Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BASRAH92
2007-10-08 15:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

BADR LEADER EXPRESSES SECURITY CONCERNS IN BASRAH

Tags:  PTER PINR PINS PGOV PREL IR IZ 
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VZCZCXRO3736
RR RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0092 2811540
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 081540Z OCT 07
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0610
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0193
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDHP/DIA DHP-1 WASHINGTON DC
RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0644
C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000092 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/8/2017
TAGS: PTER PINR PINS PGOV PREL IR IZ
SUBJECT: BADR LEADER EXPRESSES SECURITY CONCERNS IN BASRAH

CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, Regional Embassy Office
- Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000092

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/8/2017
TAGS: PTER PINR PINS PGOV PREL IR IZ
SUBJECT: BADR LEADER EXPRESSES SECURITY CONCERNS IN BASRAH

CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, Regional Embassy Office
- Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)




1. (C) SUMMARY: Former Basrah Governor and Provincial Council
(PC) member Hasan al-Rashid (Badr) told REO Director October 4
that Basrah's security has worsened. Unfortunately, Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) have done little to respond, and he
accused Security Chief Lieutenant General Mohan Hafith Fahad of
caving into Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) threats. Force would be
required to restore order to Basrah. He also noted Badr's
security concerns as a result of JAM's August attacks on Islamic
Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) offices and the recent
assassinations of Badr governors in Qadisiyah and Muthanna,
which he attributed to JAM elements. Despite Badr's historical
ties with Iran, al-Rashid believes Tehran is supporting JAM
cells, even if the targets were ISCI/Badr. ISCI leader Abd al
Aziz al-Hakim has urged the Iranians to stop supporting JAM.
JAM needs to become a political or social organization, and Badr
was working with nationalist JAM groups to legitimize
themselves. End Summary.


2. (C) Hasan al-Rashid said that Basrah's security had taken a
turn for the worse recently. There were more than 120 killings
in September, including some prominent religious clerics.
Spectacular-type attacks, like the bombings of Sunni mosques and
a VBIED attack on a police station, were previously
unimaginable. Following a recent mosque bombing, the relatives
of the victims were kidnapped by JAM when the went to the
hospital for visits. Al-Rashid was personally aware of over 20
threats to Badr affiliates, mostly Grand Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani representatives.


3. (C) The response of the ISF, in his estimation, was lacking.
He explained that LTG Mohan arrested three JAM members for the
mosque bombing and initially refused to release them until JAM
attacked his headquarters. When the ISF captured a JAM vehicle
filled with mortar rounds, Mohan sent the find to Baghdad. Two
days later, JAM demanded the rounds be replaced and Mohan
reportedly complied. Al-Rashid opined that the use of force,
preferably by the police, would be required to restore order in
Basrah. Though not a perfect solution, it was necessary in
every other major province to gain control.


4. (C) He also said that Badr feels vulnerable after the August
confrontations between JAM and Badr in Karbala. JAM's attacks
on ISCI offices throughout the country resulted in several Badr
deaths and increased tensions. ISCI/Badr blamed the GOI for
ignoring or not investigating JAM's attacks, and not providing
protection to ISCI offices. He suggested that Iran was behind
the JAM assassinations of the Badr governors in Qadisiyah and
Muthanna. When asked why Iran would support such attacks given
Iran's historical ties to Badr, al-Rashid told us that Iran has
its own interests in Iraq and will do anything to achieve them.
The attacks against the governors, according to Badr, were
planned in Najaf and attributed to JAM Special Groups led by
Ahmed al-Shaibani.


5. (C) Al-Rashid said various JAM factions are being supported
by Iran and Saudi Arabia. He said he recently met with ISCI
Chairman Abd al Aziz al-Hakim in Iran, where they urged Iranian
officials to end their support for JAM. According to al-Rashid,
JAM was divided into three groups: the largest group follows
Muqtada al-Sadr and includes the Special Groups; those funded by
the Saudis; and the "Secret Army" supported by Iran. The best
thing for Iraq's stability would be for JAM to become a
political or civil society group. Badr, he said, could act as
an intermediary encouraging moderate JAM groups one by one
towards that end. He added that some JAM cells from the Sadr
group had already contacted Badr for assistance in this process.


6. (C) COMMENT: This is the most animated we have seen
al-Rashid, who is normally a very cool-headed interlocutor.
Badr and al-Rashid have traditionally relied on Iranian support
to maintain their powerbase, and it could be that this support
is waning in favor of JAM. This, coupled with the recent court
decision in favor of his arch-rival Governor Wa'eli (cable to
follow) could be causing him to probe the possibility of
stronger relations with the U.S. End Comment.

BONO