Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BEIJING6501
2007-10-05 12:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beijing
Cable title:  

LEADERSHIP RUMORS IN ADVANCE OF THE PARTY CONGRESS

Tags:  PGOV CH 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8008
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #6501/01 2781235
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 051235Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2490
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 006501 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2032
TAGS: PGOV CH
SUBJECT: LEADERSHIP RUMORS IN ADVANCE OF THE PARTY CONGRESS

REF: A. BEIJING 6157


B. BEIJING 5706

C. BEIJING 5139

D. BEIJING 2711

E. BEIJING 2190

Classified By: Political Internal Unit Chief
Dan Kritenbrink. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 006501

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2032
TAGS: PGOV CH
SUBJECT: LEADERSHIP RUMORS IN ADVANCE OF THE PARTY CONGRESS

REF: A. BEIJING 6157


B. BEIJING 5706

C. BEIJING 5139

D. BEIJING 2711

E. BEIJING 2190

Classified By: Political Internal Unit Chief
Dan Kritenbrink. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Contacts continue to speculate on impending high-level
personnel changes as Beijing prepares for the opening of the
17th Communist Party Congress on October 15. Decisions have
reportedly "largely" been made but remain "top sec ret," with
last-minute changes still a possibility. A "core" of the
current leadership is likely to stay, contacts say, namely
President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao and Vice President
Zeng Qinghong. NPC Vice Chairman Wang Zhaoguo's star appears
to be on the rise, with one contact claiming Wang is in
charge of the Congress personnel selection process. Other
strong Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) candidates include
Guangdong Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang, Hubei Party
Secretary Yu Zhengsheng and State Councilor and Public

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Security Minister Zhou Yongkang. Opinion remains split over
the prospects of fifth generation star and Hu Jintao protege
Li Keqiang, with one source believing Li to be a "lock" for a
top spot, while another says Shanghai Party Secretary Xi
Jinping is "ahead" of Li Keqiang in the race for the PBSC,
and to succeed Hu Jintao in 2012. Meanwhile, NPC Chairman Wu
Bangguo's status seems uncertain, with one contact claiming
he will be dropped from the PBSC due to health concerns and
corruption allegations involving his son. "Competitive
elections" will reportedly be held for Central Committee and
Politburo slots, with 15 percent more candidates than seats
running for positions. Even though Hu Jintao's power is
ascendant, he must continue to negotiate over personnel
decisions and cannot dictate all outcomes, contacts say. End
Summary.

Leadership Decisions "Largely Made," but...
--------------


2. (C) As Beijing prepares for the opening of the 17th
Communist Party Congress on October 15, to be preceded by the
opening of the Seventh (and final) Plenum of the 16th CCP
Central Committee on October 9, contacts claim that personnel
decisions for the Party's top spots have "largely" been made,

which is why a precise date for the opening of the Congress
was publicly announced (Ref B). For example, Central Party
School (CPS) Professor Qin Zhilai (strictly protect) on
September 20, and Executive Deputy Director of the CPS
Institute for International Strategic Studies Kang Shaobang
(strictly protect) on August 30, separately assessed that
agreement on an opening date of the Congress could have come
only after reaching "general" agreement on high-level
personnel appointments. Nevertheless, Zhang Xiantang
(strictly protect),a senior journalist at the State
Council-affiliated newspaper Economic Times, told Poloff on
September 18 that, even though it would be "much too
dangerous" to agree on a Congress opening date without having
largely settled personnel questions, jockeying is continuing
and last-minute changes are still possible. Calling it
China's version of an "October surprise," Zhang said Party
personnel decisions are a "high stakes game," with players
attempting to introduce "new," and potentially damaging,
information on candidates in an attempt to undo previously
agreed upon arrangements at the last minute. Regardless, Qin
Zhilai lamented, whatever has been decided remains "top sec
ret," so outside observers are left only to speculate about
possible outcomes.

