GEN MOHAN ON IRAN, ISF, AND PIC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000096

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL MOPS IR IZ
SUBJECT: GEN MOHAN ON IRAN, ISF, AND PIC

REF: BASRAH 89

BASRAH 00000096 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, Basrah Regional Embassy
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (S/REL AUS, CAN, UK) SUMMARY: In an October 7 meeting, Basrah
Security Chief General Mohan listed Iran as Basrah's central
problem, with unrestricted arms smuggling leaving militias too
powerful for him to confront directly now. As UK troops leave,
he described three areas in which the U.S. could help:
intelligence, job creation, and tactical support. A fourth
imperative was reforming the police force. Regarding move to
Iraqi control of Basrah province, Mohan said that some limited
police functions could be given to Governor Wa'eli, but that the
overall security portfolio needed to stay with him and the
central government - which should recognize Wa'eli as governor
for the sake of provincial stability. Mohan's objectives in the
next three months are to defeat militias and secure the borders
from Iranian arms smuggling. END SUMMARY.

IRAN AND LACK OF INTEL THE CENTRAL PROBLEMS
--------------

2. (S/REL AUS, CAN, UK) Mohan underlined that the Iranians are
the central problem in Basrah. He outlined three ways that the
U.S. could help improve security as the British role (as he
perceives it) in the future is diminished: intelligence,
reconstruction, and tactical support. First, the U.S. needs to
supply intelligence to the ISF, to deter Iran and counter the
Basrah government institutions infiltrated by Iranian agents.
Mohan said he has no intelligence assets to speak of, and no
formal intelligence department. He claimed to have developed
significant intelligence on his own, especially on border
smuggling, but it is insufficient. Coordination with British
intelligence services is insufficient. Mohan also lamented the
lack of U.S. intelligence assets to counter Iranian operatives.

JOBS NEEDED
--------------

3. (C/REL AUS, CAN, UK) Second, the city is still in dire need
of effective reconstruction, partly to provide services and
partly to create jobs. A number of factories, for example steel
and chemical, were built or renovated by the U.S. but are not in
operation. The young men who gravitate towards Badr Corps or
JAM seek jobs; they are not motivated by alignment with the
militia's goals. Mohan emphasized a high level of poverty and
starvation in Basrah that is making working men desperate. When
the REO director warned against the militias co-opting
industries, Mohan proposed the IA should be put in charge of
factories.

SUPPORT FOR ISF
--------------

4. (S/REL AUS, CAN, UK) Third, the Iraqi Army (and police) need
tactical support. He has asked the central government many
times for effective tools, but is told there are no funds. The
ISF needs vehicles, weapons and munitions. One battalion has no
AK-47s; another 250 soldiers likewise have no weapons. They are
facing militias armed by Iran (in addition to the arms smuggled
through Maysan and Basrah that go elsewhere in Iraq),and
trained by Iran (Reftel).


5. (S/REL AUS, CAN, UK) Neither the Ministry of the Interior
(MOI) nor Ministry of Defense (MOD) has been helpful, Mohan
claimed. The MOD did not send the armor and munitions that
Mohan requested; instead it sent BMP-1 tracked vehicles that are
not appropriate for operations in Basrah City. Mohan said he
had consistently asked for wheeled BTR 80s that are more agile
for urban operations. He noted that if he tried to use the BMPs
in the city JAM would "burn them." (Note: A recent Shaiba visit
by the U.S. MND-SE LNO demonstrated that apart from the
vulnerability of the slow, tracked BMPs to IEDs, the already old
vehicles are in poor condition. It was also noted that IA
troops lack proper training on the BMPs. End Note.)


6. (S/REL AUS, CAN, UK) Mohan said that his forces are weak, but
he boasts to militias that they are strong, claiming that he has
helicopters and effective armor. He admitted that the exchange
of two brigades with others elsewhere in Iraq was helpful as the
new ones were better. Mohan concluded that Police Chief MG Jalil
Khalaf Shueil was in Baghdad as we spoke asking once again for
effective resources to confront the militias.


