GOVERNOR'S RIVAL DELIVERS IRANIAN COMPLAINT, ASSESSES BASRAH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000097

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV MOPS IZ IR UK
SUBJECT: GOVERNOR'S RIVAL DELIVERS IRANIAN COMPLAINT, ASSESSES BASRAH
RECONCILIATION PROSPECTS

REF: BASRAH 93

BASRAH 00000097 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, Basrah Regional Embassy
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) SUMMARY: Basrah Provincial Council (PC) member Hasan
al-Rashid (Badr) advised Regional Embassy Office (REO) officials
on October 18 that the Iranian Consul General, Hamid Baghnan,
visited him to protest the presence of British forces at the
al-Shalamja crossing on the Iraq-Iran border. Baghnan requested
that al-Rashid convey Iran's discontent to British military
officials at MND-SE. Al-Rashid further advised the REO that a
Basrah Islamic List (BIL) delegation will meet soon with Fadhila
representatives to discuss political reconciliation and
power-sharing. The REO Director stressed that failure to reach
an agreement could undermine Basrah's transition to provincial
Iraqi control (PIC),planned for year's end. Al-Rashid also
noted that Basrawi tribes, fed up with militia violence, want to
form neighborhood watch groups to bolster their own security.
Reconciliation among Basrah's political factions and improved
security conditions will be crucial to both a successful
transition to PIC and to the future stability of Basrah - Iraq's
economic heart and the primary source of the GOI's revenue. End
Summary.

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IRAN PROTESTS UK TROOP PRESENCE ON IRAQ-IRAN BORDER
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2. (C) Al-Rashid advised us that Iranian Consul General Hamid
Baghnan called on him just after the Eid holiday to report that
Iran was "very upset" about the presence of British troops near
the Al-Shalamja crossing on the Iraq-Iran border. Baghnan told
al-Rashid that the Government of Iran had conveyed the same
message to the UK embassy in Teheran, and asked al-Rashid to
serve as an intermediary and express Iran's discontent to
British military officials in Basrah. Al-Rashid told us that he
had not yet relayed the message to the British. He noted that
since the March 2007 abduction of British sailors, Iraqi and
Iranian border officials have been holding bi-weekly meetings
with British military officers to discuss security at
al-Shalamja and along the Shatt al-Arab. According to
al-Rashid, Baghnan said Iran would be willing to construct a
fence along the Shatt al-Arab to help control traffic across the
border.

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UPCOMING DIALOGUE WILL CLARIFY PROSPECTS FOR RECONCILIATION
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3. (C) Al-Rashid, Governor Wa'eli's main political rival, told
us that a meeting between the BIL and Fadhila will take place
within the next two weeks and this "would reveal the prospects
for political reconciliation." In the wake of the Iraqi
administrative court's ruling in favor of Wa'eli, al-Rashid
proposed a power-sharing agreement to foster reconciliation.
(Reftel) Al-Rashid's proposal would have BIL members fill the
posts of PC chairman (currently held by Dawa) and deputy
governor (Future Iraq Assembly),but allow Wa'eli to remain
governor. (NOTE: At an Iftar hosted by the REO, Wa'eli agreed
to approach to al-Rashid, but al-Rashid was a no-show. End
Note.) Asked whether he thought Fadhila was sincere and whether
the parties could overcome the obstacles between them, al-Rashid
said "of course there are no obstacles at first; the dialogue
will reveal whether we can reach an agreement."


4. (C) Al-Rashid claimed that the BIL holds the upper hand in
the negotiations, saying metaphorically that the Governor was
adrift at sea, and the BIL was throwing him a line. Al-Rashid
said that if the Governor were recalcitrant the BIL would appeal
the court's ruling, and al-Rashid expressed confidence BIL would
succeed. Al-Rashid said that he and his colleagues had held
back much of their evidence against the Governor at the initial
proceeding "to avoid chaos in Basrah," but they are prepared to
introduce new evidence on appeal.


5. (C) The REO Director said that reaching an agreement would be
crucial to avoiding political disarray in Basrah in the lead up
to PIC. The Director stressed that failure to reach a
power-sharing agreement could undermine a successful transition
to PIC, lead to mutual recrimination among the parties, and
damage them all politically. The Director added that the
Baswari people would continue to suffer. He argued that
reaching an agreement would therefore be in everybody's

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interests. The Director suggested that the parties form a
"grand coalition" under which they could all see Basrah through
the PIC transition and then let the upcoming provincial
elections settle their disputes. Striking the pose of
statesman, al-Rashid said that the BIL was reaching out to the
Governor for the sake of Basrah, that healthy political parties
were key to democracy, and that sniping at each other was not
the way forward. Al-Rashid also noted (as has Governor Wa'eli)
that replacing the PC chairman and deputy governor would require
a vote in the Provincial Council to ratify any agreement reached
by the parties.

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SECURITY IN BASRAH GENERALLY IMPROVING; TRIBES MORE ENGAGED
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6. (C) Al-Rashid described Basrah as "a little more normal."
Al-Rashid said that he met with Iraqi Security Chief, General
Mohan Hafith Fahad, on October 15 and sensed the General's
"seriousness on security." As an example of Mohan's willingness
to confront local militias, al-Rashid recounted that, after
Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) gunmen recently took two armored vehicles
from the Iraq Security Forces (ISF),the General sent his forces
to retrieve the vehicles and dismissed the two officers that had
released them. Al-Rashid also said he believed the Iraqi Coast
Guard was doing a better job of patrolling the Shatt al-Arab
river.


7. (C) Al-Rashid noted that Basrah's tribes were eager to assume
a more active role in providing their own security. He said
that local tribal leaders visited him soon after the two recent
assassinations of the Muthanna and Diwaniya governors and
requested his assistance in creating neighborhood watch groups.
Al-Rashid was circumspect: while he welcomed the tribes'
interest in helping to improve Basrah's security, he insisted
that any such initiatives be incorporated into the official
security apparatus. Al-Rashid suggested as an alternative that
the tribes go to General Mohan and request that ISF or Iraqi
police be assigned to their respective areas. He is reluctant
to see independent, armed groups sprout up throughout Basrah, as
they could morph into militias, and further muddle the security
environment.


8. (C) COMMENT: Al-Rashid is a cagey, savvy politician, and he
appears confident that his BIL commands the high ground
vis-a-vis Governor Wa'eli and Fadhila, notwithstanding the
recent court ruling in the latter's favor. Al-Rashid and his
colleagues may therefore be unlikely to compromise significantly
on their demands for the Governor to share power. On the other
hand, buoyed by the ruling, Governor Wa'eli is unlikely to see
al-Rashid's proposal as a lifeline from a gracious competitor.
The REO will continue to implore all sides to act magnanimously
and make the necessary, difficult compromises for the parties to
reconcile politically. Their failure could have negative
ramifications not just for ordinary Basrawis, but for Iraq as
whole. Without an agreement to which all the local parties
assent, Basrah's political terrain will provide little traction
by year's end for PIC to take hold. And if a rocky transition
to PIC worsens Basrah's already tenuous security, Iraq's
economic heart and the primary source of the GOI's revenue could
deteriorate dramatically.
BONO