Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BEIJING7388
2007-12-06 22:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beijing
Cable title:  

PRC-IRAN: AMBASSADOR BRIEFS MFA ON NATIONAL

Tags:  PARM PREL KNNP MNUC ETRD CH IR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIJING 007388 

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (GARBLED TEXT)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2027
TAGS: PARM PREL KNNP MNUC ETRD CH IR
SUBJECT: PRC-IRAN: AMBASSADOR BRIEFS MFA ON NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

REF: SECSTATE 162558

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Clark T. Randt, Jr.
Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIJING 007388

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (GARBLED TEXT)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2027
TAGS: PARM PREL KNNP MNUC ETRD CH IR
SUBJECT: PRC-IRAN: AMBASSADOR BRIEFS MFA ON NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

REF: SECSTATE 162558

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Clark T. Randt, Jr.
Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador told Assistant Foreign
Minister (AFM) He Yafei December 6 that the recently released
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran's nuclear
program indicates the continued need for IAEA and Security
Council action on Iran's nuclear program. AFM He said China
is studying the report to understand its implications for how
the Iranian nuclear issue should be handled. He sought U.S.
views on how to take into account the conclusion by some in
the international community that the NIE weakens the argument
for further sanctions. Regarding the current draft third UN
Security Council resolution, AFM He expressed disappointment
at the inclusion of some, but not all, Chinese comments in
the latest draft, adding that China had shown "maximum
flexibility" in recent discussions on a draft resolution.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Using reftel talking points in their entirety,
Ambassador Randt briefed AFM He Yafei December 6 on the
recently released National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's
nuclear program and the implications thereof. The Ambassador
left copies of reftel nonpaper and of Key Judgments with AFM
He. (Discussions in this meeting of conventional arms
transfer to Iran, Burma and two AmCit cases are reported
separately.)

Need for Action on Iran Remains
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


3. (C) The Ambassador told AFM He that in the new NIE the
intelligence community concluded that Iran had a secret
nuclear weapons program, and in fall 2003, it is assessed to
have halted that program as a result of international
scrutiny and pressure. He called this a hopeful sign that
the international community can be effective in pressuring
the regime to behave responsibly and urged China to continue
to work with the United States through the P5-plus-1 process

to agree on language for a third UNSC sanctions resolution.


4. (C) The Ambassador said that the NIE reported that since
2003 it is likely that Iran has been conducting research and
development projects with commercial and conventional
military applications, some of which would also be of limited
use for nuclear weapons. He told AFM He that the United
States remains concerned that the nuclear weapons program
could be restarted, noting that even after the regime's
apparent decision to halt the program, it pursued uranium
enrichment activities in defiance of the international
community. Iran's continued pursuit of enrichment in the
face of UN Security Council obligations is deeply troubling
and remains a serious threat to international peace and
security.


5. (C) The Ambassador highlighted IAEA concerns over Iran's
nuclear activities and continuing work on ballistic missiles,
stressing that the international community must have
confirmation that Iran has stepped away from its nuclear
weapons program. He stated that Iran must finally reveal all
of its programs and activities to the IAEA by the end of the
year, as IAEA Director General ElBaradei has called upon Iran
to do, and allow the IAEA to verify that past nuclear weapons
development has stopped. The Ambassador stressed that Iran
must meet its UN Security Council obligation to suspend
uranium enrichment, and that the basis and the need for IAEA
and Security Council action thus remain unchanged.

NIE May Have Implications for Action on Iran
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


6. (C) AFM He replied that there is great interest in the NIE
and that China is studying the report very closely, because
it could have implications for how the Iranian nuclear issue
should be handled. The Chinese general impression at present
is that the NIE provides three primary "messages." First, in
2003, Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in response to
international presure. Second, "for some time to come," as
noted in the NIE, Iran will be unable to acquire the
capability to produce enough fissile material to produce
nuclear weapons, but will probbly continue to push forward
with its uraniumenrichment pogram. Third, under
internationl pressure, and with an opportunity for Iran to
pursue its nuclear roadmap goals peacefully, Ian could be
convinced to extend the halt in its nuclear weapons program.


7. (C) "Some in the international community," AFM He added,
have concluded that the NIE weakens arguments for continuing
further UNSC deliberations on sanctions, and that expanded
diplomatic contact should be pursued instead, including
direct talks between the United States and Iran. AFM He
sought USG views on the best option for moving forward in
light of the NIE. He stressed that U.S.-China cooperation on
the issue has been strong. Such coordination is a "testament
to the cooperative and constructive U.S.-China relationship."


8. (C) AFM He said the NIE and the international reaction to
it raised the larger concern as to whether the UNSC would
continue to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue in light of the
changed circumstances and sought U.S. views on this issue.
"We must consider the reaction of the international
community." He said that while China attaches great
importance to U.S. concerns on the issue, the general view of
the international community is that the report casts doubt on
the need for an additional UNSC resolution. He suggested
China and the United States work together to deal with this
reality.


9. (C) The Ambassador replied that it is "just as important
as ever" to continue down the current path. A key finding of
the NIE, he stressed, is that Iran had a nuclear weapons
program before 2003; the most difficult part of developing a
nuclear weapon, the collection of sufficient fissile
material, is continuing and the rest of the program could be
restarted in a relatively short time. "We need to remain
vigilant," he added, especially because international
pressure has now been shown to be effective in persuading
Iran to act responsibly. He stressed that the goal of the
sanctions is to convince Iran to stop its uranium enrichment
activities and assuage the concerns of the international
community.

AFM Seeks Clarification on NIE Conclusion
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


10. (C) AFM He replied that he noted that in the Ambassador's
explanation of the NIE, the pre-2003 nuclear program was
halted, after which Iran continued with commercial nuclear
research that could have military applications. This,
however, is not the conclusion of the NIE as he understood
it, AFM He said. He pressed the Ambassador to explain the
difference, saying that understanding if all or some of the
commercial research can be used for military purposes is
central to China's making a judgment of the situation. The
Ambassador noted that there in fact is no significant
difference: Iran had a military nuclear program before 2003,
and continued with nuclear research after 2003 that could be
used in some ways in a military program. He added that the
United States remains concerned that the on-going research
program could facilitate the restarting of the military
nuclear program should Iran choose to go down that path again.

Current P5-Plus-1 Framework for Talks with Iran?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


11. (C) AFM He also sought clarification on the Ambassador's
point that if Iran met its UNSC obligation of suspension, the
United States would be willing to enter into negotiations
under the P5-plus-1 offer, which includes the prospect for
direct U.S.-Iran talks. AFM He asked if this meant that Iran
would be included in talks with the P5-plus-1 as currently
formulated (i.e., including Germany),or whether P5-plus-1
meant P5 plus Iran. The Ambassador replied that P5-plus-1
means the P5 plus Germany.

China Still Unsatisfied with Draft Elements
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


12. (C) AFM said China has participated in negotiations on
the UNSC resolution elements draft and showed "maximum
flexibility" at the December 1 P5-plus-1 meeting, with a view
to supporting the dual-track strategy and the overall
U.S.-China relationship. China has informed the United
States on several occasions of its proposed changes to the
text, yet the latest draft China received from France, it
appears preliminarily, contains some, but not all, of China's
proposed changes. AFM He expressed hope that the United
States and other participants would further take into account
Chinese concerns.

RANDT