEAGUES

REF: BEIJING 841 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Daniel Shields.
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) EAP DAS Thomas Christensen expressed concern to
leading Beijing University scholars about the implications of
China's anti-satellite (ASAT) test. Dean of Beijing
University's School of International Studies Wang Jisi
(strictly protect) blamed "communication failure" within the
Chinese Government for the way China carried out the test.
Wang hopes China will soon provide a fuller explanation to
the outside world, but before it does so, it must first
complete a "great deal of coordination" within the military
and between the military and civilian organs. President Hu
Jintao was informed of the test in advance, he believed, but
the MFA and many others who should have been informed were
given no forewarning. Regarding other matters, Wang said
tension between the inward-looking "Peaceful Development"
concept and the more activist "Harmonious World" policy is an
important theme in current Chinese foreign policy debates.
Playing up China's role in Sudan, Wang and his colleagues
conceded that Darfur is important to Beijing primarily in the
context of U.S.-China relations. One scholar was skeptical
of the utility of sanctions as a foreign policy tool,
including in dealing with the Darfur problem. China's Burma
policy has been reflective of more "traditional" reluctance
to interfere in the "internal" matters of others, but
cooperation between the United States and China on Burma
remains possible despite differences at the UN, Wang said.
End Summary.

Anti-Satellite Test
--------------


2. (C) EAP DAS Thomas Christensen expressed concern to
leading Beijing University scholars during a meeting over
lunch on February 7 about the implications of China's
anti-satellite (ASAT) test. Dean of Beijing University's
School of International Studies Wang Jisi blamed a
"communication failure" within the Chinese Government for the
manner in which China carried out the test. Wang, stressing
that he cannot speak for the Chinese Government, said the
government realizes the serious consequences resulting from
this failure and plans to do something about it. Wang hopes
that China will soon provide a fuller, official explanation
of the test to the outside world, but before it can do so, it
must first complete a "great deal of coordination" within the
military and between the military and civilian organs. The
top leadership must also endorse China's response, which will
take time. President Hu Jintao was informed of the test in
advance, Wang said. Professor Zhu Feng (strictly protect),
Director of the International Security Program at Beijing
University's School of International Studies, added that the
PLA probably did not make clear to President Hu how sensitive
the test would be, which only highlights China's poor
intergovernmental coordination. The MFA was given no
forewarning and many others who should have been informed
were not, Wang said. Wang emphasized that he was not
addressing whether the test should have been conducted. If
there was to be a test, however, it should have been done
differently and in a way that allowed China to prepare for
its consequences, he said.


3. (C) Once China is prepared to offer a fuller explanation
of the test, the well connected Wang said he "guessed" the
response would contain the following elements. First, the
ASAT test was "technical" in nature, with no strategic or
political intentions. Second, the debris caused by the test
will not damage other satellites. (Wang conceded this point
might be debatable on technical grounds but said it
nevertheless is likely to be part of the Chinese position.)
Third, "in the short run" China has no intention to conduct
further ASAT tests. Fourth, China will reaffirm its
"traditional" stance on space issues, including its having no
intention of engaging in an arms race in outer space. DAS
Christensen underscored to Wang the seriousness of U.S.
concerns about the ASAT test and the importance of a fuller
explanation from the PRC, noting that China's response to
date has been entirely inadequate.


4. (C) Addressing possible motives behind the ASAT test,

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Professor Jia Qingguo (strictly protect),Vice Dean of
Beijing University's School of International Studies, pointed
to Chinese concerns about missile defense, maintenance of a
credible nuclear deterrent and other countries'
anti-satellite capabilities as key rationales. China's
possession of anti-satellite weapons technology is not in and
of itself a threat, Jia averred, pointing out that other
countries such as the United States and Russia have this
technical capability. ASAT weapons are China's only counter
to the "threat" from the U.S. missile defense (MD) system
that includes Japan, he maintained. If China is not going to
match the United States in numbers of nuclear weapons, then
it must take other steps to ensure a second strike
capability. Jia stated that, in the past, he had publicly
warned that countries who feel threatened by missile defense
will feel compelled to develop ASAT technologies. Finally,
Jia claimed, China has been advocating a treaty on the
peaceful use of space, but the United States has refused to
engage.


