ANALYST DISCUSSES ANTI-JAPANESE SENTIMENT,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 003107

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PINR ASEAN CH JA
SUBJECT: ANALYST DISCUSSES ANTI-JAPANESE SENTIMENT,
REGIOANL INTEGRATION WITH CHINESE SCHOLARS


Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Daniel Shields. Reasons 1.
4 (b/d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) A visiting American analyst of Asian regional affairs
discussed Sino-Japanese relations with four scholars from
three different Chinese government think-tanks during his
mid-April visit to Beijing, soon after Premier Wen Jiabao's
visit to Japan. Scholars felt that key points in the often
tense bilateral relationship included the following:

-- Anti-Japanese sentiment in China is rooted in vivid images
of Japan's pre-WWII invasion of China, Japanese perceptions
that Japan is superior to its Asian neighbors, negative views
of Japan instilled in the Chinese educational system and the
decline of Japan as a positive economic model.

-- China and Japan are locked in an accusation-denial cycle
which makes bilateral relations emotional.

-- Widespread fear of a remilitarized Japan persists in China
despite rational arguments to support a greater international
role for Japan.

-- Challenges to improving Sino-Japanese relations include
Taiwan, Japan's bid for a permanent UNSC seat and the history
issue.

-- China is concerned about Japan's participation in
potential international efforts to contain China.

-- Bilateral and regional cooperation involving China and
Japan could be strengthened, including a greater role for the
United States. China claims to follow ASEAN's lead in
assessing ASEAN-Plus-Three as the most effective regional
architecture. End Summary.


2. (C) In mid-April, a visiting analyst of Asian regional
affairs discussed anti-Japanese sentiment in China and
Japan-China relations with Chinese scholars, soon after
Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Japan. The scholars were
Ministry of Foreign Affairs-affiliated China Institute for
International Studies (CIIS) Senior Fellow Jin Linbo,
Ministry of State Security affiliated-China Institute of
Contemporary Inernational Relations (CICIR) Institute of
Japanese Studies Director Yang Bojiang, China Academy of
Social Sciences (CASS) Institute of Japanese Studies Deputy
Director Jin Xide and CASS Modern History Chair Bu Ping, who
also heads China's delegation to the Joint Sino-Japanese
History Dialogue.

Roots of Anti-Japanese Sentiment
--------------


3. (C) Before the 1990s, Japan's rapid economic development
was heralded as a model to follow in China, but in the past
two decades Japan's economic slow down and China's rise has
allowed for greater vilification of Japan, said CIIS's Jin.
The history of Japan's pre-WWII invasion of China is still
vivid, commented CICIR's Yang, noting it is passed down from
generation to generation, memorialized in museums and
monuments and reenacted in contemporary dramas.

Curriculum Errors of Omission, Not Commission
--------------


4. (C) All four scholars agreed with the analyst's suggestion
that China's education system has played a role in driving
anti-Japanese sentiment. But the scholars attributed any
anti-Japanese tendency in China's national curriculum to
neglect and failure to update textbooks, not a purposeful
campaign of disinformation. The curriculum should be updated
to include Japan's post-1960 history of peace, Japan's
assistance to Asia and the positive aspects of bilateral
relations, CIIS's Jin and CICIR's Yang agreed.

Accusation-Denial Cycle
--------------


5. (C) Anti-Japanese sentiment feeds into a vicious cycle of
accusation and denial between China and Japan, said Dr. Bu.
Japan's perceived "mistakes" in dealing with history or
working with Asian neighbors often elicit Chinese demands for
an apology, he said. This reinforces Japanese resistance to
addressing the past, which further excites Chinese
"sensitivities." Bilateral relations are emotional with the

BEIJING 00003107 002 OF 003


political effect that China is extremely sensitive to Japan
actions, said CASS's Jin. All four scholars agreed that the
only way out of this cycle is to increase mutual
understanding and trust to make objective mutual assessments.
China must be able to confidently gauge Japan's governmental
and political mainstream positions, said CASS's Jin, to
successfully moderate its reactions and improve bilateral
relations. Bu conceded the process is slow and requires
greater support from the government, academia and the
business community, including the bilateral exchange of
experts on history, for which he is the Chinese chairman.