"Core" of Leadership to Remain
--------------


3. (C) Despite the secrecy surrounding top-level personnel
decisions, Post contacts continue to assess that the "core"
of the current leadership likely will remain (Ref B),namely
President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao and Vice President
Zeng Qinghong. This was the shared judgment of Kang
Shaobang, Qin Zhilai and Zhang Xiantang. (Note: Zeng
Qinghong is concurrently President of the CPS, and CPS
Professors Kang and Qin were "virtually certain" that he
would remain on the PBSC, though they did not rule out his
changing portfolios.) Zhang Xiantang noted that Hu, Wen and
Zeng have cooperated "very well," stating that "no major
differences" exist among them. Although Zeng of course had
long been viewed as a Jiang Zemin ally, Zhang asserted that
Zeng had been on board with the ouster of Chen Liangyu,
having played a major role in bringing down the former
Shanghai Party Secretary and in getting Jiang Zemin to bless

BEIJING 00006501 002 OF 004


the move, eventually resulting in a unanimous Politburo vote
in favor of Chen's ouster. That was just the most
conspicuous example of the collaboration among these three
leaders, which is why Hu Jintao would be in favor of keeping
this "team" intact, Zhang argued.

Other Candidates: Wang, Zhang, Zhou
--------------


4. (C) Although opinion among contacts on other high-level
personnel decisions was not unanimous, several contacts said
NPC Vice Chairman Wang Zhaoguo's star is on the rise. CPS's
Kang Shaobang repeatedly emphasized that Wang is the leading
candidate to enter the PBSC and was "far ahead" of other
contenders. Wang has been in senior Party positions for
several years, having previously been groomed by Deng
Xiaoping to become a senior Party leader, and enjoys good
relations with Hu Jintao. The Economic Times' Zhang
similarly assessed that Wang is headed for the PBSC, calling
him "Hu Jintao's guy" and explaining that Wang had previously
fallen out of favor for his previous association with Zhao
Ziyang and Hu Yaobang but is now poised to make a "complete
comeback." (Note: Zhang said he understood that Wang
Zhaoguo is also in charge of the "personnel small group" that
has handled the personnel selection process for 17th Party
Congress. Zhang claimed this small group is "separate" from
the Party Organization Department and was created especially
for the Congress, having been tasked with listening to a
"wide range" of opinions in selecting candidate lists for
Party slots.)


5. (C) Yi Xiaoxiong (strictly protect),Chinese-American
Professor at Marietta College, who has various family ties to
Wang Zhaoguo, told Poloff on September 21 that his contacts
also tout Wang as a strong candidate for the PBSC. Yi views
Wang as a "stabilizing" and "balancing" force on the PBSC and
cautioned against viewing him solely as a Hu Jintao ally.
Though he has good relations with Hu, Wang also reportedly is
viewed within the Party as being extremely competent and
experienced, also enjoying good relations with the
"princeling" faction of the Party. CPS Professor Qin Zhilai
sounded the lone discordant note on Wang Zhaoguo, telling
Poloff that Wang was likely to be retired at the Congress.


6. (C) Other top candidates for the PBSC reportedly include
Guangdong Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang, Hubei Party
Secretary Yu Zhengsheng and State Councilor and Public

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Security Minister Zhou Yongkang. Zhang Dejiang, according to
Qin Zhilai and Zhang Xiantang, will likely make the Party's
top body, with Zhang Xiantang calling the Guangdong Party
Secretary a "Jiang Zemin ally" and speculating that he is

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also a leading contender for a Vice Premier position at next
March's National People Congress (NPC),perhaps even the
Executive Vice Premier slot. Yu Zhengsheng, according to
Zhang Xiantang, is a "leading princeling" and another prime
contender for both the PBSC and for one of the Vice Premier
slots at next March's NPC. (Note: Yu Zhengsheng's father
had once been married to Jiang Qing, who later became Mao
Zedong's wife, Zhang said. Yu Zhengsheng's wife is also a
"princeling," according to Zhang.) Qin Zhilai separately
agreed that Yu's future prospects for the PBSC are bright.
Zhou Yongkang is almost certain to take over the law
enforcement portfolio currently handled by Luo Gan, according
to Kang Shaobang, Qin Zhilai and Zhang Xiantang, though Zhang
said it is not definite that Zhou would take Luo Gan's place
on the PBSC.

Fifth Generation Competitors: Li vs. Xi
--------------


7. (C) Opinion remains split over the prospects of fifth
generation star and Hu Jintao protege Li Keqiang. On one end
of the spectrum, Economic Times' Zhang Xiantang was adamant
that the Liaoning Party Secretary remains the "only" fifth
generation leader with the right pedigree and training to
ascend to the PBSC now and to succeed Hu Jintao in 2012. Li
shares a Communist Youth League background with Hu Jintao,
who selected him for elevation early on, after which Li
served successfully in both Henan and Liaoning, two very
different provinces, as Party Secretary. Zhang argued that
Li is a virtual "lock" to be promoted to the Party's top body
and thought he might even be designated as Hu's likely
successor at the Congress, all of which would make sense for
a "smooth" transition in 2012. (Note: As reported Ref A,
Zhang also claimed that Li Keqiang is in charge of the group
that drafted Hu Jintao's Political Report for the Congress.)


