VFM WANG YI BRIEFS AMBASSADOR ON BURMA VISIT;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 007197

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR IO/UNP, EAP/MLS, EAP/CM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2027
TAGS: PREL PHUM CH BM
SUBJECT: VFM WANG YI BRIEFS AMBASSADOR ON BURMA VISIT;
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION EFFORT IS "DOMESTIC AFFAIR"

REF: EAP/CM - EMBASSY EMAIL (11/21/07)

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Clark T. Randt, Jr., Reasons 1.
4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary: Briefing the Ambassador on his recent trip
to Burma, Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi said the ongoing
"political reconciliation and democratic process" are the
domestic affairs of Burma and should therefore be addressed
by the Burmese Government and people themselves. The
international community could be of assistance, but otherwise
should not interfere. VFM Wang said Burmese leaders
described the ongoing dialogue with opposition leader Aung
San Suu Kyi as "still in the confidence-building period,
clarifying misunderstandings and misgivings." ASSK, the
Burmese leaders complained, is "stubborn," "feels she is
always right and everyone else is always wrong," and is "hard
to talk to." VFM Wang also reported that Burmese leaders
expressed eagerness to resume bilateral dialogue with the
United States; Wang asked pointedly about U.S. willingness.
Drawing upon ref email points, the Ambassador urged China to
use its influence with the regime to promote genuine
dialogue, which would require the rel
ease of opposition leaders from arrest and detention. End
Summary.

A "domestic affair"
--------------


2. (C) Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi on November 21 briefed
the Ambassador on the VFM's November 14-16 visit to Burma in
his "one-time" capacity as the Chinese Government's Special
Envoy to Burma. VFM Wang stated that purpose of his visit
was to learn about the domestic situation in Burma and recent
developments. In explaining the context of his visit, VFM
Wang emphasized that the ongoing political reconciliation and
democratic process are the domestic affairs of Burma and
should therefore be addressed by the Burmese Government and
people themselves. Wang stated that the Burma situation is
different than that of North Korea and Iran because it does
not affect international peace and stability and, therefore,
the international community should not interfere. That said,
if outside countries respect Burmese sovereignty, perhaps
they could be of assistance.


3. (C) VFM Wang said that during his visit he met with Senior
General Than Shwe in the presence of other key Burmese
Government leaders, as well as with the Minister of
Information Kyaw Hsan, Foreign Minister Nyan Win, and
Minister of Labor Aung Kyi, who is also the Liaison Minister
to Aung San Suu Kyi. VFM Wang told Burmese leaders that the
Chinese Government appreciates the positive steps initiated
by the Burmese Government to stabilize the situation in
Burma. VFM Wang commented that these efforts responded to
concerns of the international community and helped restore
domestic stability. VFM Wang observed that both the Burmese
Government and democratic opposition offered positive
messages about participating in a dialogue, and the Chinese
Government encourages Burma to keep positive momentum for
that dialogue.


4. (C) The Chinese fully recognize the "good offices" mission
of UN Special Envoy Gambari, Wang stated, and he expressed
hope to Burmese Government leaders that Burma will also
increase exchanges with its neighbors, particularly SEAN.

China expects Burma to accelerate "road map"
--------------


5. (C) VFM Wang expressed the Chinese Government expectation
that Burma will accelerate the seven-step "road map""
process, complete "a transition" at an early date and achieve
long-term, domestic stability. VFM Wang further advised
Burmese Government officials to improve the economic
development and livelihood of the Burmese people.

Burmese on national reconciliation and ASSK dialogue
-------------- --------------


6. (C) For their part, Burmese Government officials,
affirming that they "attach great importance to Chinese views
and proposals," briefed VFM Wang on the situation in Burma.
Wang stated that Burmese officials described Burma as a
multi-ethnic country containing over 100 ethnic groups. His
Burmese interlocutors "complained," Wang said, about the
system of British colonial rule whereby different ethnic
groups were governed under different administrative systems.
The result, according to Burmese officials, was ethnic
separation and inter-ethnic antagonism. Because of ethnic

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tensions, the Burmese Government's top priority is to restore
national unity and solidarity.