5. (C) In reply, DAS Christensen pointed out that the United
States had only conducted an ASAT test in the 1980s, at the
height of the Cold War and a period in which economies were
not so dependent on satellites. The Chinese Government has
so far offered no strategic rationale for its test beyond,
"don't worry about it," but every country with an advanced
economy that relies on satellites is extremely concerned. It
makes no sense for China to conduct a test that threatens to
militarize space and then somehow argue that the PRC's true
intention was to promote a treaty on the peaceful use of
space, DAS Christensen noted.


6. (C) Zhu said that for People's Liberation Army (PLA),the
ASAT test symbolized the Chinese military's progress in
catching up to the United States technologically. The PLA is
constantly concerned about its "technological backwardness"
vis-a-vis the U.S. military and believes it cannot forever
lag completely behind in this area. The PLA has been working
on an ASAT capability for "a long time." The PLA
underestimated the negative international reaction the test
would provoke, Zhu surmised, and likely believed the test was
simply "the PLA's business," involving only "its" missile and
"its" satellite. Of course, the PLA was wrong, Zhu stated,
commenting that it had been "taught a lesson." DAS
Christensen told Zhu that the PLA is likely to be taught a
further lesson by the extreme negative reaction its test has
provoked internationally.

Peaceful Development vs. Harmonious World
--------------


7. (C) Regarding other matters, Wang described the ongoing
tension between China's inward-looking "Peaceful Development"
concept and the more activist "Harmonious World" policy.
Some Chinese think tanks are still debating which of these
concepts is more important for China, Wang said, observing
that the Chinese leadership's views fall somewhere between
the two ideas. The Harmonious World concept emphasizes
China's need to be engaged in issues around the world. The
Peaceful Development theory, on the other hand, advocates
sticking to a more traditional approach that is
inward-looking and opposed to "interference" in the internal
affairs of others. China is still feeling its way forward.
Beijing knows that it must play a larger role in world
affairs and it is doing so. On the North Korean problem,
China has found the "right stance," whereas on problems like
Iran, China is still "learning" what its correct position
should be, Wang stated. He predicted a "step-by-step
expansion" of China's role in Sudan, more broadly in Africa,
the Islamic world, Russia and elsewhere. China hopes it can
help the international community alleviate problems and
thereby earn praise as a responsible international player.

Darfur
--------------


8. (C) China's position on Darfur is consistent with the
Harmonious World concept, Wang stated, conceding that China's
leadership pays close attention to Darfur primarily because
it is a U.S. priority and therefore a key issue in U.S.-China
relations. DAS Christensen said we want to see China use its
influence to convince Khartoum to agree to establishment of a
robust hybrid United Nations/African Union peacekeeping force
in accordance with the Annan plan. He warned that China's
relations with regimes like Sudan, if not used toward

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positive ends, will seriously harm China's international
image. If there is no progress on Darfur, the United States
will feel compelled to take stronger measures against Sudan
that, while not aimed at China, may impact Chinese interests.
Jia responded that China's relations with countries like
Sudan were part of its "hedging" strategy. What alternative
does Beijing have, he asked rhetorically, as long as China is
treated as an "outsider" and "the other" by much of the
developed world?


9. (C) Casting doubt on the effectiveness of sanctions
against Sudan, Jia said China has never believed external
intervention can solve problems. Intervention often only
makes matters worse. While introduction of a hybrid
peacekeeping force might be the best policy for Darfur, there
may be other options. If the people of Sudan do not think
the situation is bad enough to overthrow their own
government, then the role external pressure can play is
limited. DAS Christensen noted that the situation in Sudan,
particularly Darfur, cannot be reduced to the people versus
the government. Darfur involves different ethnic groups,
armed and unarmed parties, and flagrant human rights abuses
on a massive scale. The United States is trying to encourage
China to think broadly about international norms and not
focus solely on narrow national interests, he stated.