An Acceptable "Normal" Japan
--------------


6. (C) In the context of the ongoing debate over Japan's
future political identity, scholars held different views on
what constitutes the development of a "normal" Japan
acceptable to China. CIIS's Jin said Japan's limited
military power is out of balance with its economic influence,
leading to tensions internally and in its relations abroad.
Developing a competent modern military is natural and not
threatening, he added, but cautioned that in China his is a
minority view. Scholars agreed that militarist and
"unhealthy" ultra-nationalist movements are not mainstream in
Japan. CASS's Jin was particularly concerned about Japan's
sense of moral superiority and tendency to deny atrocities.

Japan UNSC Seat No-Win for China
--------------


7. (C) The Chinese government does not officially oppose
Japan's bid for a permanent UNSC seat, but has not yet
refined its position, CICIR's Yang and CASS's Jin told the
analyst separately. The idea of Japanese permanent
membership is so unpalatable to the Chinese public that the
government will not express public support for the proposal,
Jin added, but an attempt to block the bid would damage
China's international reputation, commented Yang. CIIS's Jin
saw a permanent seat as a natural balancing of Japan's
economic and political strength.

Challenges: History, Taiwan
--------------


8. (C) All four scholars viewed the importance of the history
topic in bilateral relations differently, but none agreed
China was using history as a diplomatic card. Bu, head of
China's delegation to the joint history talks, was optimistic
that such discussions could improve public perceptions in
each country. Scholars on both sides found that their
differences were not as great as anticipated. The Chinese
were not as rigidly ideological as the Japanese had feared
and the Japanese were not all from the extreme right, as the
Chinese had feared, Bu said. Bu and CIIS's Jin agreed that
broad gains and a narrowing of differences would be achieved,
but they saw no grand resolution to bilateral tensions over
history. They also agreed that failure to reach consensus
would not derail political relations, but a downturn in
bilateral relations would bring an end to scholarly dialogue.
CIIS's Jin worried tat the Chinese government's
unwillingness to compromise was setting China up to lose
either way.


9. (C) Even if China won all the concessions it demanded,
Japan would be alienated in the process, he noted, poisoning
the future of bilateral relations. I Japan fails to
properly resolve history issues, it will not only offend East
Asia, but also the United States, said CASS's Jin. He
painted Taiwan as a major challenge in Sino-Japanese
relations. Japan especially fears Taiwan's eventual
unification with the Mainland, he said, because Japanese fear
that this could "choke off Japan's lifeline" for natural
resources.

Japan's Role in Containment, China's Rise
--------------


10. (C) As economic, political and military power in East
Asia shifts towards the Mainland, Japan's apprehensions over
a rising China have grown, said CIIS's Jin and CASS's Bu.
These fears were in some part imported from the United States
and Europe, CIIS's Jin added. China's artful use of soft
power in the region has enhanced its image and popularity,
something decades of Japanese development assistance did not
achieve, he said. As PM Abe will likely be in power until
2012, China should take a long-term strategy towards Japan
and prepare to work with the Liberal Democratic Party, said

BEIJING 00003107 003 OF 003


CICIR's Yang. CASS's Jin was concerned with a growing
"policy of containment" towards China. He mentioned Japan's
Arc of Freedom and Prosperity and democracy and human rights
rhetoric as an attempt to create a values-based alliance with
the West, India and Australia. China, Jin said, does not
like being targeted by such containment attempts.

Challenges for Regional Integration
--------------


11. (C) When asked which regional architecture will dominate,
CASS's Jin said, and the others agreed, that ASEAN-plus-Three
has the best chance to produce results in the short term and
is preferred by the majority of ASEAN countries, whose lead
China follows. CIIS's Jin said a lack of mutual trust, rapid
change and the varied strengths of countries in the region
hinder cooperation. Regional relationships are dominated by
hedging and small powers playing big powers off against each
another, primarily for economic gain, said Dr. Yang. Big
powers will form the trunk of the regional cooperation tree,
Yang added, but smaller countries must be respected because
they will act as buffers reducing friction between larger
players.


12. (C) CICIR's Yang said the United States could play an
important role in improving the chances for regional
cooperation by urging the rise of moderate views within
Japan. He suggested establishing a dialogue between China
and the United States-Japan alliance as a first step toward
broader bilateral cooperation. CASS's Jin saw the United
States as a stabilizer and necessary economic partner that
could allay fears of others in the region about being
dominated by China and/or Japan. Since the United States is
not actively participating in current East Asian groupings,
such as the East Asian Summit, mutual trust remains low and
regional integration elusive, he said.


13. (SBU) The delegation cleared this cable.
RANDT