7. (C) Burmese officials told VFM Wang that Burma remains
committed to the seven-step "road map" and that three steps
of the "road map" have been completed. A drafting committee
for the new constitution has been formed and will begin its
work December 3. The remaining steps include the referendum
on the constitution, a general election, an election of new
leaders in parliament, and the achievement of a peaceful,
modern and democratic Burma with good borders.


8. (C) VFM Wang said the Burmese Government has displayed a
readiness to restart a dialogue with opposition leaders as
evidenced by Minister of Labor Aung Kyi's recent meetings
with Aung San Suu Kyi. Burmese officials told Wang that the
dialogue is "still in the confidence-building period,
clarifying misunderstandings and misgivings."


9. (C) VFM reported that Burmese leaders complained about
Aung San Suu Kyi, saying she is "stubborn" and that "she
feels she is always right and everyone else is always wrong"
and therefore is "hard to talk to." Burmese officials
commented that "Burma is a Buddhist country, and only the
Buddha is always right." They stated that while Aung San Suu
Kyi expressed a willingness to engage in dialogue, she also
gave signs that she wishes to represent Burma's ethnic
minority groups. Burmese officials, VFM Wang stated, believe
that Aung San Suu Kyi has a "second agenda," which is an
attempt to set the ethnic groups, particularly those
marginalized through the "road map" process, against the
government.


10. (C) Senior General Than Shwe and other leaders told VFM
Wang that despite these difficulties, they believed that as
long as Aung San Suu Kyi had the appropriate attitude, the
dialogue would make progress.


11. (C) Burmese Government officials also said that the
guiding principles for drafting a constitution have been
adopted at the National Convention. Reconsidering those
principles will "cause a new round of rivalry between the
ethnic groups and the government," and, therefore, Burmese
officials will not revisit this issue.


12. (C) Burmese officials offered that the opposition could
take part in the "road map" by expressing support for or
opposition to articles under consideration for the new
constitution. The opposition could also start political
parties to take part in the elections.


13. (C) VFM Wang stated that Burmese officials noted that in
respect to the views of the UN and China, they have
cooperated with UN Special Envoy Gambari. However, they
complained that after each of Gambari's visits, international
pressure on the regime has only increased.

U.S.-Burma dialogue
--------------


14. (C) VFM Wang noted that during Special Envoy Gambari's
visit to Beijing, Gambari asked the Chinese to encourage a
restart of the U.S.-Burma bilateral dialogue. In probing
Burmese leaders on their attitudes towards the United States,
VFM Wang stated that Senior General Than Shwe described the
United States as a "great power" and that Burma does not wish
to antagonize nor be the enemy of the United States. He
stated that Than Shwe agreed that VFM Wang could convey to
the USG Burma's readiness to restart a bilateral dialogue.
At the close of the meeting, Wang pointedly asked about U.S.
willingness to restart bilateral dialogue with Burma. The
Ambassador promised to report the query for Washington
consideration.

Impressions
--------------


15. (C) Noting his visit to Burma was his first in more than
three years, VFM Wang shared five impressions from his recent
visit. First, the domestic situation had returned to
stability since the August and September turbulence. Western
sanctions hurt Burma's economy, but he still saw progress
since his last visit. Second, Burma's "special national
conditions," by which he meant the relationship between the
government and ethnic minority groups, continued to be an
important factor. While formally the ethnic groups and the
government had reconciled, the groups maintain their arms, so
the military will continue to play an indispensable role.
Third, a process is needed to promote domestic

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reconciliation. The United States holds differing views
regarding the adequacy of the "road map", but in Wang's view
the "road map" serves as a better basis for democratic
development than no "road map." The ASSK-Government dialogue
may not be completely smooth, but it could lead to progress.
The international community
should entrust the Burmese people and government to solve
their own problems.