8. (C) Other contacts disagreed that Li Keqiang is a sure bet
for the PBSC. The Party School's Kang Shaobang, for example,
echoed the doubts that he and others have expressed
previously about Li's prospects (Refs B, D and E). Kang
conceded that "so many people" are talking about Li for the

BEIJING 00006501 003 OF 004


PBSC that he might in fact make it, though Kang said he
personally continues to have serious doubts about such a
scenario. While Li Keqiang is regarded as a "good person,"
many in the Party are not impressed by his accomplishments
and instead note the "many problems" that occurred during his
tenure in Henan and Liaoning. Moreover, Kang argued, it is
"quite difficult" to make the leap all the way from the
Central Committee to the PBSC, noting that apart from Hu
Jintao, "very few" leaders in Party history have pulled off
such a feat, which means it is still quite possible that no
one from the fifth generation will make it to the PBSC.


9. (C) Party School Professor Qin Zhilai went a step further,
arguing not only that Li Keqiang's elevation to the PBSC
remains "controversial," but also that it is Shanghai Party
Secretary Xi Jinping, not Li Keqiang, who is the "front

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runner" in the race for a fifth generation seat on the PBSC
and to succeed Hu Jintao in 2012. Qin said Hu Jintao was
certainly behind the push to promote Li, which he views as a
test of Hu's strength. Hu is "obviously" stronger as heads
into this, his first Congress as General Secretary, Qin said,
a fact all the more evident with the announcement that the
Party Constitution will be revised to reflect Hu's key
concepts (Ref A). It nevertheless remains unclear whether Hu
has the muscle to get Li Keqiang on the PBSC. While agreeing
that Li has a "bright future," Qin repeatedly emphasized
that, in light of their respective "standing" within the
Party, it is Xi Jinping, not Li Keqiang, whom we should
"really pay attention to." Qin conceded that he was not sure
how this assessment might work out in terms of specific
personnel appointments at the Congress. It is possible that
neither Li nor Xi get on the top body. But, he cautioned, no
one should "write Xi off" just because he was appointed to
Shanghai as Party Secretary, which many had initially thought
indicated that Xi was likely to make the Politburo, but not
the PBSC. (Note: Qin also said he was "skeptical" of the
notion that Li Keqiang has been in charge of the drafting of
Hu's Political Report to be delivered at the Congress.)


10. (C) Apart from Li Keqiang and Xi Jinping, other
"promising" young fifth generation leaders likely to newly
join the Politburo (but not its standing committee),include
Chongqing Party Secretary Wang Yang, Tianjin Party Secretary
Zhang Gaoli, Shandong Party Secretary Li Jianguo and
"perhaps" current Commerce Minister Bo Xilai, according to
Kang Shaobang. Qin Zhilai separately agreed with this list,
except he had Jiangsu Party Secretary Li Yuanchao in place of
Li Jianguo on the "short list" to make it to the Politburo.

Additional Rumors: Wu Bangguo On the Way Out?
-------------- -


11. (C) Speculation varied considerably regarding the fate of
several current members of the Politburo Standing Committee,
including NPC Chairman Wu Bangguo and ideology chief Li
Changchun. Professor Kang Shaobang, for example, insisted
that Wu Bangguo will step down from the PBSC, citing Wu's
undefined health issues as well as "corruption problems"
involving Wu's son, who is reportedly under investigation by
the Party Central Discipline Inspection Commission. Zhang
Xiantang assessed that Wu Bangguo's status is "unclear," with
several of Zhang's contacts reportedly saying Wu is out,
while others claim that he will stay. Qin Zhilai, by
contrast, still thought Wu is likely to remain on the PBSC.
Meanwhile, Zhang Xiantang argued that Li Changchun's status
is also unclear, with strong arguments being made among
Beijing observers both for and against his remaining on the
PBSC. Qin Zhilai, however, thought it likely that Li
Changchun would retain his PBSC slot.