10. (C) Jia pointed out that Sudan is a "new" issue for
China and Beijing's recognition of Darfur's importance has
been an "evolutionary process" resulting mostly from the
prodding of the United States and others. Not too long ago
most Chinese did not even know where Darfur was. Leaders
viewed the matter solely as an "internal" Sudanese affair.
Zhu highlighted China's efforts to narrow gaps over the
hybrid peacekeepers issue, including Chinese UN Permrep Wang
Guangya's intervention with the Sudanese in New York. While
it is still hard for China to support sanctions, the
peacekeepers issue should move quickly. Zhu argued that
China must consider its credibility in Africa and therefore
cannot change its policy overnight to suddenly become an
advocate for intervention and sanctions.

Burma
--------------


11. (C) More "traditional" Chinese views reflecting the
"Peaceful Development" path have influenced Beijing's Burma
policy, Wang said. Burma is more important to China than
Darfur, Wang maintained, citing a host of considerations,
including economic and trade interests, Burma's common border
with China, the presence of KMT remnants in Burma and drug
trafficking. The international community is also more
divided over Burma that Darfur. Despite our different
approaches to the problem, Washington and Beijing should
continue dialogue on the issue and cooperation remains
possible, Wang said. DAS Christensen agreed, expressing hope
that our two sides can find common ground on Burma, despite
U.S. disappointment with recent Chinese action at the UN.

New Congress
--------------


12. (C) Wang said some in China are extremely concerned
about the effect the new Congress may have on U.S.-China
relations, but he personally is relatively optimistic. In
Wang's view, Capitol Hill does not make foreign policy but
can influence it. The new Congress is focused on issues
other than China, which gives Beijing some "breathing room"
for the time being. Wang expressed the hope that the Chinese
government would "be more careful" on issues such as the
trade deficit, intellectual property rights, human rights and
labor relations that are of particular interest to Congress.

Mil-Mil Dialogue
--------------


13. (C) DAS Christensen expressed frustration over PLA
foot-dragging on the planned visit to the United States by
the Commander of PLA Second Artillery Division. Despite
President Bush and President Hu's agreement on the visit, the
United States has had trouble getting the PLA to commit to a
date. Zhu said one explanation may be "typical" PLA
suspicion that "dialogue" is a ploy to force China to "show
its cards" and reveal secrets. Another likely reason for the
delay, Zhu speculated, is that PLA Second Artillery
representatives probably have no idea what to say in the

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dialogue. Their staffs therefore will likely need a great
deal of time to prepare briefing materials, which will
require approval from the top levels of the Central Military
Commission. DAS Christensen said the Chinese side ought to
be able to implement something to which President Hu agreed.

Ye Xiaowen, Criticism of Foreign Leaders
--------------


14. (C) Commenting on the recent inflammatory article by Ye
Xiaowen, Administrator of China's State Administration for
Religious Affairs (SARA),which mischaracterized U.S. Iraq
policy and personally maligned President Bush, Professor Wang
noted that "urgent orders" had been issued to stop the
story's distribution (reftel). According to Professor Zhu,
in a recent meeting at CCTV, he was told that CCTV staff are
forbidden from openly criticizing President Bush, or any
foreign leader, including Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
Professor Wang clarified that criticism of a country's
policies is still permitted, but personal attacks against
individual leaders are off limits.

Domestic Issues
--------------


15. (C) A participant in this week's Central Party School
study session for provincial and ministerial heads on Jiang
Zemin's Selected Works told Wang that he had no clue why
high-level cadres were studying Jiang's works. The original
topic for the study session reportedly was supposed to be
something like the scientific development concept. For some
unknown reason, the topic was changed to Jiang's works, Wang
said.


16. (C) There was "nothing new" in Luo Gan's February 1
article in the Party journal Qiushi, which reportedly
criticized foreign involvement in China's legal system and
argued for strict Party control of the courts, Professor Wang
said. Luo's comments merely reflect the center's
"traditional" concerns about these issues, Wang said.


17. (U) DAS Christensen cleared this cable.
RANDT