16. (C) Fourth, the international community should help in a
positive, constructive way, not push sanctions. Burmese
leaders told VFM Wang that the Burmese people suffer under
sanctions. "When basic needs cannot be met," they said, "how
can we talk about democracy?" Fifth, like the rest of the
international community, China wants Burma to speed up
domestic reconciliation and the democratic process. However,
given that these are "internal affairs," China is not in
favor of involving the UN Security Council on the Burma
issue, and not supportive of sanctions. VFM Wang added that
neighboring countries "share this view." China has a
2200-kilometer border with Burma, and 2.5 million ethnic
Chinese reside in Burma, so China has "major interests" in
Burma and does not wish to see chaos and turmoil. China
opposes "external forces" changing Burma, he added. China
wishes to remain in contact with the United States on the
situation in Burma and stands ready to serve as a bridge
between Burma and the United State
s.

Ambassador responds
--------------


17. (C) The Ambassador thanked VFM Wang for the read-out and
promised to convey the information to Washington. He noted
U.S. agreement with Wang's statement that Burma should speed
up its national reconciliation efforts and transition to
democracy, but stressed the need for concrete signs of
progress. The United States did not agree, however, that the
Burmese regime's violent suppression of peacefully
demonstrating monks was simply an internal affair of Burma;
rather it was clearly a significant matter of international
concern.


18. (C) The Ambassador drew upon ref email points to:

-- express disappointment that UN Special Envoy Gambari's
briefing to the ASEAN and East Asia Summits had been
obstructed;

-- express strong U.S. support for ASSK's stated desire to
begin a "meaningful and time-bound" dialogue with the regime;

-- note U.S. skepticism that such a dialogue could occur with
ASSK and other opposition leaders under arrest or detention;

-- urge the PRC to use its influence with the regime to
promote a genuine dialogue with democratic and ethnic
minority groups;

-- express concern that the "road map" process might move
forward without ASSK or democratic and ethnic minority group
participation; and

-- point out that the regime's current policies make
instability, not stability, more likely.


19. (C) VFM Wang responded that China had not wanted the
turmoil and confrontations of August and September. The good
news is that the Burmese Government sees the seriousness of
the situation and has taken positive steps, such as the
release of the vast majority of detainees. Wang noted that
Burmese leaders told him some of the protesting monks were
"fake" and some were persons with criminal records. The
situation is better now and the society more stable. Burmese
military leaders, VFM Wang claimed, are committed to
returning government to civilian rule and taking off their
uniforms, so the international community should be
encouraging rather than threatening. Talk of "regime change"
only makes them nervous, VFM Wang added.


20. (C) The "road map" may not be perfect, VFM Wang
continued, but it is a process worked out with wide
participation in Burma, including by Aung San Suu Kyi's
National League of Democracy until it withdrew. The process
may not have been democratic or representative of all views,
but at least it is a process. Wang acknowledged it is
unclear whether Aung San Suu Kyi can engage in meaningful
dialogue while under house arrest, but the dialogue is
continuing, so clearly she is adapting.

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21. (C) Regarding the Gambari mission to the ASEAN and East
Asia Summits, Wang said China hopes ASEAN will play a role in
the Burma question, but Singapore, in its haste to arrange a
Gambari briefing, did not consult with Burma. As ASEAN works
on a consensus basis, such a move was taboo. At the East
Asia Summit, the Australians, "always eager to help whether
others are ready to accept their help or not," put forward a
three-part proposal calling for a boycott, a Foreign
Ministers meeting and a strong statement criticizing Burma.
This proposal made participating states unhappy. Asian
countries, Wang said, prefer to accommodate the comfort
levels of all participants, not play up issues. In the end,
Wang offered, the actual outcome is good. A critical
presentation on Burma by Gambari might have made it difficult
for him to visit Burma again. The Australian proposal also
might have made matters worse.

Special Envoy mission a one-off event
--------------


22. (C) Asked whether his trip to Burma as Special Envoy was
a one-time designation or indicative of an ongoing role, VFM
Wang said it was a one-time designation. Of course, if
instructed to play the role again, he would. Asked if he had
requested to meet with opposition representatives, VFM Wang
said he did not, as such a request would have hindered his
ability to meet with Burmese Government leaders.
RANDT