CHINESE SCHOLARS COMMENT ON ANTI-SATELLITE TEST

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 000752

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2032
TAGS: PREL PARM MARR PGOV CH
SUBJECT: CHINESE SCHOLARS COMMENT ON ANTI-SATELLITE TEST

REF: A. SECSTATE 4837 (NOTAL)

B. BEIJING 331 (NOTAL)

C. USDAO BEIJING CH 300125Z JAN 07 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David S. Sedney.
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (S) Conversations with several Beijing scholars revealed
that none were aware of China's January 11 anti-satellite
(ASAT) weapons test beforehand and were only able to
speculate after the fact about its significance. President
Hu Jintao would have known about the test in advance, though
the Foreign Ministry may have been kept in the dark, several
scholars surmised. One scholar said the test was a "normal"
thing for a great power like China to do and hoped other
countries would not "overreact." Another speculated that the
Chinese leadership badly underestimated the strong
international reaction the test would provoke. A third
scholar said it is possible that the test was part of PLA
military preparations for a Taiwan contingency in the context
of Beijing's strong concerns that Chen Shui-bian might pursue
Taiwan independence this year. Finally, a self-described
"pro-U.S." scholar said he fears the test is proof that
China's leadership was not sufficiently cognizant of the
importance of the U.S. relationship for China and how much
damage a test like this could do to undermine forward
bilateral momentum. End Summary.


2. (S) President Hu Jintao "undoubtedly" knew about China's
anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons test in advance, Professor Qin
Zhilai (protect) of the Central Party School's Institute of
International Strategy told poloff on January 26. There is
"absolutely no way" the test could have been conducted
without Hu's advance knowledge and approval, Qin emphasized.
China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),however, was
almost surely kept in the dark. MFA "was not lying" when it
at first appeared to be unaware of the test and then later
claimed that China's position opposing the weaponization of
space remains unchanged, Qin said. In response to poloff's
question regarding how to square China's position with its
having carried out the test, Professor Qin repeatedly
asserted that the test was a "normal" thing for a great power
like China to do, arguing that the test should not be viewed
as a threat and expressing his hope that other countries
would not "overreact."


3. (S) Professor Dong Lisheng (protect) of the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS),in a separate conversation
on January 25, echoed Qin's comments by saying it was
"unthinkable" that President Hu would not have known about
the ASAT test in advance. Dong agreed that MFA "almost
certainly" would have been unaware of the test, noting that
communication among ministries in China, especially on
military matters, is "extremely poor." Commenting on China's
motivation for the test, Dong could only speculate that
China's civilian and military leadership had "badly
underestimated" the strong international reaction that the
ASAT test would provoke.


4. (S) CASS Nonproliferation Center Director Gu Guoliang
(protect) told Polmincouns in a separate conversation on
January 29 that it is possible that the test was part of PLA
military preparations for a Taiwan contingency in the context
of Beijing's strong concerns that Chen Shui-bian might pursue
Taiwan independence this year. Polmincouns reaffirmed the
U.S. one China policy based on the three joint communiqus
and the Taiwan Relations Act. He cautioned that Beijing
should not let its concern about possible Taiwan independence
moves this year drive actions that could harm international
confidence in the strength of Beijing's commitment to
peaceful development and opposition to militarization of
space.


5. (S) Gu said he remains puzzled by the test, but the idea
that the test was driven by essentially military
considerations is much more plausible to him than the
alternative theory that the test was part of a Chinese
diplomatic strategy intended to persuade the United States to
enter negotiations on a treaty to prevent militarization of
outer space. The test made it less likely that the United
States would enter into such negotiations. In any event, the
test could not have taken place without Chinese leadership
approval, although it is possible that the PLA presented the
test to the leadership in a highly technical way that did not

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highlight the broader international implications, Gu said.


6. (S) Dean of Renmin University's Sociology Department Zhou
Xiaozheng (protect) on January 27 told poloff he feared that
China's going forward with the anti-satellite test was proof
that the leadership was not sufficiently cognizant of the
importance of the U.S. relationship for China and how much
damage a test like this could do to undermine forward
bilateral momentum. The response of Zhou, a self-described
"pro-American" scholar, is perhaps predictable but
nevertheless represents the thinking of at least some
pro-U.S. intellectuals.
RANDT