12. (C) Contacts also speculated broadly on the possible fate
of other Politburo members. Current PBSC members Wu
Guanzheng, Jia Qinglin and Luo Gan will all "certainly" step
down, according to Kang Shaobang and Zhang Xiantang. Qin
Zhilai agreed, though he noted there are still "voices" who
claim that Jia Qinglin continues to have an "outside chance"
of keeping his PBSC position. Contacts continue to agree
that Wu Yi will "almost certainly" retire, as apparently is
her wish, though Zhang Xiantang claimed he continues to hear
rumors that she might be convinced to take a "special"
high-level slot, perhaps even the Vice Presidency. He
thought it more likely, however, that a senior slot on the
Politburo would be given to another female leader, United
Front Work Department Head Liu Yandong. Qin Zhilai agreed
that Liu Yandong has a good shot at receiving a promotion,
though he said one cannot totally rule out another female
leader, State Councilor Chen Zhili, from also competing for a
Politburo slot. Zhang Xiantang and Qin Zhilai both agreed
that Zeng Peiyan and Cao Gangchuan would retire. Hui Liangyu
is likely to stay on the Politburo and retain his Vice
Premier slot next March. (Note: Zhang speculated that Bo
Xilai and NDRC Chairman Ma Kai were other possible contenders

BEIJING 00006501 004 OF 004


for Vice Premier slots at next March's NPC.) Zhang and Qin
also agreed that Wang Gang was likely to be promoted to the
full Politburo, and that He Guoqiang and Guo Boxiong would
retain their Politburo slots. As for Propaganda Department
Head Liu Yunshan, opinion was split. Qin Zhilai thought Liu
still had a slim chance of being promoted to the PBSC.
Marietta College Professor Yi Xiaoxiong, who has ties to
Liu's family, however, reversed his earlier prediction about
a possible promotion for Liu (Ref B),more recently arguing
that he is hearing a great deal of criticism within the Party
of the propaganda apparatus for which Liu is responsible,
which has caused Yi now to be "highly skeptical" of Liu's
prospects.

"Elections" for the Central Committee, Politburo
-------------- ---


13. (C) "Elections" for the Party Central Committee and
Politburo will be more competitive than those held at the
16th Party Congress in 2002, Zhang Xiantang claimed. (Note:
As called for in the Party Constitution, the 2,217 delegates
to the Party Congress will "elect" the approximately 200 new
members of 17th CCP Central Committee. Immediately following
the Congress, the new Central Committee will then convene its
first Plenum to "elect" the members of the Politburo and the
Politburo Standing Committee.) Zhang said he understood that
the number of candidates would be 15 percent greater than
seats available for both the Central Committee and Politburo.
What remains unclear, however, is whether there will be any
competition for PBSC slots, or whether Central Committee
members would merely approve a slate of candidates
corresponding precisely to the number of Standing Committee
seats available. (Note: Zhang said there was no competition
for PBSC seats in 2002.) Separately, Qin Zhilai said he also
understood that elections for the Central Committee and
Politburo would be "competitive," but he did not know to what
extent, or whether this would hold true for the PBSC as well.


Hu Jintao's Power Ascendant, but Still Faces Limits
-------------- --------------


14. (C) Contacts across the board have been unanimous in
assessing that Hu Jintao's power and influence are ascendant
and that he will emerge from the Congress in a stronger
position than before. Nevertheless, sources at the same time
stressed that balance among competing "factions" with the
Party will be maintained, and that it simply is not possible
for Hu Jintao to completely have his way with personnel
appointments. Zhang Xiantang, who assessed that we will
witness the start of the "Hu Jintao era" at the Congress (Ref
A),with Hu's increased influence evident across both policy
and personnel spheres, nevertheless conceded that Hu will
have to take into account the interests of others, including
Jiang Zemin, who will maintain some limited influence over
personnel decisions. Moreover, some consideration has to be
given to "competence," Zhang argued, not just to packing the
top Party bodies with personal loyalists, meaning it might be
hard to assess after the Congress precisely how various Party
"factions" have fared on appointments.


15. (C) Kang Shaobang similarly argued that Hu is "clearly in
control" of the Party, which was evidenced first and foremost
by his takedown of Chen Liangyu, with Jiang Zemin's influence
obviously on the wane. Personnel appointments are not the
most important indicator of Hu's power, Kang asserted, saying
he places much more emphasis on Hu's manifest ability to
determine the Party's direction in terms of policy, which
makes him China's "most decisive" leader. Qin Zhilai agreed,
echoing Kang's and Zhang's comments that Hu continues to grow
in strength while Jiang weakens. Nevertheless, Qin
emphasized, Hu is "not a dictator" and must still deal with
others in the Party to reach consensus decisions on a number
of matters, including personnel.
Piccuta