7. (S/REL AUS, CAN, UK) The ISF are conducting some operations
against militias, Mohan asserted, but those operations are
insufficient and constrained by resources. He cited the lack of

BASRAH 00000096 002.2 OF 002


intelligence on arms smugglers and added that he lacks the force
strength to take them on. JAM leaders continue to brazenly ask
Mohan and Jalil for appointments to the police or army. Mohan
said that he could disarm any neighborhood, but due to the
Iranian smuggling problem the militias would quickly get
resupplied.

REORGANIZE THE POLICE
--------------

8. (S/REL AUS, CAN, UK) A fourth imperative Mohan stressed
concerned reorganizing the police. He emphasized that that the
police have failed to gain control of the city and province.
(Note: Both Mohan and Police Chief Jalil claim to be close
friends and security partners, and we assess that this is true.
However, Mohan does not shy away from criticizing the state of
the police and Jalil's tactics. End Note.) Mohan suggested that
the entire police force should be transferred to other
provinces. Of the 15,462 police in Basrah, "all are loyal to
political parties or militia." Jalil so far has received only
one National Police battalion from Baghdad and these 400-500
officers pale when compared with the number of disloyal police.
Still, there have been some positive security developments,
Mohan noted. Now no one can carry a weapon openly on the city
streets, and militias cannot get away with roadblocks.

PIC: KEEP CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF ISF
--------------

9. (C/REL AUS, CAN, UK) Mohan's recipe for PIC was to keep the
security portfolio with the central government but make a
progress towards provincial control. The police who perform
functions not related to street security - traffic police,
administrative staff, and some investigators -- could be
separated from his command and put under provincial (the
governor's) control.


10. (S/REL AUS, CAN, UK) For an effective transformation to PIC,
he noted the need to resolve the dispute over the governorship,
now that the court had decided in favor of Wa'eli. "How could
one hand over control of the province with an unstable governate
situation" he asked. He said Governor Wa'eli was his friend,
but the PM had instructed him to not speak or work with the
governor and emphasized that the PM would have to authorize him
to reengage Wa'eli. Mohan opined that the PM should make a
public statement that it was acceptable now for government
officials to deal with Wa'eli as the governor.


12. (S/REL AUS, CAN, UK) The Joint Operations Center (also
called Basrah Operations Center or BOC) should not be put under
the governor or PC (as PC Chairman Obadi told us in an October 6
Meeting). Even if the governor is given part of the security
portfolio, Mohan said it was imperative that the BOC commander
continue to receive his orders from Baghdad and retain command
of the border and facility protection forces. Is the Governor
Wa'eli ready to assume command of the security portfolio for the
city? Assuredly not, Mohan said. He said that Wa'eli never
intended to be governor when he was elected to the PC. Moreover
the governor has ties too strong to one party (as does Wa'eli's
main rival, Hasan al-Rashid of Badr.)

CONFRONTING MILITIAS
--------------

13. (S/REL AUS, CAN, UK) Mohan opined that if militias think the
ISF are strong, they will shy away from confrontation. While
individual political killings and attacks against high ranking
police officials continue, he thought that militias are unsure
if they have the strength to confront ISF in force. Mohan
described JAM as continuing to have separate elements that could
be exploited: the "good" JAM - the nationalists, the bad - tools
of Iran, and those who go back and forth.

OBJECTIVES: DISARM MILITIAS AND SECURE BORDERS
-------------- -

14. (S/REL AUS, CAN, UK) General Mohan's objectives for the next
three months are to disarm militias and secure the borders.
Realistically he noted that so long as the Fadhila party
controlled oil resources in Basrah, they would not contest
control of the province; otherwise they would fight the ISF.
Badr Corps he said would not openly confront his ISF but could
cause big problems. Mohan said that engaging with tribes to
provide security would not help in Basrah, and his ISF had
therefore stopped working with tribes. The tribes were not
reliable and would change sides depending on who paid them more;
he did think that tribes could be useful for gathering
intelligence on smuggling and militia activities. (Note: Mohan
is from the fairly powerful Al Furayja tribe, and he counts the
powerful Beni-Malik tribe as his friends. End Note.)
BONO